S320B

TOTAL ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM COURSEWARE

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

SUBCOURSE

320B/8

40
CREDIT HOURS

CENTER FOR ARMY TACTICS

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

Lesson number	Lesson Title	Credit hours	Scheduled completion date	Date mailed
1	The Role of the Corps			
2	Corps-Level Logistics			
3	Echelons Above Division Employment Doctrine			
4	Corps Planning Practical Exercise			
5	Examination			

Schedule your own program for this subcourse by filling in a target date for each lesson.

IMPORTANT!! Read and Post S320B/9

U. S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027

CORPS OPERATIONS
ERRATA TO COURSE BOOK

CHANGE ALL REFERENCE FROM ACADEMIC YEAR 98 TO ACADEMIC YEAR 99. THE COURSEWARE IS A REPRINT OF THE 98, PER THE COURSE POINT OF CONTACT AS REQUESTED.

23APRIL98/ BECKY ROGAN / COM 913-758-3366, DSN585-3366

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

PREFACE

The conduct of war is an extremely complicated endeavor requiring intensive preparation through study, education, and training. Successful combat operations result not by chance or coincidence but, rather, from the application of knowledge and skills coming from a thorough understanding of theory, concepts, and logic, S320B, *Fundamental of Echelons Above Division Combat Operations,* provides you with an understanding of tactical fundamentals, the principles of employment of the elements of the combined arms team, and the basic elements of the tactical decisionmaking process.

Tactics instruction in the Command and General Staff Officer Course contains two major educational parts: knowledge and skills. In your progress through the officer education system, you received new knowledge at all levels. Some of the material in this subcourse may be a refresher for you, or it may be new information requiring additional study. You will acquire new information in this subcourse because of the higher echelons being studied and the differing tactics, techniques, and procedures for planning and executing large-unit operations.

The skills required to master the art and science of war. for the most part, arc taught and reinforced throughout the officer education system beginning with precommissioning. These skills include decision making, critical and creative thinking, analysis and synthesis of information, writing and speaking, and more. You already possess these skills. During this subcourse, you will be enhancing, broadening, and refining them.

Fundamentals of Echelons Above Division Combat Operations builds on the instruction presented in Phases I, II, and III of the Command and General Staff Officer Course. S320B is the fundamental tactics subcourse in Phase IV. S320B examines the role of the US Army corps, corps-level logistics, and corps employment doctrine and concludes with the application of all the fundamental instruction in a major corps planning practical exercise. You will subsequently apply the knowledge and skills from S320B in S320C, *Corps Operations: Joint Force Projection,* in a Latin American scenario. Work hard to master the terminal and enabling learning objectives in S320B. S320C is an applications subcourse that will build on the knowledge and skills you gain in this subcourse.

This subcourse incorporates the latest interim doctrine on command and control and the tactical decision-making process as described in FM 101-5, *Command and Control Commanders and Staff* (Final Draft), August 1993. It is likely that portions of the doctrine will change based on comments from the field during final staffing. However, the basic concept of decisionmaking and the estimate of the situation should not change, Once the new manual is published, it will be your responsibility to determine the latest changes to the Army's command and control doctrine. Also incorporated is the latest evolution of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process from FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* Ju1 94.

CONTENTS

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

SCOPE

This course is designed to increase your understanding of echelons above division (EAD) organizations by examining US Army warfighting doctrine and its application in the planning and execution of EAD combat operations. It focuses on reinforcement of a forward presence in Europe, a developed theater, by planning and communicating tactical decisions for the employment of an in-theater multinational corps.

The course builds on previous tactics instruction and your understanding of how brigades and divisions fight and are sustained on the battlefield as part of a corps. During S310A, Combat Operations, you examined the tactical level of war through the study of US Army and US Air Force doctrine. The subcourse focused on Army operations doctrine; logistics; brigade and division combat operations, to include the command and control process; and air-ground and Army special operations, During S30OB, *Combat Operations*, you studied Soviet-style organizations and doctrine, the tactical decisionmaking process, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield. and you concluded by applying all previous instruction in a major brigade combat operations practical exercise. In S320A, *Reinforcing and Forward Deployed Operations*, you studied Soviet-style operational art, followed the development of a European scenario through the strategic and operational levels of war, planned the movement of an armored division and developed a tactical plan to employ a US division as part of a corps mobile defense.

In S320B, you have the opportunity to apply the knowledge and skills mastered in all previous Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) instruction, but particularly from S410. *Operational and Strategic Logistics*.

S320 is organized as follows:

Lesson number	Lesson title
1	The Role of the Corps
2	Corps-Level Logistics
3	Echelons Above Division Employment Doctrine
4	Corps Planning Practical Exercise
5	Examination

In lesson 1, you will examine the role of a US Army corps in Army operations doctrine, the corps as part of a larger ground force and corps force projection operations, and the corps battlefield operating systems.

Lesson 2 covers corps-level logistics and develops your understanding of the corps support command (COSCOM) and the missions, capabilities, and limitations of corps-level logistics organizations.

Lesson 3 examines echelons above division employment doctrine in a mature theater and explains how the corps plans and conducts offensive, defensive, and other tactical operations.

Lesson 4 is a corps practical exercise designed to develop your skill in each of the terminal learning objectives for this subcourse. You will refine your decisionmaking skills and increase your tactical proficiency by analyzing a tactical problem, assessing the status of a corps, developing and analyzing courses of action, and developing appropriate combat orders for corps combat operations in a European scenario.

Lesson 5. the examination, will measure how well you mastered the S320B learning objectives,

TERMINAL AND ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

S320B has three terminal learning objectives (TLOs). Each TLO has several enabling learning objectives (ELOs) that support achievement of one or more aspects of the performance standard for the associated TLO. The ELO task statements are included under each TLO so that you may see their relationship. Complete ELO task, condition, and standard statements are shown in the lesson guide in which they are accomplished.

A.00 TASK: Explain US Army doctrine for organizing and employing a corps

CONDITION: Given a written requirement. with references

STANDARD: Must explain US Army operations doctrine for organizing and employing a corps at the operational and tactical levels of war by defining the relationships of the structure of modem warfare; Army capabilities with joint and combined forces; the principles of war with the tenets and combat functions of Army operations doctrine; and the structure of the battlefield and general doctrine for offensive, defensive, and other combined arms operations IAW FM 100-5, FM 100-7, and FM 100-15,

Must explain how the US Air Force is integrated with US Army ground operations IAW FM 90-28, FM 100-103, FM 100-15, and Student Text 100-2.

Must explain doctrine for large unit operations and the elements of operational design IAW FM 100-5, FM 100-7. and FM 100-15.

Must describe corps combat operations doctrine, to include employing a corps as part of a larger ground force and corps force projection operations IAW FM 63-3 and FM 100-15

LEVEL: Comprehension

PJE PHASE 1 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVES: la: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

1b: Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.

1d: Summarize how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.

le. Comprehend how the US military is organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint and multinational operations.

2a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.

2c. Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.

A..10 TASK: Summarize US Army warfighting doctrine as it applies to corps-level operations.

A.20 TASK: Explain how corps conduct combined arms operations

A.30 TASK: Explain how echelons above corps (EAC) organizations support corps operations

A.40 TASK: Explain how corps are tailored for a theater and mission

B.00 TASK: Plan logistical support of combined arms operations at the corps level

CONDITION: As a staff officer, given a tactical scenario; higher headquarters plans and commanders' intent; a concept of the operation; data bases for consumption rates; friendly unit logistical status, locations, and movements; and a written requirement, with references.

STANDARD: The plan must be logistically feasible, correctly apply doctrine and tactics, and be justifiable through persuasive presentation of logic and reasoning applied in appropriate staff estimate and decision-making processes asdescribed in FM 63-3, FM 100-5. FM 100-15. FM 101-5 (FD), and Student Text 101-5.

The plan must include integration of direct and general support units management centers; and command and control headquarters involved in the tactical logistics functions of manning. arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems IAW FM 63-3, FM 100-5, FM 100-15, and Student Text 101-6.

LEVEL: Synthesis

PJE PHASE 1 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVE: la: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

Id. Summarize how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.

B.10 TASK: Explain how the tactical logistics functions (manning, arming. fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems) support corps operations in an established theater.

B.20 TASK: Organize a corps support command (COSCOM) to support combat operations.

C.00 TASK: Plan combined arms operations at the corps level

CONDITION: Given a written requirement, a tactical situation with maps and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products. a higher headquarters operation order (OPORD) or operation plan (OPLAN) and intelligence estimate. higher commanders' intent, and commander's restated mission and planning guidance, with references.

STANDARD: The plan will be tactically feasible and logistically supportable IAW FM 63-3. FM 100-5, and FM 100-15; will correctly apply doctrine and tactics; and be justifiable through persuasive presentation of logic and reasoning applied in staff estimates and decision-making processes as described in FM 101-5 (FD), Student Text 101-5, Student Text 101-6. and student issue materials.

LEVEL: Synthesis

PJE PHASE 1 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVE: 1a: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

1b: Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces arc employed.

lc. Explain the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the NCA, NSC, CJCS, combatant commanders, Service chiefs and Joint Forces Commanders (JFCs).

2a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.

2c. Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.

C.10 TASK: Apply the tactical decision-making process.

C.20 TASK: Prepare combat orders.

PROGRAM FOR JOINT EDUCATION (PJE)

It is important for you to recognize both the distinctiveness and interdependence of joint and service schools in the education of officers in joint matters. Joint schools provide joint education from a joint perspective. Service schools provide joint education from a service perspective. The Command and General Staff Officer Course provides you with a service perspective education.

Instruction in S320B complements joint instruction provided thus far in the course. S320B focuses at the corps level and provides a service perspective of the tactical level of war. In addition, you will see the integration of the sister services at the tactical level of war.

S320B provides primary instruction for the following PJE learning objective:

Task lb: Know how current doctrine (joint, combined, and service) affects the other services in joint and combined operations at both the tactical and operational levels of war.

S320B supports the following PJE learning objectives:

Task la: Know how the roles, functions, capabilities, and limitations of US military forces (air, land, sea. space, and special operations) affect joint and combined operations.

Task 1c: Know selected definitions and basic concepts used in studying the operational level of war

COURSE PREREQUISITES

To succeed in S320B, you must have the prerequisite knowledge from and have successfully mastered the skills and learning objectives from S310A, S310B, S320A, and S410.

ISSUE MATERIALS

This course book contains the lesson guides, lesson assignments, and practical exercises needed for S320B. You can find required maps and overlays in your box of Phase IV materials. You also received the M/S320B Staff Planning Book. The staff planning book contains the general situation, information on threat and friendly forces, higher headquarters' plans and orders, and other staff planning documents. Retain this course book, your notes, and all other issue materials for use in the follow-on tactics subcourse.

A listing of supporting references used to develop this subcourse is at appendix 1

A glossary containing many of the acronyms and brevities used in the subcourse is at appendix 2. Tab or mark appendix 2 for ready reference later in the subcourse.

ST 100-3, *Battle Book,* has been included with your courseware This reference provides information on US organizations, capabilities, and a variety of other subjects. If you are rusty or have been away from the Army for a while, review the fundamentals book as necessary.

S320B uses Student Text (ST) 101-5, *Command and Staff Decision Processes,* as a major reference. During the development of this course, FM 101-5 and FM 34-130 became the doctrinal basis for the tactical decision-making and intelligence preparation of the battlefield processes. Extracts of this evolutionary doctrine have been incorporated as major parts of ST 101-5.

USE OF THE LESSON GUIDES

The lesson guides were designed and written to help you complete this subcourse. They provide instruction about the learning objectives, list the study assignments and readings, and provide you a "road map" for each lesson. Your successful completion of the subcourse requires that you read subcourse materials as directed by the lesson guides and follow the instructions therein. Lacking classmates and an instructor with whom to engage in meaningful, insightful discussion, you must complete lesson assignments by properly using the lesson guides.

Practical exercises and other requirements will require you to use and apply the knowledge and skills you gain from your coursework. You will be required to perform a multitude of activities ranging from task organizing corps support groups and projecting logistics status to executing steps in the tactical decisionmaking and intelligence preparation of the battlefield processes to war gaming proposed combat operations. These exercises require the same kind of work you will do on the subcourse examination or in an actual work situation. To perform well on the examination, it is best for you to complete all these practical exercises and requirements.

You will most often be assigned a role as a specific staff officer or as a battlc staff officer in a specific staff section in your practical exercises. Read the special situation that describes your role, ongoing staff and unit actions, and the general requirement. After reading the special situation, stop and reflect on the overall content, your role and inherent responsibilities, and what is required. Put on the appropriate staff officer's hat, and then read the specific requirement, looking at it through the staff officer's eyes. Complete your analysis of the staff officer's requirement, and then begin work.

In some cases, you will receive preliminary instructions on activities that you must complete before starting a practical exercise. As an example, you'll have instructions on assembling individual map sheets, transferring graphics and symbols to overlays, and posting overlays. Be sure to complete these activities before beginning the practical exercise.

EVALUATION

1. GENERAL

CGSC Circular 351-3, *School o/Corresponding Studies Nonresident Catalog,* outlines college guidelines for the evaluation of student academic performance. There is no intent to repeat those guidelines here but only to specify how those policies are implemented in this sub course. If you need to refresh your memory on the contents of CGSC Circular 351-3, do so now.

2. GRADES

a. General. You will receive one grade for S320B. The letter grade will indicate how well you mastered the learning objectives.

b. Grades

(1) You will receive grades according to the following point scale:

Points	Grade	Description
90 to 100	A	You have exceeded the subcourse goal.
80 to 89	B	You have met the subcourse goal.
70 to 79	C	You have marginally met the subcourse goal.
Less than 70	U	You have not met the subcourse goal.

(2) These points are determined by your performance on the examination. The exam contains multiple-choice and multiple response questions and is 100 percent of your grade for S314.

c. Subcoursc examination. You will take the examination at the end of the subcourse. It will cover all the material presented in the subcourse. to include your assigned readings and lesson guides You must complete the assigned readings Some exam questions will only be covered in the assigned readings. Do not assume that all exam questions will be covered in the lesson guides. Many, of the exam questions will be situational-type questions and will require you to apply, the skills and knowledge you gained during the course.

SUBCOURSE ASSISTANCE

Address all question reqarding administration and grades to:

COMMANDANT, US4CGSC
ATTN. ATZL-SWE-R
DIRECTOR NONRESIDENT STUDIES
FORT LEAVENWORTH. KS 66027-6940

Refer to the CGSC catalog for telephone numbers of your counselor.

Address all questions concerning lesson content or material to

COMMANDANT, USACGSC
ATTN. ATZL-SWT
CENTER FOR ARMY- TACTICS
FORT LEAVEN\WORTH, KS 66057-6900

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FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Appendix 1 to Course Introduction. References

The following references were used in the development of this subcourse. You will not receive all of these references with your courseware; they arc not necessary for your successful completion of the subcourse. This list is provided so that you will know what references to consult should you want additional information in a particular subject area.

FM 3-100	*Chemical Operation: Principles and fundamentals, 8 May 9600*
FM 5-100	*Engineer Operations, 27 Feb 96*
FM 6-20-30	*Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations, 18 Oct. 18 Oct 89*
FM 12-6	*Personnel Doctrine, 9 Sep 94*
FM 14-6	*Resource Management Operations, 94*
FM 17-95	*Calvary Operations, 24 Dec 90*
FM 34-1	*Intelligence and Electronic, Warfare Operations. 2 Sep 94*
FM 34-2	*Collectron Management, 8 Mar 94*
FM 34-25	*Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, Sep 87*
FM 34-25-3	*All-Source Analysis System and the Analysis and Control Element, 3 Oct 95*
FM 34-130	*Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Jul 94*
FM 55-10	*Movement Control in a Theater of Operations, 8 Dec 92*
FM 63-2	*Division Support Command, Armored, Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Divisions, 20 May 1991*
FM 63-3	*Corps Support Command, 30 Sep 1993*
FM 63-20	*Forward Support Battalion, 26 Feb 1990*
FM 63-21	*Main Support Battalion, 7 Aug 1990*
FM 71-3	*Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Jan 90*
FM 71-100	*Division Operations, 28 Aug 96*
FM 90-2	*Battlefield Deception, 3 Oct 1988*
FM 90-21	*JAAT: Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations, 16 Oct 1991*
FM 90-28/TACP 50-45/ USAFEP 50-45/PACAFP 50-45	*Tactical Air Planning and Employment in Support of Ground Operations (Final Draft), 30 Sep 1991*
FM 100-5	*Operations, 14 Jun 1993*

FM 100-7	*Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations,* May 95
FM 100-10	*Combat Service Support,* 3 Oct 95
FM 100-15	*Corps Operations,* 26 Oct 96
FM 100-25	*Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* Dec 91
FM 100-103	*Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone,* 7 Oct 87
FM 101-5	*Staff Organization and Operations (Final Draft),* Aug 1996
FM 101-5-1	*Operational Terms and Symbols, 21* Oct 1985
FM 101-10-1, Vol 1	*Staff Officers Field Manual: Organizational. Technical, and Logistical Data (Volume 1),* Oct 1987
FM 101-10-1, Vol 2	*Staff Officers' Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors,* Oct 1987
ST 3-1	*Fundamentals of NBC Operations, 3 July 1989, with change,* 2 Mar 1992
ST 22-2	*Writing and Speaking Skills Senior Leaders,* Apr 1991
ST 30-1	*Selected Readings in Soviet Operational Art,* Jun 1990
ST 63-1	*Division and Corps Logistics.* 1 Jul 96
ST 100-3	*Battle Book,* 1 Jun 96
ST 100-7	*OPFOR Battle Book,* Aug 96
ST 101-1	*Command and Staff Decision Processes,* Feb 96
ST 101-6	*G1/G3 Battle Book,* Jul 96

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Appendix 2 to Course Introduction. Glossary

A	ambiguity [deception]
A^2C^2	Army airspace command and control
AA	avenue of approach; assembly area
AAA	antiaircraft artillery
AAG	army artillery group; alleid army group
AAR	after-action review
AASLT	air assault
AB	airbase
ACA	airspace coordination area; airspace control authority
ACC	air component commander
accting	accounting
ACE	Allied Command, Europe; analysis and control element
acft	aircraft
ACofS	assistant chief of staff
acq	acquisition
ACR	armored cavalry regiment
ACS	armored cavalry squadron
AD	air defense
ADA	air defense artillery
ADGE	air dcfensc ground environment
ADOLT	air defense operations liaison team
adrp	airdrop
ADT	active duty for training
AE	aeriel exploitation
AFCENT	Allied Forces. Central Europe
AFNORTH	AlliedForces. Northern Europe
AFNORTHWEST	Allied Forces, Northwest Europe
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces. Southern Europe
AG	adjutant general
AI	air interdiction
AIRCENT	Air Forces, Central Europe
ALO	air liaison officer
ALOC	air lines of communication
amb	ambulance
ammo	ammunition
ANGLICO	air and naval gunfire liaison compan)
anx	annex
AO	area of operations
AOC	air operations center
AOCC	air operations coordination center
AOR	area of responsibility
APC	armored personnel carrier

APFSDS	armor-piercing. fin-stabilized, discarding sabot
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
ARFOR	Army forces
armd	armored
ARRC	Allied Command. Europe. Rapid Reaction Corps
ARSOA	Army special operations aviation
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
arty	artillery
ASCC	Army science component command
ASIC	all-source intelligence center
ASL	authorized stockage list
aslt	assault
ASMB	area support medical battalion
ASOC	air support operations center
ASP	ammunition supply point
ASPS	all-source production section
AT	antitank; annual training
ATACMS	Army tactical missile system
ATCCS	Army Tactical Command and Control System
atk	attack
ATMCT	air terminal movement control team
ATO	air tasking order
ATP	ammunition transfer point: allied tactical publication
ATS	air traffic service
AVIM	avtation intermediate maintenance
AVLB	armored vechicle launched bridge
avn	aviation
AVUM	aviation unit maintenance
4WACS	airborne warning and control system
BAI	battlefield air interdiction
BALTAP	Baltic Approaches
BCE	battlefield coordination clement
bdc	brigade
BE	Belguim
BFV	Bradley fighting vehicle
BHL	battle handover line
BMCT	beginning morning civil twilight
BMNT	beginning morning nautical twilight
bmr	bomber
bn	battalion
BOS	battlefield operating systems
brg	bridge
BSA	brigade support area
BSFV	Bradley Stinger fighting vehicle
btl,	battery
C	Celsius
C&J	collection and jamming

C^2	command and control
C^2W	command and control warfare
C^3	command, control, and communications
C^3CM	command, control, and communications countermeasures
CA	civil affairs; counterair
CAA	combined arms army
CAC	command aviation company
CAOC	combined air operations center
CAS	close air support
CAV	cavalry
cbt	combat
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CCL	combat-configured load
Cdn	Canadian
Cdr	commander
CEB	clothing exchange and bath
CF	covering force
CFA	covering force area
CFE	Conventional Forces, Europe
CFL	coordinated fire line
cgo	cargo
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Officer Course
Chap	Chaparral
CHOP	change of operational control
Cl	counterintelligence
CINC	commander in chief
CINCENT	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
cl	class
CLGP	cannon-launched guided projectile
CM&D	collectton management and dissemination
CMBG	Canadian mechanized brigade group
CMCC	corps movement control center
cmd	command
cml	chemical
CMMC	corps matertel management center
CMO	civil-military operations
cntnr	container
co	company
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command
COFM	correlation of forces and means
COB	chief of staff
coll	collection
COMAAG	commander, allied army group
COMAIRCENT	Commander, Air Forces, Central Europe
COMLANDCENT	Commander, Land Forces, Central Europe
COMMZ	communications zone

COMSEC	communications security
CONUS	continental United States
convl	conventional
COP	contingency operation plan
COSCOM	corps support command
CP	command post
CPMC	corps personnel management center
CRP	combat reconnaissance patrol
CS	combat support
CSA	corps storage area
CSB	corps support battalion
CSC	combat stress company, combat support company
CSG	corps support group
CSH	combat support hospital
CSR	controlled supply rate
CSS	combat service support
CTOC	corps tactical operations center
CL	combat zone
D^3	decide, detect. and deliver
DA	Department of the Army
DAG	division artillery group
DASB	division aviation support battalion
DCA	defensive counterair
DCG	deputy commanding geral
DCOMLANDCENT	Deputy Commander Land Forces. Central Europe
DDMP	deliberate decision-makeing procedures
decon	decontamination
dent	dental
det	detachment
DISCOM	division support command
div	division
DIVARTY	division artillery
DIVEN	division engineers
DMMC	division materiel management center
DOD	Department of Defense
DODIC	Department of Defense identification code
DP	decision point
DPICM	dual-purpose. Improved conventional munitions
DS	direct support
DSA	division support area
DSM	direct support maintenance
DST	decision support template
DSU	direct support unit
EA	engagement area
EAC	echelons above corps
EAD	echelons above division
ECM	electronic countermeasures

EECT	ending evening civil twlight
EEFI	essential elements of friendly information
EENT	ending evening nautical twilight
ELO	enabling learning objective
engr	engineer
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
equip	equipment
est	estimate
evac	evacuation
EW	electronic warfare
F	Fahrenheit
FA	field artillery functional area
FAA	forward assembly area
FAD	final approved draft
FARP	forward arming and refueling point
fax	facsimile
FB	finance battalion; fundamentals book
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FD	forward detachment: final draft; finance detachment
FEBA	forward edge of the battle area
FFIR	friendly, forces information requirements
FG	finance group
fig	figure
fin	finance
fld	field
FLOT	forward line of own troops
fltbrg	floatbridge
FM	frequency modulation; field manual
FORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
FRAGO	fragmentary order
FS	fire support
FSB	forward support battalion
FSCL	fire support coordination line
FSCOORD	fire support coordinator
FSE	forward security clement: fire support element
FSO	fire support officer
FST	finance support team
ftr	tighter
fwd	forward
FY	fiscal year
gd	guard
GDP	general defense plan
GE	Germany
genr	generator
GM	guided missile
GMRD	guards motorized rifle division

GMRR	guards motorized rifle regiment
gnd	ground
GP	general purpose
gP	group
GRREG	graves registration
GS	general support
GSU	general support unit
GTA	guards tank army
GTD	guards tank division
GTR	guards tank regiment
HCF	High Command of Forces
hel	helicopter
HET	heavy equipment transporter
HF	high frequency
HHB	headquarters and headquarters battery
HHC	headquarters and headquarters company
HHD	headquarters and headquarters detachment
HHT	headquarters and headquarters troop
HIDACZ	high-density airspace control zone
HIMAD	high-to-medium air defense
his	history
hldg	holding
HN	host nation
how	howitzer
HPT	high-payoff target
HQ	headquarters
HSS	health service support
HUMMT	human intelligence
hv	heavy
IAW	m accordance with
IEW	intelligence and electronic warfare
IFV	Infantry, fighting vehicle
IGB	inner-German border
IMRR	Independent motorized rifle regiment
indep	independent
info	information
intel	intelligence
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR	information requirement
J-SEAD	joint suppression of enemy air defenses
J-STARS	joint surveillance and target attack radar system
JAAT	joint air attack team
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JOA	joint operations area

JOG	joint operations graphic
JPI	joint-precision interdiction
JRA	joint rear area
JSOA	joint special operations area
JTF	joint task force
JZ	joint zone
km	kilometer
LANDCENT	Land Forces, Central Europe
LCC	land component commander
lchr	launcher
LD	line of departure
LD/LC	line of departure is line of contact
LOC	line of communication
log	logistics
LP/C	launcher pod/container
LRC	Logistics Readiness Center
LRS	long-range surveillance
LRSC	long-range surveillance company
LRSD	long-range surveillance detachment
LRSU	long-range surveillance unit
LSA	logistic support area
lt	light
m	meter
M	misdirection [deception]
MA	mortuary affairs
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
maint	maintenance
MASF	mobile aeromedical staging facility
MASH	mobile army surgical hospital
mat	material; materiel
MBA	main battle area
MBT	main battle tank
MCC	movement control center
MCO	movement control officer
MCT	movement control team
mdm	medium
mech	mechanized
med	medical
METT-T	mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available
mgt	management
MHE	materiel handling equipment
MI	military intelligence
mil	military
MLRS	multiple-launch rocket system
MMC	materiel management center
MOADS	maneuver-oriented ammunition distribution system

MOD	mobile obstacle detachment
MOPP	mission-oriented protective posture
mort	mortar
MP	military police
MR	motorized rifle
MRB	motorized rifle battalion
MRD	motorized rifle division
MRE	meal. ready to eat
MRL	multiple rocket launcher
MRR	motorized rifle regiment
MRT	movement regulating team
MSB	main support battalion
MSC	major subordinate command
MSE	mobile subscriber equipment
msl	missile
msn	mission
MSR	main supply route
MST	maintenance support team
MTT	mobile training team
mtz	motorized
MWR	morale, welfare, and recreation
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NADS	NATO Augmented Defense System
NAI	named area of interest
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear. biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authority
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NFA	no-fire area
NL	Netherlands
NLT	not later than
OAS	offensive air support
OB	order of battle
obj	objective
OCA	offensive counterair
OCOKA	observation and fields of fire. cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain. and avenues of approach and mobility corridors
OIC	officer in charge
OMG	operational maneuver group
OO	on order
op	operation
OPCOM	operational command
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
opnl	operational
OPORD	operation order
ops	operations
OPSEC	operations security

ord	ordnance
p^2	procedural and positive
PA	public affairs
PACOM	Pacific Command
PASR	personnel accounting and strength reporting
PCH	press camp headquarters
PE	practical exercise
PERINTSUM	periodic intelligence summary
pers	personnel
PERSCOM	personnel command
petrl	petroleum
PG	personnel group
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
PJE	Program for Joint Education
PL	phase line
PLL	prescribed load list
PLS	palletized load system
Plt	platoon
PM	preventive medicine
POL	petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POMCUS	pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets
prot	protection
prov	provisional
PSB	personnel services battalion
PSYOP	psychological operations
PT	programmed test
Pts	points
purif	purification
PzGren	Panzer Grenadier
QM	quartermaster
RAAMS	remote antiarmor mine system
radl	radiological
RADREL	radio relay
RAG	regimental artillery group
RAOC	rear area operations center
RAP	rocket-assisted projectile
RAS	regimental aviation squadron
rdo	radio
rdotech	radio technical
REC	radioelectronic combat
recon	reconnaissance
regt	regiment
rep	repair; representative
repl	replacement
res	reserve
RFA	restrictive fire area

RFL	restrictive fire line
RHHT	regimental headquarters and headquarters troop
RIPL	reconnaissance and interdiction planning line
rkt	rocket
ROE	rules of engagement
ROM	refuel on the move
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
R R P	rapid reinforcement plan
RSA	regimental support area
RSR	required supply rate
RSTA	reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
RTF	regeneration task force
RV	reconnaissance vehicle
ry	railway
S&P	stake and platform
S&S	supply and service
S&T	supply and transport
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SALUTE	size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment
salv	salvage
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SAR	search and rescue
SEAD	suppression of enemy air defenses
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SEMA	special electronic mission aircraft
Sep	separate
SF	special forces
SFC	sergeant first class
SGI	small-group instruction
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SHORAD	short-range air defense
sig	signal
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SITREP	situation report
SLAR	side-looking airborne radar
SLCR	shower, laundry, and clothing repair
SLOC	sea line of communication
SOCCE	special operations command and control element
SOF	special operations forces
SOI	signal operation instructions
SOP	standing operating procedure
SP	self-propelled
SPB	staff planning book
spt	support
spting	supporting
sqdh	squadron
SR	special reconnaissance
SSM	surface-to-surface missile

SST	system support team
ST	student text
STANAG	standardization agreement
sup	supply
Survl	surveillance
svc	sevice
SWO	staff weather officer
TA	terrain analysis; tank army; theater army
TAA	tactical assembly area
TAACOM	theater army area command
tac	tactical
TAC	tactical [command post]
TACAIR	tactical air
TACOM	tactical command
TACON	tactical control
TACP	tactical air control party
TACSAT	tactical satellite
TAF	tactical air force
TAI	target area of interest
TAMCA	theater army movement control agency
TAR	tactical air reconnaissance
TASOSC	theater army special operations support command
TB	tank battalion
TBD	to be determined
TBP	to be published
TC	tank company
TCAE	technical control and analysis element
TCF	tactical combat force
TCP	traffic control party
TD	tank division
TDM	tactical decision making
TE	tactical exploitation
TENCAP	Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program
TF	task force
tgt	target
TLO	terminal learning objective
tm	team
TMT	transportation motor transport
TO	theater of operations
TOC	tactical operations center
TOE	table of organization and equipment
topo	topographical
TOW	tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile
TR	tank regiment
trans	transport; transportation
trf	traffic
trk	truck
trp	troop

TSA	theater storage area
TSOP	tactical standing operating procedure
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
TVD	theater of military operations
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UI	unidentified
USACGSC	US Army Command and General Staff College
USAF	US Air Force
USAFE	US Air Forces, Europe
USAREUR	US Army, Europe
USARF	US Army Reserve Forces
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
USMC	US Marine Corps
USSPACECOM	US Space Command
UW	unconventional warfare
veh	vehicle
vet	veterinary,
VGK	Supreme High Command
VGT	viewgraph transparency
VHF	very high frequency
vic	vicinity
whl	wheeled
WO	warning order
W0	without
WOC	wiring operations center
XO	executive officer
xplt	exploitation

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 1. The Role of the Corps

SCOPE

This lesson is designed to increase your understanding of the role of the corps. Your focus will be on the role of a US Army corps in Army operations doctrine. The instruction begins with an examination of key concepts of the corps' role as part of a larger ground force and in corps contingency operations. Following this. you will address sister service contributions to corps operations and corps combat functions. The lesson concludes with an examination of the corps in force-projection operations.

LEARNING OBJECTIVE

A.10 TASK: Summarize US Army warfighting doctrine as it applies to corps-level operations

CONDITION, Given a written requirement, with references

STANDARD: Will explain Army, operations doctrine, with a primary focus on warfighting, by defining the structure of modern warfare; the principles of war and tenets operations: the dynamics of combat power; the seven combat functions; and the general doctrine for offensive, defensive, and other tactical operations as outlined in FM 100-5 and FM 100-15.

Will explain warfare at the operational level; summarize its underlying design concepts and the relationship between campaign planning and tactical planning: and relate theater-level operating functions to the tactical-level battlefield operating systems according to JCS Pub 3-0, FM 100-5, FM 100-7, and FM 100-15.

Will explain the tactical logistics functions in support of tactical-level and operational-level offensive. defensive, and other operations IAW FM 63-3 and FM 100-5.

LEVEL: Comprehension

PJE PHASE 1 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVES. la: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

lb. Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces arc employed.

le. Comprehend how the US military is organized to plan. execute, sustain and train for joint and multinational operations

2a. comprehend current Joint doctrine.

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use the lesson guide to assist you in achieving the lesson learning objectives. Follow the instructions in the lesson guide and read the materials listed at the suggested time When you complete a reading, return to the appropriate place in the lesson guide and continue to follow the instructions. If the lesson guide requests that you write a response to a question or complete a practical exercise, you should do so for the learning value.

REFERENCES:

a. FM 100-15, *Corps Operations,* chapters 1, 2, and 4 through 8 and appendices.

b. FM 100-5, *Operation,* chapter 3.

c. ST 100-3. Battle Book, chapter 1 and pages 2-1 through 2-14.

LESSON GUIDE

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to your first combat operations subcourse in Phase IV of the Command and General Staff Officer Course. This is your corps operations fundamentals course. S320B will develop your competence in planning basic corps-level tactical operations.

The complex and dynamic nature of the battlefield demands that leaders at all levels gain and maintain tactical competence. For leaders and commanders, this entails firm knowledge and understanding of the employment of units and organizations to achieve success on the battlefield.

This lesson focuses on Army operations doctrine, the role of the corps, and how the corps operates within the context of Army operations doctrine. The corps is unique in our doctrine; it is the echelon of command that can operate at the operational and tactical levels of war simultaneously. This lesson will require you to recall your previous instruction on Army operations doctrine and your instruction on joint and sister service capabilities.

THE CORPS

Corps originated during the European wars that followed the French Revolution in the late 1700s and early 1800s. The speed, versatility, and agility gained when Napoleon grouped his divisions into corps changed the nature of land warfare. Napoleon's concept was "march separately, strike together." This concept forced other nations to adopt similar organizations. Corps have been used in US Army operations since the Civil War, and they have placed major roles in 20th-century wars involving US forces. The modem day corps is not like the corps of the past During World War II, the corps was simply a tactical headquarters, and a field army provided the necessary administrative and logistical support for subordinate divisions. Today's corps is no longer simply a tactical headquarters It now provides administrative and logistical support for its subordinate units and synchronizes combat power at the decisive time and place on the battlefield. Today's corps contain all the combat. combat support. and combat service support capabilities required to sustain operations for extended periods.

Take a look now at the corps itself and its role in Army operations doctrine.

Read FM 100-15, *Corps Operations,* chapters 1 through 3. Although not required, you may want to quickly review FM 100-5, Chapter 2, Fundamentals of Army Operations, and Chapter 6, Planning and Executing Operations, especially if you have not looked at FM 100-S in a while. You read these two chapters in a previous tactics subcourse and should be familiar with their contents.

What is a corps ?

Corps are the largest tactical units in the US Army and are the instruments by which higher echelons of

command conduct maneuver at the operational level. A corps is typically composed of two to five divisions and other required combat, combat support, and combat service support assets necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. The corps commander is normally a three star lieutenant general. The US Army tailors corps for the theaters and missions for which they are deployed. Because they are tailored units. units *there is no standard organizational structure for a corps.* Keep this point in mind during your Phase IV instruction. A corps headquarters can operate as part of a layer ground force, be the JTF HQ, or be the JFLCC HQ. Corps are the link between the operational and tactical levels of war. They plan and conduct major operations and battles and synchronize tactical activities including maneuver, artiliery. fires, naval fires, supporting tactical air, and actions of combat support and combat service support units to bring together the effects of these separate activities at the decisive time and place on the battlefield.

As stated above, the corps is a link between the operational and tactical levels of war. Put these terms into context. From your readings and previous courses, you know there are three levels of war: strategic, operational. and tactical. Strategy involves the art and science of employing armed forces and other instruments of national power to secure strategic goals. The National Command Authority and the Chairman. Joint Chiefs of staff, translate strategy into military policy and requirements which become the starting point for developing campaign plans. The campaign plan sets theater strategic goals and becomes the basis for operational-level planning. The operational level is the vital link between national- and theater-strategic aims and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield. The focus at the operational level is on conducting joint operations-the employment of military forces to attain theater-strategic and operational objectives through this design, organization. and execution of subordinate campaigns and major operations. Remember, the intended purpose of the operation. not the level of command, determines whether an Army unit functions at the operational level. At the tactical level of war, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish assigned military objectives. These victories, put together, achieve operational results. Your past tactics courses focused on the tactical level of war and the tactics or battlefield problem solving used by brigades and divisions.

The corps is the central point on the battlefield for the synchronization of combat power to achieve tactical and operational success over the enemy. What are some of the key roles or tasks corps perform to synchronize combat power?

Corps-

- Plan and conduct operations in consonance with other elements of the joint force to achieve campaign objectives.

- Integrate available Air Force, Nary, and Marine combat. combat support, and combat service support into tactical operations. This includes joint efforts in intelligence, target acquisition, target attack. electronic warfare. suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). and combat service support

- Collect intelligence, anticipate enemy activities and intentions, and plan at least 72 hours into the future.

- Plan and conduct deep and rear operations to support close operations

- Plan the employment of nuclear weapons to support campaign objectives.

- Plan and conduct effective deception operations to support deception plans of higher echelons.

Spend a few minutes thinking about each of the above in the contest of synchronization of combat power to achieve tactical and operational success. What was XVIII Airborne Corps' role in Operation JUST CAUSE in

Panama? What were the roles of XVIII Airborne and VII Corps in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM'? What were the end results of each of these operations?

Corps as Part of a Larger Ground Force

The corps may be located in or deployed to a theater to fight as a component of a larger ground force. This situation occurs when a significant military threat exists in a specific geographic region or because of treaty obligations. Corps operating under the control of higher echelons will have few, if any, operational-level responsibilities. Operational-level planning will generally be done at echelons above corps (EAC). Corps translate these plans into tactical execution.

Corps as Joint Task Force Headquarters

A joint task force is composed of Army, Navy, Marine corps. and Air Force assigned or attached elements or two or more of these services. The corps as a JTF can conduct either tactical or operational level force operations. The mission, not the six of the force. determines at which level the JTF functions. When the focus is on conducting joint operations to attain theater strategic objectives, the JTF serves as an operational headquarters. However the commander must fully understand both the tactical and operational-level environments to ensure a supportive relationships exists between his plans and operations and those of subordinate and higher headquarters.

Corps as the ARFOR of JFLCC Headquarters

One option for organizing a JTF and exercising OPCON is by creating service component commands. As the name implies, a JTF-level services component command generally consists of forces from only one service that are assigned or attached to a JTF. When a corps is placed under OPCON to a JTF, the Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) may designate the corps as the ARFOR headquarters, giving it Title 10 responsibilities, and, in most case. OPCON of a number of assigned or attached forces.

When designated as the Commander, ARFOR (COMARFOR) or JFLCC, the corps has the following additional responsibilities, coordinating with other JTF-level component or functional commands; coordinating with the service components component command headquarters of the JTF establishing authority for administrative and logistic support: planning and conducting operations in compliance with CJTF guidance and detailed plans: and providing liaison personnel to CJTF, other component commanders, and supporting commanders. as necessary or as directed by the CJTF.

Corps are uniquely suited to be the ARFOR or JFLCC headquarters in a JTF. They are optimized for executing the battle command functions that the higher headquarters of ground maneuver forces requires.

Earlier, your read that corps are the instruments by which higher echelons of command conduct maneuver at the operational level and serve as the link between the operational and tactical levels of war. What are some of the differences between tactical and operational operations conducted y a corps?

Operational

At the operational level, the corps can have major additional joint functions and responsibilities. Some of these may include operational (campaign) planning responsibilities and joint task force command Additionally, the corps must be prepared to conduct force projection operations. Force projection operation characteristics and strategic guidance affect the way that force projection operations are conducted. In these operations, the corps must be prepared to-

- Task organize or tailor a force quickly for rapid deployment and/or combat and deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict. Realize also that corps deployed for force projection operations are often organized with light or mixed (heavy-light) maneuver forces.

- Plan for simultaneous deployment and employment of the force realizing that fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position.

- Deploy a force directly into combat following an opposed entry into the area of operations.

- Provide an operational headquarters capable of conducting rapid response. quick deployment, and fast, decisive offensive operations for a clear victory. On execution, the corps' command and control capability must move early into the objective area to evaluate the situation and make critical operational level decisions.

Think of Operation JUST CAUSE as an example. Force projection operations usually occur in undeveloped theaters. Think for a moment about the challenges, especially from a logistics perspective, of moving such a large organization into an undeveloped theater and conducting combat operations.

Tactical

At the tactical level, corps functions and responsibilities are familiar The corps acts as part of a larger land component. It prepares tactical operation plans based on a campaign plan. The corps may be forward deployed with fully developed war plans and with an in-place sustainment base. Think of a European corps or DESERT STORM as examples.

SISTER SERVICE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CORPS FIGHT

FM 100-5, *Operations,* stresses that the Army will not operate alone but will integrate its efforts in the theater commander's unified operations along with the other services, other national agencies, and often allied and coalition forces. By their very nature, corps will always fight as part of a joint force. working in very close cooperation with the US Air Force, Navy, and possibly Marine Corps.

Take a quick look at Sister Service contributions to corps operations. This is not intended to be a review of sister service organizations, roles, missions, and functions You've covered these in previous subcourses. If you need a review of the Sister Services, do so now, and then return here.

A prime consideration in employing joint forces is gaining and maintaining the freedom of action to conduct operations against the enemy. Control of the air gives commanders the freedom to conduct successful attacks that can neutralize or destroy an enemy's warlighting potential. Friendly forces mount a continuous effort to gain and maintain the capability to use the enemy's airspace to perform combat missions and deny the enemy use of friendly airspace. Control of the air allows land forces to execute operations without interference from an enemy's air forces. Operations in the maritime or littoral (sea shore) environment contribute to gaining and maintaining freedom of action, just as do air operations. Sea control gives commanders the freedom to project power through the strategic and operational movement of forces by sea, to protect sea lines of communications (SLOCs), to secure littoral areas from sea-based threats, and to execute air and land operations from the sea.

What missions or service responsibilities do the Air Force, Navy, and Marines have in supporting the corps ?

Air Force

- Counterair-gaining control of the air environment. Counterair operations protect friendly forces, ensure freedom to use the aerospace environment to perform other air missions and tasks, and deny the use of the aerospace environment to the enemy. The goal of counterair is to control the airspace to allow commanders to execute their operational plans.

- Air interdiction-delaying, disrupting, or destroying an enemy's military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Air interdiction can delay the arrival or buildup of enemy forces and supplies, disrupt the enemy commander's concept of operation and control of forces. or cause him to divert valuable resources to other uses.

- Close air support-supporting land operations by attacking hostile targets close to friendly ground forces. Close air support can enhance ground force operations by delivering a wide range of weapons and massed firepower at decisive points.

- Airlift-providing rapid and flexible movement of forces (including force insertion) and limited amounts of equipment and supplies. It provides the best means of movement for replacement personnel and time sensitive resupply and equipment.

- Surveillance and reconnaissance-collecting information from airborne. space-based. surface-based. subsurface sensors. Smeillance and reconnaissance operations provide a wide variety of information on any given area of the earth's surface. Army, Air Force, Navy. and Marine Corps surveillance and reconnaissance efforts are part of national intelligence gathering and the systematic observation process. Surveillance and reconnaissance is a new term for tactical air reconnaissance (TAR).)

Navy

- Providing naval forces, including naval air, to conduct amphibious operations.

- Providing sea-based air defense

- Providing close air support and naval support (including naval gunfire support) for land operations

- Providing sealift. Sealift moves large tonnages of supplies. heavy equipment. and weapon systems throughout a campaign. Sealift allows for the projection of power through amphibious landings and transport to ports within or adjacent to the theater of operations.

Marine Corps

Marine Corps operations normally complementing or contributing to a corps effort include-

- Conducting land operations essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign
- Conducting amphibious operations.

Just as a point of interest, you will have a chance to do some planning with Marine Corps elements in the S320C exercise.

What are some additional ways the sister services can enhance corps operations?

Air Force

- Electronic combat.
- Warning, command, control, and communications.
- Intelligence.
- Weather service.

Navy

- Intelligence.
- Electronic warfare.
- Naval gunfire support.
- Early warning.
- Offensive and defensive air operations beyond close air support.
- Deep strikes employing cruise missiles.

Marine Corps

- Air and naval gunfire liaison companies (ANGLICO).
- Offensive air support.
- Antiair warfare.
- Intelligence.
- Electronic warfare.

Remember, Marine tactical aviation is unique in that it is organic to each Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). The MAGTF commander normally retains operational control of MAGTF air assets during joint land operations. MAGTF air assets will normally support the MAGTF. Any excess sorties available may be allocated to other elements of the joint force. This is all you'll see on Marine TACAIR in S320B. You will get more on this in S320C.

You are about to start your examination of corps combat functions, but before you do, go ahead and take a stretch break or grab a cup of coffee or can of soda.

CORPS COMBAT FUNCTIONS

Welcome back. Shift gears a bit and look at the corps in the context of seven combat functions of intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, logistics, and battle command as listed in FM 100-5. Remember, commanders integrate and coordinate the functions to synchronize battle effects in time, space, and purpose.

These functional operating systems have derivatives at the operational and tactical levels of war For our purposes, we'll use the battlefield operating systems (BOS) that you are familiar with from your previous tactics courses. The seven BOS are still current doctrine and provide planners a useful tool with which to plan or examine any combined arms operation. You'll look at the battlefield operating systems in this order: maneuver. mobility and survivability, fire support, air defense, intelligence, combat service support, and command and control. First, take a look at maneuver.

Maneuver

Maneuver is both an element of combat power and a principle of war. It is movement relative to the enemy to put him at a disadvantage and ultimately achieve success on the battlefield. The objective of maneuver at the corps level is to place or move brigade- and division-sized combat elements into positions where they can bring their fires to bear on the enemy with the greatest effectiveness.

You may want to open ST 100-3, *Battle Book,* to page 2-3 where you will find a corps wiring diagram. Refer to the wiring diagram as appropriate during the following discussion of each battlefield operating system.

What are the maneuver elements of the corps?

The maneuver elements of the corps are its divisions and separate maneuver brigades, the cavalry regiment. and the aviation brigade.

Divisions are fixed combined arms organizations capable of performing any tactical mission and are largely self-sustaining. They are the basic used of maneuver at the tactical level and perform major tactical operations for the corps. Corps normally have from two to five divisions

What determines the number and types of divisions allocated to the corps?

Remember, corps are tailored for the theaters and missions for which they are deployed. Allocation is based on the requirements and capabilities to accomplish those requirements. Here is a simple example. If there is a requirement for a rapid deployment and an opposed entry by. parachute assault. then the airborne division is the choice. If deployment is by by, light forces have the best strategic deployability. If the requirement is to defeat an armored or mechanized threat, then the armored or mechanized division is the choice but will take longer to deploy if not already in theater.

If you need to review the capabilities of divisions, do so now. It was in a previous requirement and has been covered in Phase I and II tactics subcourses. You can find a good review in ST 100-3 starting on page 2-5.

A corps may also have separate maneuver brigades in its allocatedforces. Separate brigades add to the flexibility of the corps commander and can be used to reinforce divisions, but they can also operate as independent units. How does a separate maneuver brigade differ from a divisional maneuver brigade?

The separate brigade-

- Is a fixed organization with organic maneuver battalions. combat support. and combat service support elements

- Has organic calvary, engineer, air defense, field artillery, military intelligence. military police, and combat service support units.

- Is commanded by a brigadier general and has a more robust staff organization than that of a divisional brigade.

- Normally receives combat service support from the corps support command (COSCOM).

- Can be used to reinforce maneuver divisions but are also capable if operating as independent units

Bottom line, A separate brigade plugs into the corps just like a division and is capable of independent operations.

You will not have a US separate brigade in S320B. However. you will have the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. which is similar

The divisional brigade-

- Is not a fixed organization. The only organic element is the brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) Maneuver battalions are attached to the brigade based on division's allocation.

- Has combat support and combat service support elements that are attached or otherwise provided.

- Is commanded by a colonel.

- Normally receives combat service support from a forward support battalion of the division support command (DISCOM).

- Usually conducts operations that are part of their division's larger mission

What are some of the capabilities and limitations of the armored cavalry regiment, and what types of operations might it conduct?

Open your M/S320B Staff Planning Book to chapter 1, page 1-12. and refer to the troop listing for the 209th ACR.

The armored cavalry regiment (ACR)-

- Has organic air and armored cavalry, units that can operate as combined arms teams over wide areas, serving as reconnaissance and security forces. (The 209th ACR has three armored cavalry squadrons and one air cavalry squadron.)

- Has organic air defense, engineer, military intelligence. chemical, and combat service support units. This is why you will often see a regimental support area (RSA). It is where the regiment's equivalent of a forward support battalion operates. Like the separate brigade. the ACR can also conduct independent operations.

- Lacks infantry, and a force field artillery headquarters and may require augmentation in these areas

- Performs reconnaissance, security, and economy of force operations for the corps

- May conduct offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations.

- Can effectively conduct covering force, flank security, or counterattack operations

What are some of the capabilities and/imitations of the corps aviation brigade, and what types of operations might it conduct?

Turn again to M/S320B Staff Planning Book, chapter 1, page 1-13, and look at the 10th Avn Bde (Corps) troop list.

The aviation brigade-

- Is a versatile organization. Unlike the divisional aviation brigade, the corps aviation brigade has subordinate aviation regiments to aid in the command and control of attack helicopter and lift battalions.

- Has attack helicopter battalions with significant day and night operation capabilities, Attack helicopter battalions may augment ground maneuver units, but they are normally kept under corps control as a highly mobile attack force. Attack helicopters may be used to attack critical enemy formations, to attack the flanks and rear of enemy formations, or to conduct counterattacks.

- Has assault helicopters, observation helicopters, medium helicopters, and a limited number of fixed-wing command and control aircraft. Assault helicopters provide air-mobile and air assault capabilities for dismounted infantry and ground antitank units. Assault and medium helicopters can provide limited resupply to units with critical needs. Observation helicopters provide a wide range of reconnaissance and security capabilities.

- Is not a maneuver force in the traditional sense of a ground maneuver brigade; however, under certain carefully considered situations and for limited periods, it can be used as a maneuver force when augmented and supported. Aviation units cannot hold terrain in the traditional sense. but they can certainly dominate specific terrain for short periods of time.

While you're looking at maneuver, shift your focus a bit and quickly look at the forms of the tactical offense, the forms of maneuver. and the defensive patterns.

Forms of the Tactical Offense

The four general forms of the tactical offense are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. You studied these in great detail in previous tactics subcourses. The purpose here is not to replow old ground but to look at the forms of tactical offense in the context of corps operations.

Why does a corps conduct a movement to contact?

The corps conducts a movement to contact to gain or reestablish contact with the enemy and develop the situation. The movement to contact is characterized by rapid movement along multiple axes, centralized planning and decentralized control. and the rapid transition of combined arms formations from the march to the attack.

Why does a corps conduct an attack?

The purpose of the attack is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy. There are two types of attacks: hasty and deliberate. The differences lie in the amount of planning, coordination, and preparation before execution. Whether hasty or deliberate, a successful attack depends on the skillful massing of effects against the enemy force, The hasty attack is the most likely result of a meeting engagement. Commanders launch a hasty attack with the forces at hand and with minimum preparation to destroy the enemy before he can concentrate forces or establish a defense. The primary aim is to gain the initiative and overwhelm the enemy before he can react. In contrast to hasty attacks, deliberate attacks are fully synchronized operations that employ the effects of every available asset against the enemy defense. Because such synchronization requires careful planning and extensive co&nation, deliberate attacks take time to prepare. The corps conducts a deliberate attack when a hasty attack cannot succeed.

Why does a corps conduct an exploitation?

In the exploitation, the attacker extends the destruction of the defending enemy force by maintaining offensive pressure. The purpose of the exploitation is to prevent the enemy from reconstituting an organized defense. counterattacking: conducting an orderly withdrawal, or continuing to support his operations. The ultimate objective of the exploitation is the disintegration of the enemy to a point where he has no alternatives but to surrender or flee. Exploitation is the chief means of translating tactical success into operational advantage.

The opportunity to conduct an exploitation is usually indicated-

- When the enemy is having difficult! maintaining his position.
- When attacking divisions are making decisive gains.
- When enemy resistance is lessening.
- When deep surveillance operations detect a general enemy wihtdrawal.

When conducting an exploitation, the corps attacks the enemy support systems by-

- Securing objectives deep in the enemy rear.
- Cutting major lines of communication.
- Containing major enemy forces.
- Disrupting. capturing, destroying, or dispersing major enemy reserves.
- Seizing and holding critical enemy logistic resources-especially fuel and ammunition.

Why does a corps conduct a pursuit?

A pursuit is an offensive operation against a retreating enemy force. The object of the pursuit is destruction of the opposing force. Pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation and completes the destruction of an enemy force that has lost the means or the will to defend or delay and is attempting to disengage and withdraw. Unlike the exploitation, in which the attacking force seeks to old avoid combat units to defeat the enemy's support systems. the attacker in a pursuit focuses on destroying the fleeing enemy force. Pursuit operation require a direct pressure force and normally an encircling force. The corps can conduct a pursuit on its own or can be part of a pursuit conducted by a higher command.

Now take a quick look at the forms of maneuver.

Forms of Maneuver

The forms of maneuver are envelopment turning movement, infiltration penetration, and frontal attack. You've studied these during your tactics subcourses in Phases I and II.

Which of these forms of maneuver does the corps plan and execute?

A little review may be necessary, especially if you have been away from tacties and operations for a while You can find discussions of the forms of maneuver along with illustrations in both FM 100-5 and FM 100-15 As you conduct your review or proceed through the following relate the forms of maneuver to the planning and execution of corps operations.

- Envelopment uses maneuver and fires to put greater combat power against the defender and strip him of his advantages. To use this form of maneuver, commanders must find or create an assailable flank. An envelopment may by single or double and may develop into an encirclement if a double envelopment successfully

cuts off the enemy's line of communications. An envelopment often requires fixing the defender's attention forward through a combination of fires and supporting attacks while the attacker maneuvers his main effort to strike at the enemy's weak flanks and rear

- *Turning movement* uses freedom of maneuver to create a decisive point where the enemy is unprepared. The turning movement is distinguished from an envelopment chiefly, by the depth of its objectives and by what the commander Intends it to accomplish In an envelopment. the focus is on attacking the flanks or rear of the enemy force In a turning movement, the corps force seeks to avoid the main enemy force, pass around its defensive belts. and secure an objective deep in the enemy rear to make the enemy position untenable. The purpose of the turning movement is to force the enemy to divert major forces to cope with the new threat or to abandon his positions

- *Infiltration* uses convert movement of forces through enemy lines to attack positions in the enemy rear. It requires a high degree of security and must avoid detection and engagement while covertly moving through enemy lines. Infiltration is normally used in conjunction with other forms of maneuver.

- *Penetration* is used when enemy flanks arc not assailable. Commanders mass sufficient combat power at the point of penetration to overwhelm the enemy and gain the advantage. They mass the effects from fires from all available means at the point of penetration to make the breach. hold open the shoulders, and cripple any enemy counterattacks.

- *Frontal attack* strikes the enemy across a wide front and over the most direct approaches. It IS normally, used when commanders possess overwhelming combat power and the enemy is at a clear disadvantage. The frontal attach is the simplest form of maneuver, but it is the most costly form of maneuver, especially for deliberate attacks against prepared defenses.

To answer the original question above about which of these forms of maneuver corps could plan and execute-

- The corps can perform all forms of maneuver by itself, as part of a larger ground force, or with its subordinate maneuver elements. Remember the size of the elements in this discussion. A division may have 17,000 to 18,000 soldiers. A corps could easily exceed 100,000.

- The corps normally uses a combination of the forms of maneuver when attacking The forms of maneuver a useful means of convey the commander's scheme of maneuver and what he intends his subordinate units to accomplish. As an example, the corps corps commander may direct one division to effect a penetration and pass another division through to envelop a defending enemy force. The subordmate divisions may not adopt forms of maneuver indentical to those conveyed by the corps commander. In our example. the enveloping division may used a frontal attack as its form of maneuver. From From the corps perspective, the division is conducting an envelopment, from the division perspective, it is supporting the corps envelopment by using a frontal attack.

- Because of the large: distances involved, the corps will most often be parts of an operation of an operational turning movement and will execute the operation as part of a larger ground force.

- The corps will not normally infiltrate as a single entity: however, its light infantry subordinate units may conduct an infiltration in combination with other forms of maneuver used by the corps.

- The corps may serve as either the direct pressure or encircling force in the exploitation or pursuit if it is part of a larger ground force. The corps itself may conduct an exploitation or pursuit and use its subordinate brigades or divisions as the direct pressure or encircling forces.

It is extremely important for you to understand the corps role in these large unit operations. The corps normally plans at least 72 hours into the future. It has the assets and resources to gather the information necessary to conduct this advance planning. The corps must look ahead and anticipate future events across the range of military operations. There arc not normally distinct events or actions that dictate transition from the attack to the exploitation to the pursuit. Commanders and staff planners must be prepared to take advantage of opportunities as they arc presented.

Now, take a quick look at the defensive patterns.

Defensive Patterns

The two primary forms of defensive operations are the mobile defense and area defense. These forms apply to both the operational and tactical levels of war. Mobile defenses orient on destroying the attacking force by permitting the enemy to advance into a positron that exposes him to counterattack by a mobile reserve. The minimum force possible is committed to pure defense; maximum combat power is placed in a striking force that catches the enemy as he attempts to overcome that part of the force dedicated to the defense. In conducting a mobile defense, terrain is traded for the maximum effect to divert the enemy's attention from the defender's main force, forcing the enemy to expose his flanks, and making him vulnerable to counterattack

Area defenses orient on retaining terrain by absorbing the enemy in an interlocking series of positions and destroying him largely by fires. The majority of the defending force is used to retain ground using a combination of defensive positions and small mobile reserves. The battle results arc often less decisive than with the mobile defense pattern.

What defensivepattern will the corps most often use?

The typical corps defensive battle will combine both the area and mobile defensive patterns. The corps will employ a combination of dynamic and static elements based on the factors of METT-T to defeat an attacking enemy. The preferred corps defense allows the maintenance of a large reserve designed to conduct 3 planned counterattack or spoiling attack that is a decisive clement of the overall defensive plan. In some instances. however, the corps may not have much latitude regarding the pattern it adopts because it may be directed by the higher commander. In any event, the corps may have elements attacking. defending, and delaying all at the same time to defeat the attacking enemy, regain the initiative, and ultimately return to the offensive.

You've finished with the maneuver BOS. Look at mobility and survivability nest

Mobility and Survivability

Mobility operations preserve the freedom of maneuver of friendly forces. By denying mobility to enemy forces, Army forces can destroy them with fire and maneuver. These efforts limit the maneuver of enemy forces and enhance the effectiveness of fires. Survivability operations protect friendly forces from the effects of enemy weapon systems and from natural occurrences. Survivability operations include NBC defense measures.

What role does the engineer brigade perform for the corps?

Engineers enhance the effectiveness of maneuver units by providing mobility support; by degrading the enemy's ability to move on the battlefield; by providing protective emplacements and structures; by performing general construction and maintenance on roads, airfields, and structures; and by providing topographic support. Corps will normally place at least one combat engineer battalion (often two) in a command relationship to each of its committed divisions. Take a quick look at the X (US) Corps task organization in the M/S3S320B Staff Planning Book. chapter 8, page 8-18, to see how the 52d Mech and 25th Armored Divisions have been augmented with corps engineer battalions.

What types of missions can the engineers execute in performing these roles?

- Mobility missions include breaching enemy obstacles, increasing battlefield circulation, improving existing routes or building new ones providing bridging or raft support for crossing rivers, and identifying routes around contaminated areas.

- Countermobility missions include building obstacles and using smoke to hinder enemy maneuver. Additionally. the corps engineer advises on the employment of scatterable mines in the corps area regardless of the means of delivery.

- Sunivability missions include hardening of facilities and fortification of battle positions

What other corps units contribute to mobility and survivability?

At the corps level, military police from the military police brigade contribute to mobility by conducting battlefield circulation control. Chemical reconnaissance and decontamination elements From the chemical brigade contribute to Survivability. Smoke units, also from the chemical brigade, contribute to countermobility operations.

Now, take a look at fire support.

Fire Support

Fire support is the collective and coordinated employment of the fires of armed aircraft, land- and sea-based indirect-tire systems, and electronic warfare systems against ground targets to support land combat operations. Synchronizing fires with maneuver is critical to the successful prosecution of combat operations

What assets are available at the corps level to accomplish the function of fire support?

As you go through the next portion of the lesson guide. think about the increased joint involvement at the corps level.

Fire support at the corps level is the collective use of field artillery, electronic warfare (jamming), Army aviation. Air Force tactical air support, and, when available, Marine Corps and Navy tactical air support and gunfire.

The corps artillery contains all of the field artillery cannon, guided missile, and multiple-rocket battalions that are not organic to maneuver units. The cannon artillery, rocket, and missile battalions are normally organized into field artillery brigades that are allocated as needed to augment the fires of committed maneuver units or are kept under corps control to provide general support tires. Refer to the M/WS320B Staff Planning Book, chapter 1, page 1-13, and look at what the 10th (US) Corps Artillery has.

You should note the 10th Corps Artillery has both cannon and MLRS battalions. ST 100-3 contains a great deal of information on artillery and other US organizations and weapon systems. The US Army no longer has nuclear weapons and must relay on Air Force and Navy nuclear capabilities Corps planners may nominate potential nuclear targets to the theater commander if operation in an environment of the enemy first use or threatened use of these weapons Corps planners may also be required to target corps intelligence systems to locate these weapons. Cannon artillery systems are capable of firing chemical munitions.

What are some of the uses of the artillery kept under corps control?

Artillery at corps is used to add depth to the battle, to support rear operations, and to influence the battle at critical times.

Why is the corps the key element in synchronizing ground maneuver and fire support?

You've aheady, looked at the joint nature of corps operation. At the corps level, the synchronization of ground maneuver and fire support comes together. Corps artillery contains the sytems with the capabilities to reach deep. These systems combined with the corps aviation elements. Air Force tactical air support. and organic and Air Force jamming and electronic warfare systems provide the corps with the very potent of delaying. disrupting. or destroying enemy enemy forces during close, deep, or operation operation. Additionally, real time downlinks from DOD and national surveillance system permit the corps to have firsthand knowledge of the current situation and see deep enough to gather tnformation on enemy activities that can affect future operations.

Shift your focus now to air defense.

Air Defense

Air defense includes all measures designed to nullify or reduce the effictiveness of attach by hostile aircraft or guided missiles, both before and after they are airborne, to preserve combat power and maintain friendly freedom of action. Within a given theater of operations, a single commander is responsible for theater air defense. He is the area air defense commander who is normally the air component commander within the the theater. All US Army ADA weapons and small and arms crew-served weapons used to engage attacking enemy aircraft operate under air defense rules and procedures established by the area air defense commander.

What type of air defense capabilities does the ADA brigade provide to the corps?

The corps ADA brigade is the corps commander's primary air defense resource. The corps commander must make sure that his forces at all levels have adequate air defense. and he must thicken and bolster those defense when necessary. Corps ADA units arc assigned appropriate: command and support relationship based on METT-T to augment division organic ADA units. This is done to weight the corps main effort or to provide a critical area additional protection. Gun/missile battalions and batteries are provided when the air threat is expected to be predominantly helicopters. Short-range missile air defense units are provided when the air threat is expected to be primarily fixed aircraft. The corps will retain significant ADA assets under its control to support corps operations. Take a look at the 10th ADA Brigade troop list in the M/S320BS0B Staff Planning Book. chapter 1. page 1-13

Have a look now at intelligence.

Intelligence

At corps. the military intelligence brigade provides intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support to combat operations. For specific operations, corps may also coordinate electronic warfare support with the Air Force or the Navy, The corps has access to intelligence gathered by higher echelons. other services, and national intelligence agencies.

What is the purpose of the MI brigade, and how is it structured to accomplish this purpose?

The corps MI brigade provides intelligence and electronic warfare support to combat operations. Intelligence operations provide information on terrain, weather, and the enemy. The MI brigade contains operations. tactical exploitation. and aerial exploitation battalions that conduct intelligence and electronic warfare functions in general support of the corps and augment the intelligence capabilities of the corps' subordinate units. The brigade collects and analyzes information from multiple sources including signal, imagery, and human intelligence. The brigade's gound rend aerial collection and ground jamming capabilities give the corps the ability to "see deep" into enemy rear areas and to disrupt to disrupt command control, and communications at critical times during the battle. At the corps level, tactical and strategic intelligence efforts are brought together. It is the corps that controls organizations and coordinates resources that can see deep enough to provide essential information. Look at the 20th MI Brigade troop list in the M/S320B Staff Planning Book. chapter 1, page 1-14.

You will cover combat service support next.

Combat Service Support

Logistics is the process of planning and executing the sustainment of forces in support of military operations Combat operations and logistics increasingly merge at higher levels of war. Neither can be conceived without considering the other. From past tactics subcourses. you know the tactical logistics functions of manning, arming. fueling, and moving the force, and sustaining soldiers and their systems. These combat service support functions mast be totally integrated into the planning and conduct of corps operations to provide the commander a combat multiplier with which he can weight the battle. You also learned from past subcourses that logistics cannot win war, but its absence or inadequacy can cause defeat.

What elements within the corps provide combat service support?

The corps support command (COSCOM), the finance group, and the personnel group arc responsible for providing CSS to the corps.

Remember that the COSCOM is not a fixed organization In previous tactics subcourses, you studied the division support command and the forward support support battalion that normally supports a divisional maneuver brigade. These units had fixed organizations structures as prescribed by their tables of organization and equipment (TOEs). The COSCOM is not a fixed organization and contains a mix of subordinate units as required by the size and configuration of the corps.

You'll examine the corps CSS structure in great detail during the nest lesson. Right now, take a look at the final operating system-that of command and control. But before you do, go ahead and take a stretch break. Time for another cup of coffee or soda?

Command and Control

Scan FM 100-15, Corps Operations, pages 4-1 through 4-21. As you complete this assignment, think back to what you learned in previous tactics subcourses about command and control at the brigade and division levels and relate it to command and control at the corps.

In previous tactics subcourses, you learned that command was the authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. You also learned that to command is to direct. The commander directs subordinates. makes decisions, sets priorities for resources, assigns missions, and focuses the unit to accomplish the mission. The element of control is inherent in command. Functionally, control is the capability a commander uses (with the help of his staff) to regulate forces and functions of subordinate and supporting units on the battlefield to ensure consistency with his will and intent. When used together, command and control has a different meaning. The command and control function or process is performed through the arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures that a commander employs in planning, directing, coordinating. and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.

The corps headquarters plans. directs, controls, and coordinates corps operations. It consists of the corps commander, deputy corps commander, and corps staff to include liaison elements assigned to work with the corps. You've already looked at the Joint interface required at the corps level and the requirement for liaison elements from outside organizations to work with various corps staff sections. Liaison elements may be provided by subordinate units, the Air Force, the Marine Corps. the Navy, special operation forces, echelons above corps elements. allied forces. and host nation elements.

What are some of the aspects of corps staff activities that are different from division or brigade?

- Because of the increased Interface with allied forces. host-nation agencies. and other US senices, there are a greater number of liaison elements from these agencies working at corps, and their coordination with the corps staff is of increased importance.

- The coordination of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps combat support is especially important at corps level. The corps staff must be sure that maximum benefit is gained by fully integrating available close air support. air interdiction. tactical air reconnaissance and surveillance, counterair operations. tactical airlift, and sealift into the operation.

- The planning for NBC defense and its integration into the operation arc of major importance at the corps level.

- The corps must continuously plan at least 72 hours into the future to anticipate battlefield conditions and then move forces and assemble resources in time to successfully fight the enemy To plan continuously. the staff must anticipate conditions that may exist several days ahead. As you think about this, you may want to contrast this 72-hour-and-beyond planning window with the 24- to 48-hour planning window for the division and the 12- to 24-hour planning window for the brigade.

How big is a corps headquarters?

This is not a trick question. This is to help you put this concept into context and gain an appreciation for the size of a corps headquarters. Comprehending the enormity and complexity of a corps headquarters will be a challenge.

The corps headquarters is a large and complex organization. The corps CP structure (headquarters) can comprise more than 900 people. Remember that there will be a large number of liaison personnel supporting the corps and collocated at the various corps CPs.

How is the corps headquarters organized, and what are the responsibilities of each CP and the command group?

The corps uses a TAC, main. and rear CP just like the other echelons you have studied in previous tactics subcourses. At the corps level, the general responsibilities of each CP and the command group arc the same as you saw at other echelons.

- The corps commander will exercise command from three command posts and a command group. CPs support the commander by providing the structural framework to facilitate planning, directing, controlling, and coordinating corps operations. Each command post must operate efficiently to be effective, as well as to survive in a normally lethal environment.

- The corps established three command posts in the field: the main command post (main CP). the tactical command post (TAC CP), and the rear command post (rear CP).

- The main CP primarily synchronizes the entire battle, directs deep operations. and plans future operations. Secondly it coordinates CSS over the entire depth of the battlefield.

- The TAC CP primarily controls corps close operations and prepares to function as the main CP if neccssary.

- The rear CP focuses on conducting rear operations and sustaining the battle

- The command group consists of the corps commander and those members of his staff whom he designates to be with him, normally a G3 officer, a G2 officer, and fire support clement representatives. The command group is not a permanent organization. It is adjusted as required by the mission and staff alvailable to the commander. The command group moves away from the TAC CP to locate well forward where it can see and influence the battle with rapid decisions and orders.

Also, keep in mind that the corps has a unique role in the Army command and control systems as the Integrator of higher level combined and joint systems with the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS-pronounced A-ticks). ATCCS is the command and control system used by all tactical echelons through corps level. Corps is the highest echelon involved in ATCCS. Corps provides the link between ATCCS and the command ,and control stems of the next higher command. The corps is also the link between ATCCS and the theater command and control system for the sustainment of the corps.

What organization provides communications for the corps?

The signal brigade provides the Installation. operation, and maintenance of communications within and between the corps command and control facilities. as well as an extensive area communications network that connects all of the elements of the corps. The signal brigade uses radio and wire communications to transmit voice, digital data, and facsimile into an integrated tactical communications system

What is the command and control process used at the corps level?

The corps commander and his staff use the tactical decisionmaking process and supporting procedures and techniques. This allows the commander and his staff to find out what is going on. decide what action to take. issue instructions, and supervise execution. The tactical decisionmaking process is a systematic approach to problem solving. FM 101-5 describes three methods (or procedures): deliberate decisionmaking, combat decisionmaking, and quick decisionmaking. Factors such as available time and echelon of command will usually determine which method is used. All three methods include the four basic steps of analyzing the mission. developing courses of action, analyzing and comparing courses of action, and arriving at a decision.

You will be using the deliberate decisionmaking method in S320B. You should be familiar with it from past tactics subcourses. If you need to review the tactical decisionmaking process, You should do so by using ST 101-*5, Command and Staff Decision Processes.* The corps also used the intelligence preparation of the battletield (IPB) process. The IPB process is not part of the decisionmaking process. It is a separate process that supports the decisionmaking process. IPB includes definition of the battlefeild environment a description of the battlefield's effects, evaluation of the threat, and determination of threat courses of action You should be very familiar with IPB from past tactics subcourses. If you need to review IPB, use FM 34-130.

SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES

Special operations are actions conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipment military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, diplomatic, economic, or psychological objectives by, unconventional means. Special operations occur frequently in hostile, denied. or politically sensitive areas across the full range of Army operations. in operations other than war, special operations may substitute for the commitment of general purpose military forces. In previous tactics subcourses, you examined in detail the role. missions. and functions of Army special operations forces. From this instruction, you should remember that Army special operations forces have five types of units: Special Forces, rangers, Army special operations aviation. psychological operations (PSYOP). and civil affairs. At the corps level, you normally find a civil affairs brigade and a PSYOP battalion.

What is the purpose of the civil affairs brigade? How does it normally empty its subordinate battalions?

Civil affairs forces arc used to enhance relationship between military lines anti and civilian authorities and populations in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas of' operations. Civil affairs forces are used to reduce civilian interference and to gain popular understanding. support, and compliance with measures to accomplish the mission. Civil affairs forces engage in the type of activities associated with the operation of civil government and its institutions, population. and resources

The civil affairs brigade normally consists of a brigade HHC and from three to five civil affairs battalions. Under the staff supenision of the corps G5, the civil affairs brigade headquarters analyzes the corps mission for civil affairs requirements and prepares the civil affairs annex to corps plans and orders. The brigade headquarters company includes four technical support teams. each containing government, economics. public facilities, and special functions sections that provide civil affairs technical advice and assistance to unit commanders throughout the corps area A civil affairs battalion is normally attached division and to the COSCOM. These civil affairs battalions plan, coordinate, and supervise civil affairs activities as directed.

What is the purpose of the PSYOP battalion ? What are its capabilities? How does it normally employ its subordinate tactical PSYOP companies?

PSYOP forces are employed to favorably influence the attitudes and behaviors of specific foreign audiences and reduce the will, capacity, or influence of hostile forces to wage war or otherwise threaten US interests.

PSYOP forces are equipped with audiovisual, print, loudspeaker, and radio and TV broadcasting capabilities to support friendly forces. Their activities are often sensitive and have significant political implications,

The corps PSYOP battalion normally consists of a battalion HHC, an operational support company, and from three to five tactical PSYOP companies. The operational support company conducts tactical PSYOP and counterpropaganda operations in general support of the corps. It also provides printing support to the tactical PSYOP companies. Each tactical PSYOP company is normally placed in direct support of a division, separate brigade, or ACR. Tactical PSYOP companies use loudspeakers. audiovisual equipment, and light printing equipment to perform their mission

What is the purpose of a special operations command and control element (SOCCE) (pronounced SOCK-see), and when should the corps request one.?

Special operations forces (Special Forces, rangers, and Army special operations aviation) frequently operate in conjunction with or close to general purpose forces. These forces may be operating as part of the theater commander's special operations effort or may be operating in support of the corps. When synchronization is required between special operations forces and general purpose forces. the SOCCE is the focal point for this synchronization. The SOCCE performs liaison and coordination functions for special operations forces in conjunctron with or under the control of a general purpose force. A supported general purpose force commander who anticipates operations requiring synchronization or physical integration with special operations forces at any point during the operation should request a SOCCE as soon as the requirement is identified. In cases where prolonged contact is required, the role of the SOCCE becomes critical. (Them is a very subtle point here that may need amplification. The SECDEF has designated SF, rangers. and Army special operations aviation (ARSOA) as special operations forces. He has not designated PSYOP and civil affairs forces as special operations forces. However, the Secretary of the Army considers Army PSYOP and civil affairs forces to be Army special operations forces and has placed them under the command and proponency of the US Army Special Operations Command. You learned this in prevrous tactics instruction.)

This completes your look at the corps battlefield operating systems. The next topic will be the corps as a contingency force in a force-projection Army,.

CORPS IN FORCE-PROJECTION OPREATIONS

Read FM 100-5, *Operations,* chapter 3, and FM 100-15, *Corps* Operations, chapter 3. After you finish your reading, return here.

The preface to FM 100-5 shows the importance of force-projection operations when it states. "This keystone manual links Army roles and missions to the *National Military Strategy,* of which power projection is a fundamental principle. Thus, force projectron-the military's ability to respond quickly and decisively to global requirements-is fundamental to Army, operations doctrine. The Army recognizes that it will normally, operate in combination with air, naval, and space assets to achieve the overall strategic aim of decisive land combat."

Force projection IS the demonstrated ability, to rapidly alert, mobilize, deploy and operate anywhere in the world. It is a key element of power projection-the ability, of a nation to apply all or come of the elements of national power to act in crises, to contribute to deterrence. and to enhance regional stability. Power projection is a central clement of US national security and National Military Strategy The Army contributes to this strategy as part of a joint team through force projection.

Combatant commanders often attempt to resolve crises within their area of responsibility with forward-presence forces. Quick responses may preclude the escalation of crises. When such a response is not enough or not available, the projection of forces from CONUS or another theater may be the only recourse.

What are the stages offorce-projection operations, and what occurs during each stage?

The stages of force-projection operations usually include mobilization (if necessary), predeployment activities, deployment, entry operations, operations, war termination and postconflict operations, redeployment and reconstitution. and demobilization. These stages may not be distinct. Activities of one stage will often blend with another.

As you go through this portion of the lesson, remember that a corps is a tailored force. It is not fixed. It receives the forces it needs to accomplish the mission. The corps must also conduct force tailoring. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix and sequence of units. Remember, the goal of forcc-projection operations is mission accomplishment, not just entry into the area of operations. In all contingencies. the force must possess the required lethality to accomplish the mission and to protect the force the moment it arrives in theater. Necessary, combat support and combat service support must be tailored into the force package to ensure sustainment and protection. Additionally, the corps will have subordinate units in various stages of the operation at the same time. Command and control and synchronization of activities will be difficult at best in split-based operations. Corps staff planners must be extremely adaptable and flexible. They will be planning the simultaneous employment of initial forces and deployment of follow-on forces

Mobilization

- Mobilization is a process in which the Armed Forces augment the capability of the Active Component in preparation for war or other national emergencics.

- Mobilization includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling and organization personnel, supplies, and materiel and certifying the proficiency of individuals and units.

Predeployment Activity

- Successful force-projection capabilities rely on a foundation of fully trained, well-led, properly equipped and sustained units and soldiers. Units and individuals must be trained and ready to participate in force-projection operations Operation security must remain high to retain the element of surprise.

- Army commanders must set priorities for lift requirements consistent with METT-T. The need to plan and prepare for deployment in a compressed timeframe will be a particularly demanding aspect.

- The corps must anticipate the requisite military conditions for success and sequence activities that will achieve those conditions. The corps must select and tailor a force and must quickly develop or refine operational concepts to accomplish the overall mission. The operational concepts developed in this phase will set the necessary conditions or end states for subsequent stages of the operation

Deployment

- Army, forces provide the predominant ground element to joint forces in force-projection operations.

Commanders must balance the factors of METT-T against available airlift and sealift to determine the composition of the initial response force.

Light and special operations forces may be best for initial deployment when time is critical. Commanders must balance the speed with which light and special operations units can deploy against the greater lethanlity and protection provided heavier forces In deployment, commanders must maintain versatility and agility in force mix, combat capability sustainment. and lift.

Entry Operations

Entry may be opposed or unopposed. Entry may be in direct support of host nation or fontard-presence forces. but it could also be conducted in the absence of both.

Unopposed Entry

- US forces normally seek unopposed entry and entrance into the theater peacefully with the assistancc of the host nation.

- Early deploying units may flow through au-ports or seaports into a lodgment area. In the lodgment area. US forces will prepare to assist forward-presence or host nation forces, protect the force, reconfigure. build combat capability, train, and acclimate to the environment.

Opposed Entry

- An opposed entry, requires combat operations to land deploying forces in the theater

- In certain circumstances, the entry and combat operation phases could combine to achieve the strategic objectives in a single operation. Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama is an example.

- Normally. Army, forces. as part of a joint team, will gain, secure, and expand a lodgement before conducting major combat operations.

- The force-projection operation is at greatest risk during opposed entry operations.

- Airborne or air assault forces arc best designed to achieve strategic surprise during thus stage.

- Light forces or heavy forces may be brought in as part of follow-on forces once the lodgmcnt is secure.

- Adequate combat support forces (for example, aviation. field artillery, air defense and engineers) normally accompany the initial assault force or immediate follow-on force. Air Force and naval forces may have to compensate for an initial lack of ground combat power. Remember maneuver units can’t do it alone This is combined arms warfare.

Operations

- At some point in time, the joint force commander will decide to move against the enemy

- The ground commander assembles sufficient. sustained combat power to win the decisive battle Ground commanders will use the doctrine, tactics, and techniques you've been looking at in this lesson to achieve success.

War Termination and Postconflict Operations

These terms are fairly new in our doctrine, but the Army has been accomplishing the actions associated with the terms for many years. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to assist the Kurds at the end of Operation DESERT STORM is a recent example. Use of constabulary forces at the end of World War II is another.

- When a cessation of hostilities or a truce is called, deployed forces transition to a period of postconflict operations. Anticipation and appropriate planning during early stages will smooth the transition during this critical period.

- Postconflict operations focus on restoring order and minimizing confusion following the operation. reestablishing host nation infrastructure, preparing forces for redeployment. and continuing presence to allow other elements of national power to achieve overall strategic alms.

- The corps may use many of its elements to conduct postconflict operations. Corps elements can control prisoners, handle refugees, mark minefields, destroy unexploded ordnance: and provided emergency health service support, humanitarian assistance, and emergency restoration of utilities and other civil affairs.

- There is a possibility of the resumption of hostilities. Thus. units must be prepared to remain in theater and resume combat operations.

Redeployment and Reconstitution

- The objective in this stage is to redeploy assets no longer needed

- Redeploying forces will return to CONUS or home theater but must be prepared to deploy to areas other than home station on short notice.

During redeployment, the commander must balance the factors of MEYY-T against available lift assets.

- Reconstitution efforts include rebuilding units to premobilization levels of readiness, regenerating logistic stockpiles, and accounting for equipment and supplies.

Demobilization

- Demobilization is the process by which units, individuals. and materiel transfer from an actives to a premobilization posture.

You will spend a lot more time on force-projection operations during S320C. In fact, you will plan a force-projection operation into Latin America.

CONCLUSION

During this lesson, you examined the role of the corps, Sister Service contributions to corps operations, the corps battlefield operating systems, and force-projection operations You should now understand and appreciate the size and complexity of a corps and the conduct of corps operations wither as part of a larger ground force or in force-projection operations.

This lesson was designed to provide a portion of the operational foundation you will need for successful completion of this phase of the Command and General Staff Officer Course You will receive more of the foundation in lessons 2 and 3. Take what you learned here into those lessons and into the S320B and S320C application lessons.

In your our next lesson. Corps-Level Logistics, you will look at the tactical logistics functions at the corps level.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. Corps-Level Logistics

SCOPE

This lesson covers the tactical logstics functions at the corps level. The lesson begins with a short review of the logstics continuum and division-level logistics organizations presented in previous subcourscs and then focuses on logistics organizations and operations at the corps level. This lesson completes your examination of tactical logistics and the logistics continuum. At its completion, you should have a thorough understanding of how corps-lever combat service support units arc organized and operate as part of that continuum to support combat operations

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

B.10 TASK: Explain how the tactical logistics functions (manning, arming. fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems) support corps operations in an establishment theater

CONDITION: Given written requirements with reference.

STANDARD: Explanation will include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of corps-level logistics units, including how those units arc organized and operate on the battlefield IAW FM 63-3. FM 100-5. FM 100-15. and student ISSUE materials and study requirements.

LEVEL: Comprehension

PJE PHASE 1 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVE la Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

B.20 TASK: Organized a corps support command (COSCOM) to support combat operations.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement and a tacticle situation, with references.

STANDARD: The organization will be optimized to support the given operation and will be IAW the appropriate doctrine for logistics command and control IAW FM 63-3 and student issue materials and study requirements

LEVEL: Application

PJE PHASE 1 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVE la: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

Id: Summark how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use the lesson guide to assist you in achieving the lesson learning objectives. Follow the instructions and read assignments at the suggested time. When you complete a reading, return to the appropriate place in the lesson guide and continue to follow the instructions. To enhance your learning. answer all the questions before going on to the provided answers and discussions.

REFERENCES:

a. ST 101-6, G1/G4 Battle Book.

h. FM 63-3. Corps Support Command.

LESSON GUIDE

INTRODUCTION

By now, you should be very familiar with the components of that overall logistic support structure called the logistics continuum. The logistics continuum stretches from the forward edge of the combat zone all the way back to the strategic support base in the continental United States (CONUS). In previous subcourses, you examined logistics at the strategic level (the CONUS sustaining base) and the operational level (theater army and theater army area command levels-S410). You also studied tactical logistics at the division and brigade levels during S310A.

This subcourse provides the remaining "piece" of that continuum. the balance of tactical logistics-corps-level logistics. Before you get deeply involved in this lesson, take a quick lock at the logistics references you will use during this subcourse.

The two primary doctrinal references for corps-level operations arc FM 63-3, *Corps Support Command*, September 1003, and FM 100-15, *Corps Operations.* October 96. (There arc no assigned readings from FM 100-15 for this lesson. but you will need to refer to it during later lessons. FM FM 63-3 does not adequately address other-than-COSCOM operations: therefore, It is sometimes necessary to refer to both manuals The lesson readings arc selected to provide the most up-to-date information and to avoid possible discrepancies between the two manuals. The general rule of thumb when using more than one field manual is to give precedence to the one with the latest publication date. Most manuals have alphabetical indexes to help you find different subject areas.

Another good reference is ST 101-6, G-1/G4 *Battle Book.* This book contains descriptions of the logistics units at both the division and corps levels. If you need to determine capabilities or compositions of CSS units. this is the most user-friendly reference you have. It also contains logistics planning factors that may come in handy during later lessons. When more detailed information is required, refer to the appropriate field manuals,

As usual, what you learn in this lesson you'll apply in following lessons, so don't skip anything. By the time you finish this subcourse, you'll understand how the corps fits into the logistics continuum and helps ensure that the correct items of supply or pieces of equipment flow from CONUS to the combat zone, getting to the right unit in the right place at the right time. This subcoursc uses a European scenario, but during the next subcourse. S320C, you'll examine corps-level logistics as part of a force projection operation in an underdeveloped theater.

The Division Support Command

Before you start examining the corps support command, revisit the division support command. There may have been a few changes since you last looked at division-level logistics.

Review Appendix 1, The Division Support Command, and then return here and continue with the lesson guide.

How does the organization shown below differfrom the one you studied in S310A?



You should have noticed that aviation maintenance is different. Before, a division aviation maintenance company was assigned to the DISCOM. Now, that company has been replaced/upgraded to a division aviation support battalion (DASB).

How does this change affect DISCOM operations?

There is no real change in aviation maintenance, but there are major changes in other areas. Now, the headquarters and supply company of the DASB, instead of the supply and service company in the main support battalion (MSB), provides supply support to division aviation. The maintenance of other than aircraft, which was previously performed by the MSB maintenance companies, is now done by the ground maintenance company. In other words, the division aviation brigade no longer depends on the MSB for support other than medical support. It might be said that the division aviation brigade almost has its own forward support battalion.

This could have district advantages for the aviation brigade as well as the MSB. What advantages might there be to having this new organization?

There is no school solution to this question. Possible advantages derive from the MSB having fewer customers and the aviation brigade having its own dedicated support.

There have been some other changes in terminology that you may have noticed. Now, the term "reinforcing" is used instead of "backup." Where there was once "backup DS," there is now "reinforcing DS." Don't get overly concerned about this. The terms may be different, but the support relationship they both describe remains the same, You'll still see both of the terms used until all the manuals have been updated. Another thing that appears to have changed, but really hasn't, is mortuary affairs. Now, the collection points are referred to as mortuary affairs collection points instead of graves registration (GRREG) collection points. These are really minor changes, so don't let them confuse you.

How well do you remember division-level logistics? Who provides ammo within the division, and how is it provided?

- Under the maneuver oriented ammunition distribution system (MOADS), there is one ammunition transfer point (ATP) in support of each maneuver brigade. This ATP normally operates in or near the brigade support area (BSA) and is supposed to provide 100 percent of the ammunition for that brigade and, within its capability, support all other divisional units operating in the brigade's area. Ammunition resupply from the ATP is normally supply point distribution.

- The ATP is staffed and operated by the class V section in the forward support battalion (FSB) supply company. The FSB provides the forklifts to transload ammo and the personnel to run the ATP, but the ammo is delivered by corps units on corps trailers. The uploaded trailers minus their tractors remain at the ATP until recking units empty them. Tractors arrive with a loaded trailer, drop it off in the ATP, and backhaul an empty one. Ammunition is transloaded directly, from these trailers to the supported units ammo carriers.

- A corps ammunition company operates an ATP and up to three ammunition supply points (ASPs) in or near the division rear to support other divisional and corps units operating in the division rear area. There is usually one ammo company supporting each division.

If the FSB staffs and equips the ATP and the corps provides the trailers full of ammo, what contribution does the MSB make?

None. You should remember from earlier instruction that the MSB does not have any ammunition supply responsibilities.

What's the difference between a required supply rate (RSR) and a controlled supply rate (CSR)?

- Required supply rate (RSR) is the amount of ammunition a maneuver commander estimates will be needed to sustain tactical operations. without ammunition expenditure restrictions, over a specified period of time. It is expressed as rounds per weapon (on hand) per day. RSRs are G3/S3 business.

- Controlled supply rate (CSR) is the amount of ammunition that can be made available. It is usually based on availability of specific types of ammunition. ammunition unit capability. transportation assets, or the guidance of the higher commander when considering future missions. It may change on a daily basis and is usually specific for a particular unit. If the CSR established by a higher headquarters exceeds your projected RSR, you will not be issued more than your RSR. It is also expressed as rounds per weapon (on hand) per day. CSRs arc published by the G4/S4.

What does it mean if you are not given a CSR?

If you are not given a CSR on a particular item, it means that the CSR is the same as the RSR. It does not mean there is no limit.

Now, can you explain who provides bulk fuel and how it's provided?

- The primary way corps delivers fuel to the division is in 5,000-gallon fuel tankers (trailers). The fuel is provided by a petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) supply company, but it is delivered by a transportation (truck) company.

- The MSB supply and service (S&S) company receives the bulk fuel from the corps. It has twelve 10,000-gallon bags for storage and thirty-four 5,000-gallon tankers for distribution. The S&S company operates POL supply points to support the units operating in the division rear area and also delivers fuel forward to the FSBs. The petroleum section in the supply platoon of the FSB supply company operates a POL supply point in the BSA.

What about aviation fuel?

Corps delivers aviation fuel to the division aviation brigade. The MSB used to issue ground fuel to the aviation brigade but now that is done by the division aviation support battalion.

What is a ROM?

A ROM is a refuel on the move. This is a resupply technique whereby fuel is delivered along the route of march using 5,000 gallon tankers to pump fuel directly into tactical vehicles. The concept requires a march unit to arrive at a ROM site, stop one vehicle at each nozzle head (staying in formation), and refuel all vehicles simultaneously. Refueling is gauged by time, not by amount. If everything works right, all vehicles arrive, refuel, and depart the ROM site in a single, smooth flow just in time for the next march unit to arrive at the site. Although a unit can conduct a ROM using its own tankers and equipment, it is usually preferable to have this accomplished by some other unit, using that other unit's tankers and equipment. This allows the receiving unit to keep its basic load of fuel intact and its own tankers full and available for immediate use later,

Now that you've reviewed the organizational structure of the DISCOM and also reviewed some of the support concepts, quickly review how the DISCOM is located on the battlefield.

The Forward Support Battalion

You should remember that the area where the forward support battalion locates the bulk of its units is called the brigade support area (BSA). The FSB's mission is to support all divisional units located in the brigade area, This is illustrated by the following sketch.



How does the FSB provide that support?

The point to remember is that the FSB sets up supply points in the BSA and the brigade units come to the BSA to pick up what they need. The FSB does not normally deliver. The FSB depends on corps units to provide most field service support. There is one FSB for every maneuver brigade.

The Main Support Battalion

Now look at the main support battalion. From where on the battlefield does the MSB operate?

The MSB operates from the division support area (DSA) located in the division rear area.



This sketch indicates that the MSB has an area support mission. What does that mean?

The MSB supports all divisional forces operating within the division rear area.

In addition to its area support mission, the MSB also provides designated and reinforcing support to the FSB. You know that reinforcing is another way of describing backup, but why does it say "designated" support instead of simply saying that the MSB provides all supply and maintenance support to the FSB?

The MSB does not provide all supply and maintenance support.

It was already pointed out that the MSB does not have a class V mission, nor does it have much of an organic capability to provide field services.

Both the FSB and MSB have medical companies. Do you remember the difference between the two?

This was covered a long time ago. The medical company of the MSB is more capable. It has a medical supply office, a preventive medicine section, a mental health section, and an optical section.

Hopefully, most of this is starting to come back to you. Before leaving the division and moving on to the corps level, there is one more area you need to review.

What are the tactical logistics functions?

The tactical logistics functions are manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems.



When you consider the six tactical logistics functions, some are pretty straightforward, and some are a little more involved. Arming, Fueling, and Moving are fairly simple concepts. Fixing involves more than one normally thinks of when using the word "fix." It not only includes providing mechanics along with the proper training and tools, but it also includes supplying the needed repair part or parts and, when a major item of equipment or vehicle is not readily reparable, issuing a replacement. The function of sustaining includes the five elements shown on the preceding diagram. The fifth element, quality of life, is achieved through the accomplishment of the other four.

Corps-Level CSS Units

NOW, you are ready to look at how corps-level CSS units are organized and how they accomplish these six tactical logistics functions.

Read Appendix 2, The Corps Personnel and Finance Groups, and Appendix 3, The Corps Support Command Logistic Mission, and then return here and continue.

This is the overall organization you just read about:



As you can see, not all the combat service support units are assigned to the COSCOM. Why are the finance group and thepersonnel group assigned to the corps headquarters instead of to the COSCOM? (To answer this question, read the preface to FM 63-3, page ii.)

The COSCOM is made up of only logistics units. The preface of FM 63-3 identifies the term "logistics" as including supply, field services, maintenance, transportation, and health service support. The term "CSS" includes the logistics functions and finance and personnel service support. This explains why not all the units are assigned to the COSCOM. Whether it's called support, logistics, combat service support, or sustainment isn't really critical. Semantics are not important. What is important is to understand that everything shown here must work together to ensure that the corps has the wherewithal to conduct successful combat operations.

is this a fixed organization, or is it based on requirements?

The CSS structure of the corps is variable. It is based on all the same considerations that you have examined before: size and composition of the supported force, geographical considerations, and so on.

However, even though it has a variable organizational structure, it is not *completely* variable. All COSCOMs have subordinate rear and forward corps support groups and both a materiel management center and a movement control center-only the number and types of companies, teams, and detachments that make up these units are variable. The types of units are based on capabilities-the number of units is determined by workload. The types or kinds of support usually needed is pretty much the same; therefore, you can identify or establish a fairly standard headquarters structure and hierarchy of unit types. What is variable is the amount of that type of support that will be needed; that is, the number of particular units. The structure shown in the preceding diagram is what you would expect to see without even considering actual support requirements. The only thing really variable about the structure shown is the possible requirement for a transportation group headquarters, which

depends on the required number *(amount)* of transportation battalions (based on number of transportation companies).

Now, continue your examination of corps-level logistics with a look at how the COSCOM divides its area of responsibility between the forward and rear CSGs. The combat zone is diagrammed below.



As you can see, the combat zone is made up of the corps and division rear areas, the main battle area (MBA), and the covering force area (CFA). The DISCOM's FSBs operate from the BSAs in the main battle area while its MSB locates the DSA in the division rear area. Behind the division rear is the corps rear area, which is divided into corps support group areas of responsibility.

Notice that there is a BSA designatedfor each brigade support area and a DSA for each division support area The other designated areas are obvious& corps support areas, so why aren't they labeled as CSAs?

LSA stands for logistic support area. LSA is not a doctrinal term and is not found in any of the FMs you were issued. It was coined by CGSOC instructors because one can't talk about something that doesn't have a name. CSA was already taken-the corps storage area (for ammo) is the CSA. The next best alternative is LSA, so that is what we will use to describe the area in which the corps concentrates or groups some of its CSS units. There is only one BSA in each brigade rear area and only one DSA in each division rear area, but there can be several LSAs in the corps rear area. Even though only one support area is shown in the rear CSG area, there could easily (and probably would) be more than one.

Of course, the actual layout of the battlefield is based on METT-T considerations, but the distances shown in the diagram are accurate enough to draw some basic conclusions about when it may be necessary to displace to a new support area.

The DISCOM manual states that the DSA should be within 2 hours' drive from the BSA. Here, it shows about 35 to 45 kilometers. Which is right?

Both are right. Under combat conditions, it could easily take almost 2 hours to drive a military vehicle 35 to 45 kilometers.

Another rule of thumb is that corps support should be positioned no farther away from the division than a "line haul." Do you remember the definition of a line haul?

A line haul is determined by time and/or distance. A line haul is two round trips per day, which in practice limits the one-way distance traveled to about 90 miles (144 kilometers).

Does that truck with what is shown here?

Close enough!

There are a lot of good reasons why you want to keep distances to a minimum, but there are also very good reasons to stay as dispersed as possible. Why are the general distances reflected here important?

You can use them as a guide. If and when the distance you are supporting across starts to approach the distances shown here, it is time to consider displacing the support operation or support area. One mistake that novice planners often make is to want to displace the DSA or LSA when there is no real need to do so.

What's wrong with constant@ moving the support base to keep it as close as possible to the supportedforce? Doesn't this increase responsiveness?

Remember that when a CSS unit is moving, it can provide little support. Even displacing by echelon (which is the best way) means that not all of the support capability is available during the move. The point to remember is that moving DSAs and LSAs has many temporary disadvantages that should be considered-displacement should be done only when the situation really requires it. If you don't have any firsthand experience in this area, you can use the distances shown here as guides to help you determine when to plan your moves in concert with the operational flow of forces.

Look again at the combat zone layout provided earlier, and take a moment to appreciate the possible dimensions of the area supported by the corps. This area could cover up to 21,000 square kilometers. That's a lot of territory but as you will see, it can still get crowded. There are three forward CSGs shown. There is normally one per supported division. The forward CSG supports all forces located in its assigned area of responsibility in the corps rear area and also supports all nondivisional forces located in its corresponding division's rear area. The following sketch focuses on the operations of the forward CSGs.

The Forward Corps Support Group



This is a fairly simple diagram, but it represents a lot of work on the part of the forward CSG. As was mentioned, the forward CSG has area support responsibility (supports all units) in its portion of the corps rear and area support responsibilities for all nondivisional units in the division rear area. The forward CSG has two or more corps support battalions to provide all this support. It organizes one CSB with only direct support units and coordinates with the division to locate the bulk of the battalion in the DSA. This CSB supports all nondivisional units operating in the division area. It can even send some teams or detachments up to the BSA if needed to support nondivisional units operating that far forward. The CSG headquarters and the remainder of its support structure (one or more additional CSBs) operate from one or more logistic support areas (LSAs) behind the division rear boundary.

Notice that the sketch indicates the CSG provides logistics but not medical support. Why not?

The CSG doesn't have any medical units. This is a typical structure for a forward CSG:



Since the CSG has no medical units, who provides medical support to units in the corps rear area?

The medical brigade assigned to the COSCOM provides medical support in the corps rear area.

What about medical support for the nondivisional units operating in the division rear area? Does the medical brigade take care of them since they are corps-level units?

No. The medical company of the DISCOM's main support battalion has area medical responsibility in the division rear area. It supports *all* units located within that area.

Which of the corps support battalions shown in the preceding diagram would normally be located in the division support area?

The CSB on the far right would be supporting within the division rear area. It is the only one of the three that consists of only DS units. The other two have GS units in them.

Why are there two battalions instead of just one operating in the corps area behind the division rear area?

The only reason to have any battalion headquarters is for command and control. A battalion headquarters can normally handle three to seven subordinate companies. Because there are at least nine companies in this example, two headquarters are needed. Other than span of control, there is no special reason for the number of battalions.

You need to look at how the subordinate companies provide support, but first finish examining the corps support groups, This is what a typical rear CSG looks like:



How many rear CSGs does a corps normally have?

Rear CSGs are allocated on the basis of one per COSCOM.

Also notice that the rear CSG contains two types of battalions. There are corps support battalions (CSBs) and junctional battalions like the S&S and transportation battalions. What is the difference between a CSB and a functional battalion?

One major difference is in the missions of the two types of battalions. The functional battalions provide their type of support or function corpswide while the corps support battalions provide multiple functions within only a designated portion of the corps area. This will be explained later. Another difference is in the headquarters for the battalions. The functional battalions have single function headquarters with commanders from that functional area; for example, the transportation battalion would have a transportation corps lieutenant colonel in command, and his staff would be concerned with planning and conducting transportation operations. Conversely, all CSBs are commanded by commanders with a functional area (FA) 90 designation. FA 90 designates that individual as "multifunctional." This designation is awarded only to officers branched in transportation, ordnance, quartermaster, aviation maintenance, or medical service corps. In addition to the traditional S-staff organization, the headquarters staff of the CSB also includes an element not found in the functional battalions-a support operations section. That section provides the functional expertise (in supply and services, transportation, and maintenance) to oversee the daily support operations of subordinate units.

The rear CSG will normally have the functional battalions shown in the previous diagram (including the water supply battalion if the corps is in an arid environment) and one or more corps support battalions consisting of direct support supply, maintenance, and services companies. The rationale for this organization becomes more apparent when you consider its operations.

The Rear Corps Support Group



The rear CSG operates from one or more logistic support areas in the corps rear. Here, just one large LSA is shown, but in reality, there would probably be several smaller ones. The CSG has three basic missions. The corps support battalions provide support on an area basis, providing supply, maintenance, and services to all units operating in their assigned areas of responsibility. The functional battalions provide their particular support throughout the entire corps area. The rear CSG also reinforces the forward CSGs. Again, notice that the rear CSG, like the forward CSG, does not provide medical support. The medical brigade supports the entire corps rear area.

So far, you've seen several diagrams showing the BSA, DSA, and a couple of LSAs. what do all these support areas have in common?

You may have come up with all sorts of answers, but one observation you should have made is that these are all really base clusters. This should fit in with what you remember about organizing for security in the rear area.

You should now understand how the corps support groups are organized and located in the corps area, what their missions are, and how they distribute those responsibilities among their subordinate units.

The following diagrams summarize the organizational structures you have been examining. Mark these pages and return here whenever you need to put a unit back into an organizational perspective.





If you have any remaining questions about the COSCOM organization, review the first 25 pages of FM 63-3, chapter 1.

When you studied division-level CSS operations, you viewed them in the contest of the tactical logistics functions. This lesson guide will also follow that method. The six tactical logistics functions are shown across the top of the following diagram:



As you can see, the manning and sustaining functions share the subfunction of personnel service support. The easiest way to understand this relationship is to think of manning as supporting units and commanders and sustaining as supporting soldiers. start with the manning function. You should remember that manning consists of the three elements that are highlighted on the diagram. Manning is the provision of soldiers to the battlefield.

- The *personnel readiness management* system distributes soldiers to subordinate commands based on documented manpower requirements or authorizations and the commander's priorities.

- The *casualty operations management* system records, reports, and verifies casualties; notifies appropriate individuals; and provides assistance to next of kin.

- *Replacement management* is physically receiving, accounting, processing, supporting, equipping/reequipping, training, and delivering personnel. This includes replacements and return-to-duty soldiers and civilians.

These three elements are included in what is called personnel services support, which, as you saw, is also part of the sustainment function. You'll look at sustainment later. Right now, continue with the corps units that support the manning function.



The personnel group is assigned to the corps, not to the COSCOM, but it still has the combat service support mission of supporting the manning function. The personnel group usually locates a subordinate personnel services battalion in the corps rear area and in each division rear area to provide readiness and casualty management on an area basis. It also places a replacement company in direct support of each division and one to support the nondivisional units operating in the corps rear area. Replacements flow from the theater straight to the replacement company in the division rear area for personnel assigned to the division and from theater directly to the replacement company located in the corps rear area for nondivisional replacements.

Manning is a pretty simple and straightforward function. Now, look at a function that is not quite so simple and straightforward-the arming function.



This diagram shows the flow of ammunition within the corps area Before examining how ail this works, you need to make sure that you understand a few terms that may be new to you. Notice the acronym in the box at the lower left of the diagram? What is a DODIC?

A DODIC is a Department of Defense identification code. There is one DODIC assigned to each component of ammunition. Each type of projectile, fuze, caliber, and so on, has a unique DODIC. In other words, a single DODIC shipment would consist of only one kind of ammo component. Don't confuse DODIC with lot number, Lot numbers are used to track when and where a particular item of ammo was manufactured.

How about PLS? Are you familiar with this?

PLS is the palletized load system. A PLS is actually a 16.5-ton tactical vehicle composed of a prime mover with integral self-load/unload capability, a 16.5-ton trailer, and flatracks (demountable cargo beds). These vehicles can also be equipped with materiel handling equipment (MHE) and/or winch. The PLS performs line haul, local haul, unit resupply, and other missions in the support of modernized, highly mobile organizations. The PLS prime movers with associated trailers are selectively replacing or augmenting the standard tactical vehicles currently in field artillery and transportation units. The use of flatracks greatly enhances the ability to handle bulk ammo. Currently, the PLS can handle only ammo, but modifications to the flatrack are being developed to allow the system to also haul general cargo loads. *For this subcourse, consider a PLS truck as capable of handling only ammo loads.*

You have covered it before, but for review, what is a CCL?

A combat-configured load is a preplanned package of ammunition designed to support a specific weapon system or unit and is transported as a single unit. The primary purpose of a CCL is to simplify planning and coordination for ammunition resupply. CCLs are a predetermined mix of ammunition designed to fit on a specific vehicle such as a stake and platform (S&P) trailer or a PLS flatrack.

Now that you understand the terminology, you can look at how the corps is armed.

- Ammo is shipped from the ports and the theater storage areas (TSAs) to the corps storage areas (CSAs) on trucks, railcars, and even barges if possible. The CSAs get about half of their ammo from the ports and the other half from the TSAs. The ammo is packaged as single DODICs.

- The CSA located in the rear CSG's area supports the units operating therein and also stores the corps reserve stocks of ammunition.

- There will normally be another CSA in support of each division. It is located in the forward CSG's area and supports all the units operating within that portion of the corps rear area.

- That CSA does much more than just support the local units. It forwards some of the single DODIC flatracks to the ammunition supply points (ASPs) supporting the division and located along the division rear boundary. It does this with PLS trucks. The CSA also downloads some single DODIC flatracks and repackages the ammo into CCLs, which are delivered forward to the ammunition transfer points (ATPs) supporting the maneuver brigades.

- The ASPs support nondivisional units and, when time is available, convert single DODIC shipments received from the CSA into CCLs before sending the ammo forward to the ATPs.

- As shown by the diagram, the ATP that supports each brigade gets approximately 25 percent of its ammo from its supporting ASP and the rest from the CSA supporting the division. The 25-75 split is only a planning factor. The actual percentages are going to be based on existing unit requirements and capabilities.

Notice that as the ammo moves forward from the theater level, more and more of it is converted into CCLs. By the time the ammo gets to the using battalion, it is just about all CCL.

Now that you understand the flow of ammunition, can you figure out what units are needed to make that system work and how they are organized?

What unit or units would be responsible for operating the three ASPs and the ATP located behind the division?

This is done by a corps ammo company. The forward CSG positions a CSB in this area. That CSB structure inches a DS ammo company. The ammo company headquarters will normally be in the DSA, but it will set up its ASPs and ATP where they can best satisfy support requirements.

Who wouldprovide the CSA that supports the division?

This CSA is located in the forward CSG's area, so you would look within the CSBs that support that area. You'll find that there is a GS ammo company there.

That leaves the CSA that also stores the corps ammo reserves. Who's responsiblefor this one?

In the rear CSG is a (functional) ammo battalion with two GS ammo companies to handle this CSA and its customers.

What about chemical munitions? Who handles those?

Go to the index at the back of FM 63-3. On page Index-2, you will find two entries related to chemical ammunitions: Chemical ammunition organization, page 5-5, and Chemical ammunition release, page 5-10. Read both of these entries in chapter 5.

Now you know that chemical ammunition is provided by the same system that handles conventional ammunition, only the releaseprocedures are different. But what about nuclear ammunition?

You won't find a listing in the FM 63-3 index related to nuclear ammunition. This is because the Army no longer has a tactical nuclear mission.

That is a simple explanation of arming the corps. As you've seen, it is easy to understand how the various COSCOM units are organized and operate if you know what and where support is required or provided.

If you need further information about the arming function, read FM 63-3, Chapter 5, Arming the Corps Force. Don't get confused by the differences between what is described in this lesson guide and what is shown in FM 63-3. This lesson guide reflects only PLS operations. The FM reflects both with and without PLS, and it can be confusing unless you read it ail carefully.

Another critical item of supply is fuel. The modem corps uses as much fuel per day as General George S. Patton's entire Third Army used in its race across France. The COSCOM may need to supply an estimated 600,000 gallons of fuel per day to support a heavy division sector. Nondivisional elements may require an additional 80,000 gallons each day. To support this requirement, COSCOM petroleum supply units and DS supply units must stock 11 million gallons in dispersed class III points. The following diagram reflects how the corps is fueled.

FUELING the Corps



As you go through the following explanation of fueling activities, refer to the summary diagrams that you marked on pages 2-14 and 2-15 to see where the various units mentioned fit in the COSCOM structure.

- The theater army (TA) petroleum group distributes bulk fuel either by pipeline, railcar, or truck into the corps area.

- The POL supply battalion (a functional battalion of the rear CSG) operates in the corps rear and stores the corps' fuel reserves.

- Fuel is distributed as indicated by the diagram. Unit customers receive bulk fuel from supporting POL supply points.

- POL trucks transport fuel from the POL supply battalion to the DS supply companies of the corps support battalions in the rear CSG. These companies provide fuel to all forces located in their area. The POL supply battalion even operates a POL point for nearby units.

- The POL battalion also supplies the GS POL supply company in the CSB of the forward CSG.

- The POL supply company supplies the DS supply companies, one or more operating in the forward portion of the corps rear area and the other operating in the division rear area to support nondivisional units located there.

- The POL supply company also supplies the DISCOM. As you should remember, bulk fuel is delivered to the supply and service company of the MSB (in the DSA) which then delivers some of that fuel to the supply company of the FSB (in the BSA), or the POL supply company can throughput directly to the FSB, bypassing the MSB when required.

- Bulk fuel (aviation and ground fuel) is delivered to the headquarters and supply company of the division aviation support battalion.

This is a rather simplistic view of the process, but it should give you the idea.

How do all these units know how much fuel to sendforward?

This is where the corps materiel management center (CMMC) comes into the picture. It receives requirements (forecasts) from the corps subordinate units and usage reports from petroleum suppliers. The CMMC develops a distribution plan based on available fuel and priorities. When everything works right, the system supplies bulk fuel to the right place in the right amount, replacing the quantities that have been issued. At the corps level, you need to remember that the amount of fuel sent forward to the divisions is restricted not only by availability of corps resources, but also by the divisions' ability to receive, store, and issue that fuel.

That completes fueling the corps. If you need more information about the fueling function, read FM 63-3, Chapter 6, Fueling the Corps Force.

You are now going to look at the fixing function. What things are included in fixing the corps?

Included are the actual repairing of equipment, recovery and evacuation, supplying of repair parts, salvage, and the replacement of major class VII (such as combat vehicles).

Remember that the focus is on repairing forward. All these maintenance companies have maintenance and/or systems support teams of various types that work as far forward as practical within the limitations of the commander's priorities, resources and time available, and the tactical situation, The number and types of these teams are based on the types of units and the amount of equipment to be supported. See if you can identify all the units shown in the following diagram and determine how they help accomplish the fixing function.

FIXING the Corps



Start with the maintenance company shown in the brigade area and work your way back To whom does this maintenance company belong and whom does it support?

The only maintenance company normally located in the brigade area is the one assigned to the FSB. It supports its designated maneuver brigade.

There are five divisional maintenance units shown in the division rear area. What are they and to whom do they belong?

The heavy maintenance, light maintenance, and missile maintenance (also called missile support) companies belong to the DISCOM's main support battalion. The aviation maintenance company belongs to the division aviation support battalion. The maintenance company to the right of the aviation maintenance company is the ground maintenance company, also from the DASB, that supports the division aviation brigade's ground vehicles.

What about that corps-level maintenance company shown in the division rear area?

It belongs to the CSB of the forward CSG and provides maintenance support to the nondivisional units operating in the division rear area.

And the two maintenance units located in the forwardportion of the corps rear area?

These two maintenance companies belong to corps support battalions of the forward CSG and support all units located within the forward CSG's portion of the corps rear area.

And the last two maintenance units (located in the rear CSG's area) belong to corps support battalions of the rear CSG and support all the units in that area.

Now, refer to the fixing diagram as you examine how all these units get the repair parts they need to do their jobs.

- The repair parts company in the rear CSG's supply and service battalion receives repair parts from the theater army area command (TAACOM) and then distributes those repair parts to the other maintenance companies as shown by the arrows.

- Missile repair parts are received from the theater by the missile and Hawk maintenance companies. They repair equipment in the corps rear and forward needed repair parts to the missile maintenance company of the MSB.

- The aviation maintenance company in the corps rear belongs to the rear CSG's aircraft maintenance company, supports aircraft in the corps rear, and forwards needed repair parts to the aviation maintenance company in the division area.

The process just described applies to all common item repair parts. Some parts, especially some missile and aviation repair parts, are designated for delivery via the air lines of communication and are, therefore, referred to as ALOC items. These are sent by air to the airfield nearest the requiring maintenance company, which then picks up the items, bypassing all the intermediate units.

Who decides what items are ALOC items and who manages the requisition and flow of repair parts for the corps ?

The CMMC does this, based on the corps commander's guidance and established priorities,

Another thing managed by the CMMC is the supply of class VII. Refer to the flow shown on the bottom portion of the fixing diagram. As the units are discussed, you may want to refer to the summary diagrams on pages 2-14 and 2-15.

- Class VII is received from the theater by the heavy materiel supply company in the S&S battalion of the rear CSG.

- In accordance with instructions from the CMMC, the class VII item is loaded on a heavy equipment transporter (HET), if needed, and sent forward to a supply unit for issue to the receiving unit. The forward CSG has a DS supply company in a CSB behind the division rear boundary and one in the CSB that is located in the division rear. These DS supply companies receive and issue class VII to the nondivisional units located in their areas.

- Class VII supply within the division is almost as simple. Class VII is either delivered straight through to the supply company in the FSB or dropped off at the supply and service company of the MSB. As required, class VII is moved from the DSA to the BSA on HETs belonging to the MSB's transportation motor transport (TMT) company.

You can now move on to the moving function.

When one thinks of moving the corps, one usually thinks of trucks. What types of trucks or truck units are found in the corps area?

There are several types of truck units, but basically, they are medium truck (POL), medium truck (PLS), medium truck (container/cargo), medium truck (water), and heavy equipment transport (HET). There are also combinations of these, such as the transportation motor transport (TMT) company assigned to the DISCOM MSB that includes both medium trucks (container/cargo) and HETs.

Refer to the summary diagrams (pages 2-14 and 2-15) and look at the truck units that are part of the COSCOM. Notice that some truck units are assigned to transportation battalions while other truck units are assigned to other types offunctional battalions. Why is that?

This has to do with what is called "habitual support relationships." Some types of trucks can be used only for transporting a particular commodity. Since POL trucks haul only bulk fuel, it makes sense to habitually pair them with POL supply companies, The same is true with water trucks and water supply companies, A habitual support relationship also applies to PLS trucks until flatracks that can be used for something other than ammo are fielded. On the other hand, since medium trucks (container/cargo) and HETs can be used for just about anything other than uncontainerized liquids; they are not aligned with a particular type of supply company.

The following diagram isn't as complicated as previous ones, but the moving function is just as important.



This diagram shows only corps transportation units.

- There is a light-medium truck company in the CSB that operates in the division rear. The rest of the forward CSG relies on the medium truck company (container/cargo) for its transportation needs. The POL trucks are used for the obvious.

- In the rear CSG's area, one or more companies of POL trucks will normally be assigned or attached to the POL supply battalion.

- There are also some HET companies that normally belong to the transportation battalion.

- The medium truck companies may be container/cargo or PLS. Container/cargo trucks are usually in the transportation battalion. If the PLS trucks can be used only for ammo, they might rightfully be included in the ammunition battalion.

- The two units shown in the lower left comer of the diagram support airdrop operations. The corps will normally have an airdrop supply company to rig aircraft for aerial deliveries and an aerial equipment repair company to maintain and repair the rigging-they usually come as a set. Airdrop is a field service, but it is also a form of transportation.

- The rear CSG's transportation battalion also includes one or more cargo transfer companies to transship cargo at air, rail, motor, and inland barge terminals.

The diagram also shows MCTs and MRTs. What are they?

They are movement control teams (MCTs) and movement regulating teams (MRTs), and they help the corps movement control center (CMCC) manage movement within the corps area. The CMCC is the nerve center of

the transportation system where movement requirements are received and analyzed, where transportation resources are allocated, and where resources are committed to satisfy these movement requirements.

Both types of teams belong to the corps movement control center.

- MCTs provide or obtain the transportation assets (trucks). They process transportation requests from units in their area of responsibility, committing transportation resources under their control and forwarding requests that exceed their capability to the CMCC for action. Usually, one or more MCTs are in each CSG's area. As you can see on the diagram, an MCT may operate in the division area as well.

- MRTs regulate the transportation flow (routing). They plan, route, and schedule use of roads. The MRTs are located along vehicle and convoy routes, and they coordinate traffic movement and report disruptions in traffic flow due to vehicle breakdown road conditions, or enemy action.

If MRTs regulate traffic, what do the military police do?

Their functions are complementary but completely different. MPs *enforce* traffic regulations.

For additional information about the moving function, read FM 63-3, Chapter 8, Moving the Corps Force.

That finishes movement. You will now look at sustaining soldiers and their systems.

SUSTAINING Soldiers and Their Systems

The sustaining function includes personnel service support, health services, field services, general supply support, and quality of life. You need to look briefly at the first four of these. When they are taken care of, the fifth one, quality of life, will be also.

Look at the first area-personnel service support:



- Resource management is handled by the corps' resource management office or comptroller.

- Skip over personnel services and finance services for now. You will come back to them in a minute.

- Chaplaincy activities are taken care of by the corps chaplain.

- Command information is handled by the G1 or assistant chief of staff, personnel, and the public affairs officer.

- Legal services are the purview of the staff judge advocate.

The activities above (except for the two you skipped) are accomplished by the general, special, and/or personal staff, not by combat service support units.

Now back to personnel services and finance services, which are accomplished by CSS units. You already examined three of the elements of personnel services. Readiness management, replacement management, and casualty operations management were addressed with the manning function. Take a look at the remaining four elements of personnel services fist, and then move on to financial services.

Remember, the personnel and finance groups are assigned to the corps, not to the COSCOM. Because of this, they are not covered in FM 63-3 but are addressed in FM 100-15. Appendix 2 to this lesson guide contains the latest information concerning these two groups.

Personnel and Finance Service Units



The personnel services battalions of the corps' personnel group have personnel detachments to handle personnel accounting and strength reporting; personnel information management; and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) and community support operations. (It could be argued that the band also contributes to MWR activities and community support operations.) The personnel services battalion also has a postal company to provide and manage postal operations.

The finance group has finance battalions, finance detachments, and finance support teams to provide finance services throughout the corps area.

What finance services are needed on the battlefield?

Finance services include disbursing currency (cash/money) to battlefield commanders. Currency is like another class of supply, a commodity required to execute the battle. Finance units provide and control currency on the battlefield.

- There is a need to pay for contract operations and commercial vendor services operations (such as local purchases and imprest fund operations). This includes paying for goods and services such as laundry operations, bath operations, transportation, maintenance, supply parts, class I supplements, and construction materials that have been obtained through formal contracting procedures.

- There is also a requirement to pay for non-US support. Finance units provide pay support for host nation employees, day labor, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), and civilian internees.

Now that you're familiar with the types of personnel and finance units, you can look at where and how they operate.

Postal and Finance Support



The personnel services battalion provides postal support through one or more postal companies operating postal platoons throughout the corps area. Processing ordinary and accountable mail involves:

- Receiving.
- Separating.
- Sorting.
- Dispatching.

- Redirecting.

As the arrows indicate, mail flows into and out of the corps through a GS postal platoon that routes mail to and receives mail from all the other DS postal platoons.

The finance battalion also locates subordinate finance detachments to provide area support. These will locate as far forward as the brigade area.

Health Service Support

Another and very critical subfunction of sustaining is health service support. Much of the medical force structure is in flux. New unit organizations and medical concepts are being implemented over time.

However, the principles of health service support remain unchanged.



As mentioned earlier, the COSCOM normally has a medical brigade to command and control all nondivision al medical units in the corps area of operations. It usually organizes most of those assets into subordinate medical groups. Using the diagram, start with the mobile army surgical hospital (MASH) and work your way back. (The medical force structure is changing-MASHs are being replaced by surgical teams beginning in FY 96.)

- There are normally two MASHs supporting the corps. Although the MASH is a corps-level unit, it is designed primarily to function within the division rear area or in the corps rear area near the division rear boundary. The 30-bed MASH provides hospitalization for patients who require far-forward surgery and medical treatment to stabilize them for further evacuation.

- The medical brigade normally has two or three combat support hospitals (CSHs) for each division it supports. This hospital can handle all types of patients and will normally be employed in the corps rear area, The CSH provides hospitalization for up to 296 patients; surgical capacity with eight operating room tables; pharmacy, clinical laboratory, blood banking, radiology, and nutrition care services; and physical therapy support to patients.

- The medical brigade will usually have an evacuation battalion with one or more ground ambulance companies and air ambulance companies to evacuate patients from points as far forward as possible.

- The area support medical battalion provides routine levels I and II health services (dispensary care), emergency care, and patient evacuation on an area basis to all corps elements that do not have organic medical resources.

- The medical battalion (logistics) (forward) provides class VIII supplies, optical fabrication, medical equipment maintenance support, and blood storage and distribution to divisional and nondivisional units operating in the corps area.

- The medical holding company can handle up to 1,200 minimal care patients.

- The combat stress company (CSC), veterinary detachment, and dental companies support the corps on an area basis and operate as far forward as possible.

The sustainment function also includes field services.

Field Service Support



What activities are included in field services?

Field services include food preparation and water purification, bakery, laundry and shower support, clothing and light textile repair, airdrop supply and repair, and mortuary affairs.

The quartermaster field service companies shown in the previous diagram provide tactical field services to division and nondivisional personnel from the corps rear area to the forward line of own troops (FLOT). This includes shower, laundry, limited clothing repair, and delousing. Field service companies are normally assigned to corps support battalions (as shown on the summary diagrams on pages 2-14 and 2-15).

What did you learn earlier about the two companies shown in the lower left corner?

These units were covered as part of the moving function. Airdrop is a field service, but it is accomplished with aircraft. The airdrop supply and airdrop equipment/repair companies provide airdrop support, but they don't have any aircraft. Air Force aircraft as well as Army helicopters are used to provide airdrop.

The supply and service battalion of the rear CSG doctrinally has a mortuary affairs collection company. This company has five forward collection platoons that can operate four collection points each. This provides for 20 collection points throughout the corps, division, and brigade areas. The collection company's main collection platoon, located in the corps rear, receives remains from the five forward collection platoons. The main collection platoon arranges for remains to be further evacuated to the rear by air and surface transportation to cemetery or mortuary platoons in the theater army area. This is a good example of a functional battalion from the rear CSG providing support throughout the corps area.

The last piece of sustaining to be examined is general supply support.

General Supply Support



The supply of classes I, II, III (packaged), and IV and maps is straightforward. The GS supply companies receive supplies from the theater and resupply the supply companies as shown above. There is a GS supply company in the rear CSG and one in the forward CSG. The DS supply companies assigned to the corps support battalions resupply the nondivisional units located in their areas. The supply and service company in the DSA and the supply company in the BSA support division and brigade units respectively.

Classified maps are requisitioned and distributed differently than regular maps. Classified maps are requested through command channels. The intelligence staff (S2/G2) must approve the requisition. The GS supply company distributes the maps to the requester, skipping all intervening supply companies.

This has been a very cursory overview of corps-level support units and how they operate. You've looked at the bits and pieces, so it's time to put everything together.

Corps CSS Units



You should now have a better appreciation for the depth and complexity of the CSS structure that supports the corps. If you add all the combat and combat support units to this picture, you can envision why synchronization on the battlefield is so important.

Before you can start planning corps operations, you need to understand how the corps area is divided between CSGs and how those CSGs are organized to support the corps force. Here's your chance to see how well you understand the COSCOM's support structure.

Turn to page 1-15 in the M/S320B Staff Planning Book The troop list for the 10th COSCOM starts on this page. If you look in the right-hand column, you will see that it states, "The following units will be task organized during lesson 2." This is lesson 2. You don't have to worry about organizing the medical brigade, but you are required to organize the rest of the COSCOM-the corps support groups.

Get out a clean piece of paper and, based on your acquired knowledge of the COSCOM, organize the required corps support groups. The COSCOM will be supporting two heavy divisions. You should be able to complete this requirement in about 20 minutes.

When you feel confident with your solution, compare the organization you developed against the one shown on the following pages. Do not skip this requirement! You will need the expertise you confirm during this practical exercise to satisfy the requirements of later lessons.

Complete the assigned requirement before turning the page.

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PRACTICAL EXERCISE SOLUTION
ORGANIZING THE COSCOM

The commander of the 10th COSCOM has approved your recommendation to organize the 10th COSCOM corps support groups as shown below. This structure is derived from the list of units provided in appendix 1 of the M/S320B Staff Planning Book. *Save this information. It reflects the CSG organization for combat that will exist at the beginning of lesson 4.* (You may want to remove these two pages and attach them at the appropriate place in the Staff Planning Book.)

13th CSG (Fwd)

13th CSB
- 593d Ord Co (Convl) (GS MOAD/PLS)
- 714th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
- 741st Trans Co (Mdm Trk Cntnr/Cgo)
- 273d QM Co (Sup) (GS)
- 9012th Maint Co (DS)
- 9013th Maint Co (DS)

90th CSB
- 220th QM Co (Petri Sup)
- 721st Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
- 235th QM Co (Sup) (DS)
- 293d QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
- 9017th Maint Co (DS)

199th CSB (located in division area)
- 9011th Maint Co (DS)
- 271st QM Co (Sup) (DS)
- 291st QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
- 580th Ord Co (DS) (MOAD/PLS)
- 759th Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)

14th CSG (Fwd)

14th CSB
- 594th Ord Co (Convl) (GS MOAD/PLS)
- 707th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
- 748th Trans Co (Mdm Trk Cntnr/Cgo)
- 239th QM Co (Sup) (GS)
- 9015th Maint Co (DS)
- 9016th Maint Co (DS)

91st CSB
- 221st QM Co (Petrl Sup)

722d Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
- 253d QM Co (Sup) (DS)
- 292d QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
- 9018th Maint Co (DS)

198th CSB (located in division area)
- 9014th Maint Co (DS)
- 208th QM Co (Sup) (DS)
- 294th QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
- 581st Ord Co (DS) (MOADS/PLS)
- 735th Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)

20th CSG (Rear)

129th CSB
- 260th Maint Co (DS) (Patriot)
- 249th Maint Co (DS) (Msl Spt)
- 237th Maint Co (DS)
- 9025th Maint Co (DS)
- 9027th Maint Co (DS)

138th CSB
- 251st QM Co (Sup) (DS)
- 238th QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
- 9028th Maint Co (DS)
- 9029th Maint Co (DS)

932d Avn Bn (AVIM)
- 700th Avn Co (AVIM)
- 701st Avn Co (AVIM)
- 702d Avn Co (AVIM)

33d QM Bn (Petrl Sup)
- 229th QM Co (Petri Sup)
- 260th QM Co (Petri Sup)
- 724th Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
- 725th Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)

55th Ord Bn Ammo (DWGS)
- 590th Ord Co (Convl) (GS MOAD/PLS)
- 591st Ord Co (Convl) (GS MOADS/PLS)

20th S&S Bn
- 257th QM Hvy Mat Sup Co (GS)
- 258th QM Co (Adrp Sup)
- 259th QM Co (Adrp Equip Rep & Sup)
- 298th QM Co (Rep Parts Sup) (GS)
- 20th Coll Co (MA)
- 290th QM Co (Sup) (GS)

180th TMT Bn
- 777th Trans Co (Hvy Trk)
- 778th Trans Co (Hvy Trk)
- 779th Trans Co (Hvy Trk)
- 780th Trans Co (Cgo Trf)
- 781st Trans Co (Cgo Trf)

182d TMT Bn
- 734th Trans Co (Lt/Mdrn Trk)
- 733d Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)
- 709th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
- 710th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
- 746th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
- 747th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)

There shouldn't be much variance between what you developed and what is reflected in this solution, The unit identifications (number designations) are not important as long as the type and size of the unit is correct, When you get to lesson 4, use the organization provided in this solution.

CONCLUSION

The unit list you were provided to work with was sufficient to organize a complete structure similar to that presented earlier and shown in the reference manuals. The support structure you developed was not constrained by an insufficiency of units. This may not always be the case. The organizational structures presented during this lesson may not be achievable in an actual deployment or employment. By understanding corps-level support capabilities and organizations under the "best case," you will be able to modify or adjust to a "less than best case" situation if required.

This lesson covered a lot of material. You should now better understand and appreciate the corps' support structure and its area missions. Each CSG is structured with the units it needs to accomplish its assigned missions.

If you need further information or an explanation about how the corps accomplishes the tactical logistics functions, refer to FM 63-3. Chapter 4 covers sustaining; chapter 5, arming; chapter 6, fueling; chapter 7, fixing; and chapter 8, moving the corps. Don't be afraid to turn to a reference manual when in doubt,

Now that you've examined corps-level logistics, continue with lesson 3.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. Corps-Level Logistics

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. The Division Support Command Logistic Mission

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The division support command (DISCOM) provides division-level logistics and health service support (HSS) to all organic and attached division elements. The corps support command (COSCOM) provides combat service support (CSS) to the nondivisional units operating in the division area. The DISCOM commander is the principal division logistic operator. He exercises full command authority over all support command organic units. The division G4 has coordinating staff responsibility for logistic planning. He develops division-level plans, policies, and priorities. The relationship between the division G4 and the DISCOM commander must be extremely close because of the similarities of interests. The DISCOM support operations section and the division materiel management center (DMMC) plan and coordinate to ensure logistic support for all division and attached units.

The DISCOM provides the following CSS:

- Support of classes I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX supplies.

- Operation of ammunition transfer points (ATPs) within the division. (Under the maneuver-oriented ammunition distribution system (MOADS), the corps direct support (DS) ammunition company operates the division rear ATP.)

- Direct support maintenance (DSM) and reinforcing unit maintenance support for all common and missile materiel organic to the division and aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) support for all aviation materiel.

- Materiel (supply and maintenance) management for the division.

- Materiel salvage facilities.

- Echelon I and II HSS to units assigned and attached to the division, as well as intradivision ground evacuation, emergency dental care, and optometry support.

- Planning, coordinating, and conducting rear operations within its assigned area of responsibility (AOR).

The DISCOM depends on the following:

- Corps transportation to bring supplies forward to the division support area (DSA) and brigade support areas (BSAs) (classes IV and V and limited class III).

- The division aviation brigade or corps medium helicopter units for airlift needed to support logistic requirements.

- Additional water support distribution

- Nondivisional field service units for laundry, bath, clothing exchange, and mortuary affairs services (only when there are no authorized organic augmentations).

- Appropriate corps elements for financial, legal, personnel, and administrative services.
- Corps aeromedical evacuation units for aeromedical evacuation support.

DISCOM ORGANIZATION

The following shows the organization of the DISCOM.



DISCOM Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC)

The DISCOM headquarters (HQ) commands and controls its organic and attached units. It supervises and controls all division-level logistic and HSS operations. It also advises the division commander and staff concerning supply, maintenance, medical, transportation, and field services functions throughout the division. The HQ company provides all necessary administrative, supply, maintenance, and field feeding support for the company and the DMMC.

Division Materiel Management Center (DMMC)

The DMMC is the primary materiel managing element in the division. The center receives policy and operational guidance from the DISCOM commander and advises him on materiel (supply and maintenance, less medical) management. Activities include-

- Determining supply requirements.
- Ordering and directing the distribution of supplies the division receives (except class VIII).
- Developing and supervising the division authorized stockage lists (ASLs) and prescribed load lists (PLLS).

• Operating all integrated division maintenance management information programs. The DMMC maintains maintenance status, including problems, maintenance requirements, and unit materiel readiness in the division.

Main Support Battalion (MSB)

The MSB is the main logistic and medical operator in the division rear. It supports units in the division rear and provides designated and reinforcing support to the forward support battalions (FSBs). The battalion provides DSM, supply, transportation, and medical support to units for a variety of missions. When the battalion is augmented, it also provides field services. The MSB effectively manages subordinate units. It also directs and coordinates security for these units. A detailed description of the MSB's mission, organization, and functions is in FM 63-21.

One MSB is organic to the DISCOM and is normally commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The command element supervises, directs, and coordinates assigned and attached units that run the support operations in and around the DSA. The following shows a sample MSB layout within the DSA.



NOTE: Sizes are approximations to give general planning guidance. Actual sizes will depend on available terrain.

The DSA is that portion of the division rear occupied by the DISCOM and division rear command posts (CPs) and many of the units organic and attached to the DISCOM. This area may also contain combat support units and COSCOM elements that support the division. The DISCOM commander is also the DSA commander. The division rear CP normally collocates with the DISCOM CP. This helps with coordination, shares area communication assets, and draws life support and security.

The DSA is normally between the division rear boundary and the BSAs and next to air-landing facilities and the main supply route (MSR). The DSA's precise location depends on a number of factors. Some of the major factors are the tactical plans, the location of COSCOM installations, and the MSRs. The terrain in the area of operations (AO), security, and access to lines of communication (LOCs) must also be considered. It may be necessary, because of terrain restrictions or a guerrilla threat, to limit dispersion of logistic facilities even when there is a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) threat. Ideally, logistic activities disperse far enough to avoid the destruction of more than one unit. However, too much dispersion may reduce operational efficiency. It also increases the vulnerability of logistic units to sabotage, pilferage, guerrilla attack, and enemy conventional attack. Defensive measures should be taken to ensure the least interruption in support operations. All troops must know how to use the individual and crew-served weapons organic to their unit. DISCOM units in the DSA displace only as necessary to maintain continuous support to the division and for security reasons. If a move is necessary, the DISCOM commander recommends the new location. This is done through the division rear CP operations cell. All DISCOM units in the division rear (except the division aviation support battalion) must be able to move every 1 to 3 days.

Commanding, controlling, and coordinating the many MSB elements with their diverse missions present a challenge for the MSB commander and staff. They must perform the logistic tasks of arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining the soldier. They must integrate these tasks into a comprehensive battle support plan. The thrust is to push CSS as far forward as possible.

Division logistic and medical elements are integrated into the MSB's command and control system. This allows the division to shift its support effort to the critical place and time to influence the battle. For example, MSB elements can and do routinely operate outside of the DSA. Some elements habitually support specific divisional units. Others may be ad hoc formations to reinforce a main effort sector or an FSB. The DISCOM HQ coordinates support. organizes for combat, assigns locations, and specifies command relationships after thorough consultation with the MSB, DMMC, FSBs, and supported units.

The MSB performs its mission if it supports the division's course of action and meets the DISCOM commander's guidance. Specifically, it supports the division rear and reinforces units by providing or coordinating to provide all classes of supply, as well as maintenance, medical, field services, and transportation support. in the amounts and at the times specified in the MSB standing operating procedure (SOP). It must replenish its supported units' basic loads of all supplies, including repair parts. It must also replenish prescribed loads of maintenance-significant class II and class IV items and maintain equipment to meet prescribed operational levels. It distributes class VII items in accordance with the division commander's priorities. The MSB coordinates transportation requirements with the movement control officer (MCO) to meet the division's needs. Finally, it coordinates medical evacuation and treatment operations and field services activities with the DISCOM support operations branch to meet division rear needs.

Forward Support Battalions (FSBs)

The FSBs are organic to the DISCOM. There is one FSB for each divisional maneuver brigade. These units provide division-level logistics and HSS to the brigades and other divisional units located in the brigade areas. FM 63-20 contains a detailed description of the FSB mission, organization, and functions.

Each FSB has a headquarters and headquarters detachment, supply company, maintenance company, and medical company. As part of the maintenance company, the FSB is assigned tank, mechanized infantry, and artillery system support teams (SSTs). The FSB maintenance company has one team to support each maneuver battalion assigned to the supported brigade as well as the DS artillery battalion. The FSB's primary role is to provide DS to the brigade and divisional units operating in the brigade area.

The FSB also provides support to nondivisional units, such as corps artillery and engineer battalions, located in the brigade AO. The FSB is the single point of contact for support in the brigade AO. However, to support nondivisional units, corps logistic task force elements operating in the division area must augment the FSB. In addition, the FSB is responsible for base cluster defense of the BSA and operates under brigade command for this mission. The following shows a sample FSB layout within the BSA.



NOTE: Sizes are approximations to give general planning guidance.
Actual sizes will depend on available terrain.

The BSA is that portion of the brigade rear occupied by the FSB, the brigade rear CP, and other units. In those instances where the maneuver battalion trains are echeloned, the battalion field trains are included. The BSA is normally between the DSA and the battalion areas. The BSA is approximately 25 to 30 kilometers behind the forward line of our own troops (FLOT). This provides protection against enemy indirect-fire weapons. The sample layout depicts units normally found in the BSA. Both division and corps units may locate within the BSA. The BSA, interfacing with the brigade S1, the S4, and the FSB, coordinates personnel and logistic support for the brigade. There is direct coordination because the brigade rear CP collocates with the FSB tactical operations center.

The FSB commander is the BSA commander. He must balance the need for security against the need for dispersion. Specific missions, condition of road nets, and disposition of other troops in the area influence the distance between troop units. Like units in the DSA, elements within a BSA are dispersed, and each element must be prepared to provide its own protection. Employing passive defense measures, such as dispersion, movement,

concealment, cover, camouflage, and deception, reduces detection. Unit SOPs should prescribe active and passive defense measures for personnel, materiel, and installations.

The FSB performs its mission if it supports the brigade's course of action and meets the DISCOM commander's guidance. Specifically, it supports the brigade and reinforcing/supporting units by providing or coordinating to provide all classes of supply, as well as maintenance, medical, field services, and transportation support, in the amounts and at the times specified in the brigade service support annex and the FSB SOP. It must replenish its supported units' basic loads of all supplies except repair parts. It must also replenish prescribed loads of maintenance-significant class II and class IV items and repair parts. Equipment must be maintained to meet prescribed operational levels. Class VII items are distributed in accordance with the brigade commander's priorities. The FSB coordinates transportation requirements with the movement control officer to meet the brigade's needs. Finally, medical evacuation and treatment operations and field services activities must be coordinated between the brigade and FSB to ensure brigade needs are met.

Division Aviation Support Battalion (DASB)

The DASB is organic to the heavy division DISCOM. This battalion provides aviation maintenance and division-level logistics, less HSS, to the heavy division aviation brigade.

The DASB has a headquarters and supply company, a ground maintenance company, and an aircraft maintenance company. The battalion provides focused CSS to the heavy division aviation brigade. The headquarters and supply company provides the aviation brigade with classes I, II, III (for both ground and air), IV, and VII. It also operates a consolidated battalion mess.

The ground maintenance company provides the aviation brigade with ground vehicle maintenance, consolidated class IX for air and ground repair parts, a maintenance support team (MST) for the division cavalry squadron reinforcing ground vehicle recovery and evacuation, and consolidated unit maintenance for the DASB. The aircraft maintenance company provides the aviation brigade with AVIM, reinforcing aircraft recovery, and reinforcing aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) support.

DISCOM DEPLOYMENT

The mission is the basic consideration in locating CSS units and their facilities, Maintenance, supply, and medical companies and other DISCOM units must be far enough forward to be appropriately responsive to the requirements of supported units. Maintenance, for instance, takes place not only in the BSA but also wherever the weapon system is located, if possible. Mechanics and mobile equipment must be there to fix or replace weapon system components. Enemy capability and proximity to support activities and other potential targets are additional considerations. BSAs and the DSA normally locate toward the rear of the units they support.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. Corps-Level Logistics

Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. The Corps Personnel and Finance Groups

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PERSONNEL GROUP

The mission of the personnel group (PG) is to sustain corps personnel readiness and to exercise command and control over assigned personnel units. The PG manages critical personnel systems and synchronizes the corps personnel network.

The PG commander also serves as the corps adjutant general (AG). The two positions encompass different responsibilities and require separate manpower. The PG table of organization and equipment (TOE) provides the manpower to satisfy both requirements.

In the command capacity, the PC commander operates on the same level as other corps major subordinate unit commanders. In the staff capacity, the AG operates as part of the corps staff and directs the corps personnel management center (CPMC) in performing its personnel management mission for both divisional and nondivisional units.

The CPMC normally operates as an element of the corps rear command post (CP). A small cell from the CPMC normally operates with the G1 in the corps main CP.

The personnel group CP normally locates where the commander can best supervise the CPMC, the field operating division, and the PG staff. Ideally, the PG CP and the CPMC are collocated. The corps PG may function as a provisional theater personnel command (PERSCOM) should the corps deploy independently or until the theater PERSCOM can deploy. This role requires additional personnel, communications, and other resources.

The PG has limited internal support capability. It can provide food service support for the headquarters and collocated units not having organic food service capability. It depends on outside sources for supplemental transportation, DS maintenance, health services, religious, finance, and legal support.

The PG coordinates its activities with the COSCOM, corps medical facilities, and division G Is.

The COSCOM provides transportation for personnel replacements and mail, direct support maintenance, and reequipping support to replacement companies for return-to-duty soldiers.

The corps medical facilities provide casualty information and report soldiers, Army civilians, assigned or attached joint and combined personnel, and/or contractor personnel who are returning to duty. This information flows through automated systems interfaces and casualty liaison teams.

The corps commander exercises command and control over personnel units through the PG commander. The PG combines AG technical expertise with Army command operational planning and command and control capabilities.

The PG, as shown below, is a flexible organization that can adjust to specific mission requirements. Adjustments take place through changing the number and types of subordinate units. The PG normally commands a headquarters detachment, personnel services battalions, replacement companies, and the corps band.



The personnel services battalion (PSB) mission is to operate the direct support (DS) dimension of the personnel information and casualty management systems and to provide essential personnel services to commanders, soldiers, and Army civilians.

The PSB is responsible for critical tasks associated with the following systems: data base management of personnel accounting and strength reporting (PASR), casualty operations management, and personnel information management. The PSB is also responsible for the following services: identification documents, personnel evaluations, promotions and reductions, officer procurement, and soldier actions.

The PSB exercises command and control over personnel detachments and a modular DS/GS postal company, which will replace the currently fielded DS postal company. The PSB modular structure consists of a headquarters element, from two to six identical personnel detachments, and a postal company. Commanders use these building blocks to tailor their organizations to support specific missions in accordance with METT-T Personnel detachments have been designed to increase or decrease the support capability of a PSB in increments of up to 6,000 soldiers serviced.

A PSB provides DS personnel services for each division as well as support for other units within the division area. These PSBs play a major role in supporting the division's personnel readiness and replacement management systems. To support this role, the PSB collocates with the division rear CP. This arrangement facilitates personnel information exchange between personnel information and personnel readiness managers. PSBs supporting corps nondivisional units provide direct support to units located within their designated areas of operation. They manage personnel information for supported units. They also ensure that the information flows to and from the correct command personnel database manager and nondivisional units. The PSBs operate throughout the area of operations, usually close to one or more corps major subordinate unit headquarters.

FINANCE GROUP

The Finance Corps mission on the battlefield is to sustain Army, joint, and combined operations by providing timely commercial vendor and contractual payments, various pay and disbursing services, and limited accounting on an area basis.

Finance units disburse currency (cash/money) to battlefield commanders. Currency is like another class of supply, a commodity required to execute the battle. This commodity can alleviate shortages and timing problems related to procuring various classes of supply and services within the AO. Because of this, finance units can be a significant force multiplier. Therefore, finance unit commanders must be prepared to meet the twin challenges of providing support and surviving on the battlefield.

Finance units provide support for the procurement process. While other areas such as military pay and travel often receive considerable attention, support to the logistic system is considered critical to success in battle. A large percentage of the finance units wartime efforts may be directed toward satisfying this responsibility. This principle is divided into two areas: contract operations and commercial vendor services (CVS) operations (imprest fund operations).

- Finance groups (FGs) conduct contract operations. They involve paying commercial accounts for goods and services such as laundry operations, bath operations, transportation, maintenance, supply parts, class I supplements, and construction materials that have been obtained through formal contracting procedures.

- CVS operations provide for the direct daily needs of the force that the standard logistic support systems cannot reasonably satisfy. CVS will be paid in cash by imprest fund cashiers, finance support teams (FSTs), and class A agents. Cash payments are usually for such items as pay for day laborers, class I supplements (not otherwise on contract), and purchases construction materials not available through the contract or supply system. CVS operations-

  - Provide banking and currency support. Currency support includes supplying US currency, foreign currencies, US Treasury checks, foreign military scrip, military payment certificates, and, in some operations, precious metals (gold, silver).

  - Control currency on the battlefield. The amounts of US currency, military payment certificates, and foreign currencies available and used on the battlefield will be controlled. This is necessary to reduce black-market activities, to secure individual soldiers' money, and to help control problems related to either US or host nation (HN) currency inflation.

  - Provide non-US pay support Finance units must provide pay support for HN employees, day labor, EPWs, and civilian internees.

The finance group, as shown below, is the center of finance support operations in the corps. It provides funding, commercial accounting, travel settlement, disbursing, and non-US pay services. The corps FG commander is also the corps staff finance officer. The FG commander maintains command and operational control of all finance organizations in the corps. Each FG has a number of subordinate finance battalions (FBs) and separate finance detachments (FDs) that provide support in the corps area. The FG coordinates with supported commands to ensure soldiers receive essential finance support.



The FB is a corps unit under the FG's command and control. The FB's primary mission is to provide finance support to the commands, units, and soldiers within a geographical area that the FG commander determines. The FB is a modular TOE unit, and its size depends on the population supported. Two to six subordinate, TOE units, called finance detachments, can be assigned to support populations from 12,000 to 36,000. A network of FDs provides finance support to all units in the corps area. FBs will typically support an area assigned to a division, separate brigade, COSCOM, or corps support group (CSG).

The FD is the basic TOE finance unit. The FD is a command and control unit within an FB. The FD provides military support, CVS, disbursing/funding support, and finance database maintenance for units and personnel in the specific geographical AOR designated by the FB commander.

FSTs are organic to FDs. FSTs provide onsite support for small populations at a distant location from the FB. To perform this onsite support, an FST will use the transportation and communication assets organic to its parent FB whenever possible. FSTs can move on the battlefield to provide finance support to units within the FB's AOR An FST normally consists of two to five finance soldiers led by a deputy finance officer (officer or NCO, SFC or above). An FST can perform any of the FD functions for short duration.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. Corps-Level Logistics

Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. The Corps Support Command Logistic Mission

---

The COSCOM provides logistic support to the corps. It enables the corps to sustain high levels of combat over the duration of major operations. Its battlefield support mission enables the corps commander to generate combat power at the decisive time and place. The COSCOM provides-

DS and GS supply to nondivisional units and GS supplies to divisions, separate brigades, and armored cavalry regiments (ACRs). Supply support includes ammunition; class III; water (GS in arid regions); classes I, II, and IV; repair parts; major end item replacement; airdrop supply; and reinforcing supply support to the FSBs and MSBs.

- Service support, including mortuary affairs; shower, laundry, and clothing repair (SLCR) (also known as clothing exchange and bath (CEB)); and tactical post exchange.

- Direct support maintenance (DSM) and aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) to nondivisional units; reinforcing DSM and AVIM to divisions, separate brigades, and ACRs; and missile-rocket maintenance support.

- Transportation support, including mode operations, movement control, terminal operations, cargo transfer operations, and airdrop support.

- Medical treatment, hospitalization evacuation, logistics, patient regulating, and medical services support, including combat stress, veterinary, dental, and preventive medical services.

CORPSWIDE SUPPORT

COSCOM logistics elements position in depth to minimize the effect of threat attacks on the overall logistic effort and allow for weighting the corps commander's efforts to gain and maintain the initiative. COSCOM functional battalions provide corpswide support. Transportation battalions provide intra- and intercorps transportation. The petroleum supply, ammunition, and supply and service (S&S) battalions provide class III, class V, and general supplies corpswide, respectively, supplying the bulk distribution systems. The AVIM battalion provides corpswide AVIM support. In an arid region, the water supply battalion provides potable water throughout the corps area.

AREA SUPPORT

The COSCOM assigns area support missions to its subordinate corps support groups (CSGs) and the medical brigade. CSG subordinate direct support units (DSUs) provide support on an area basis to units located in or passing through their AOR. Medical brigade medical groups provide levels I and II HSS on an area basis to nondivisional units lacking organic HSS and reinforce division level II HSS. In contrast to dedicated unit support, area support unit workloads depend on corps maneuver and positioning of units requiring support.

The COSCOM normally provides area support to nondivisional units whether they are employed in the corps rear area or in the division area. This precludes generating an excessive workload on DISCOM MSB and FSBs and provides a single support point of contact for supported units. However, nondivisional units employed in the division area, which could number around 8,000 soldiers in a heavy division AO, may receive area support in one of several ways:

- From the DISCOM MSB and FSBs, but only within the DISCOM's capabilities. This normally occurs when the number of nondivisional troops and their support requirements are very limited (one or two battalion equivalents).

- If the nondivisional requirements exceed DISCOM capabilities, the COSCOM could augment the MSBs/FSBs with corps assets to enable the DISCOM to provide area support to the nondivisional units. This support arrangement limits the number of support locations that must be established within the division area.

- Finally, the COSCOM normally supports nondivisional units deployed within division boundaries, of the number noted above: through a corps support battalion (CSB) providing area support in the division area. The CSB establishes forward logistic points in the MSB and FSB area by coordinating with the appropriate terrain managers.

COSCOM SUPPORT ORGANIZATION

The COSCOM support organization depends on the number of soldiers to support, the number and types of weapon systems to repair, and the tonnage of supplies to issue and transport.

The following is a typical COSCOM organization.



* TRANS GP assigned if there are three or more functional transportation battalions included in the force structure.

The COSCOM normally consists of a special troops battalion and headquarters company, two functional control centers, a variable number of CSGs, a medical brigade, and may include a transportation group.

Functional Control Centers

The corps materiel management center (CMMC) and corps movement control center (CMCC) implement COSCOM policies and directives. The CMMC centrally manages and controls supply and maintenance. The CMCC provides centralized movement management and highway regulation for the corps.

- The CMMC performs integrated materiel management for the corps for all classes of supply (except medical supply, classified communications security (COMSEC) equipment, and classified maps). Integrated materiel management involves computing requirements, establishing stockage levels, directing and distributing, procurement, disposal, and guidance developing for maintenance priorities. The CMMC also performs maintenance management for all assigned or attached maintenance activities.

- The CMCC provides centralized movement control and highway regulation. It uses its subordinate movement control teams (MCTs) and movement regulating teams (MRTs) to commit and allocate corps transportation assets.

Corps Support Groups (CSGs)

CSG headquarters provide command, control, staff planning, and supervision of from three to seven subordinate logistics battalions. The COSCOM task organizes CSGs to meet the needs of supported forces based on the scheme of maneuver the corps G3 establishes and the CSG's forward or rear employment missions. While there is no standard CSG organizational structure, the forward CSG consists of multifunctional CSBs providing direct and general support The rear CSG consists of one or more CSBs providing DS and functional battalions providing GS.

- Forward CSGs are the source of logistic support (less medical) for all corps organizations within their AOR They provide forward support on an area basis to nondivisional forces operating in the division AO, either directly through a CSB or indirectly by augmenting or reinforcing MSBs and FSBs. They provide area support to nondivision units behind the division's rear boundary and GS supply and reinforcing DSM and field services support to divisions, separate brigades, and ACRs. Usually, one forward CSG is allocated per division. A sample forward CSG is shown below.



Each forward CSG employs a tailored CSB in the division area to provide responsive support to forward-employed nondivisional forces. Unlike the DISCON's fixed-structure MSB and FSB supporting division elements, the CSB is task organized to provide DS-level supply, services, and maintenance support to corps forces operating in the division area. The CSB reduces the command, control, and communications problems caused by long distances between supported nondivisional elements and supporting corps units otherwise located in the corps rear area. Though employed in the division area and merged with division bases or base clusters for rear operations security, the CSB remains under the command and control of the forward CSG. Terrain management and highway regulation are coordinated with the division. The following shows a typical task-organized CSB in the division area.



The remaining CSBs of each forward CSG are employed behind the division rear boundary. They consist of both GS- and DS-level units to support nondivisional forces in their assigned AOR as well as provide GS and reinforcing DS to the division, any separate brigades, and the ACR if employed in their AOR. Typical task-organized CSBs employed behind the division rear boundary are shown below. (The actual number and type of companies depend on workloads.)



- The corps is normally allocated a rear CSG. The rear CSG provides corpswide support and reinforcing support to the forward CSGs. Like the forward CSGs, it provides area support to units employed in or passing through its AOR The rear CSG may consist of multifunctional CSBs and functional battalions. The following is a typical rear corps support group organization.



The CSBs of the rear CSG provide DS-level area support to units in or passing through the CSG's AOR. These include hospitals, replacement units, signal units, corps headquarters elements, and corps units supporting a reserve division. The following is a sample task-organized CSB in the rear CSG.



The rear CSG's functional battalions provide corpswide logistics support to divisions, separate brigades, and ACRs as well as reinforcing support to the forward CSGs. The petroleum supply battalion, ammunition battalion, and S&S battalion maintain the corps reserve stocks. These stocks enable the corps commander to support combat and provide the surge capability to win in battle. The transportation battalion (or battalions) supports the supply and replacement distribution systems. The AVIM battalion provides corpswide AVIM support and reinforcing aviation unit maintenance (AVUM). In an arid environment, a water supply battalion provides corpswide GS-level water supply. Sample functional battalions are shown below.




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AMMO
HHC
ORD CO
AMMO
GS


S&S
BN
HHD
GS
SUP CO
HVY MAT
SUP CO
GS
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SUP CO
GS
MA
COLL CO
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SUP CO
AIRDROP
EQUIP REPAIR
& SUP CO


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
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

Medical Brigade

The medical brigade provides treatment, hospitalization, evacuation, logistics, patient regulating, preventive medicine, combat stress relief, dental, and veterinary support to the corps. The medical brigade headquarters task organizes the medical assets in the COSCOM to meet the patient workload and HSS requirements generated by corps forces. Medical assets are task organized under subordinate medical groups normally employed geographically in the corps rear area and directly under the brigade headquarters. The following is a sample medical brigade organization.



Transportation Group

A transportation group could be attached to the COSCOM to provide command, control, and staff planning if three or more functional transportation battalions are included in the corps force structure. The number of transportation battalions in the force structure is normally based on the number of truck and terminal operating units providing corpswide support under the rear CSG, not on those assigned or attached to forward CSGs.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. Corps-Level Logistics

Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. Logistic Unit Symbols

LOGISTIC UNIT SYMBOLS

FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Symbols,* is the doctrinal reference for unit map symbols. YOU previously had the opportunity to study this manual. That should have given you a fairly comprehensive understanding of unit symbology. During the lo-year period between editions (last edition is dated October 1985), force structures have changed, new units have been developed, and symbology has evolved. For this reason, you may encounter in the various field manuals and student texts published during the last few years, slightly different variations in symbology. Do not let these minor inconsistencies distract you. As long as you understand the basks of unit symbols, you should have no problem correctly identifying or drawing the appropriate logistic unit symbols.

The following information is provided to refresh your memory and/or to help you understand the symbols (primarily from FM 63-3) that are used in this subcourse to portray logistic units:

CSS facility/installation



echelon-below-corps unit



corps unit



theater army unit





By combining two or more of the preceding symbols with unit size designations, units can be identified as shown below. These are only a few examples, but they illustrate the basics of logistics symbology.





Remember-there can be several slightly different variations to these symbols. This appendix is not a replacement for FM 101-5-1. It is intended to save you time by providing a simple, quick review and a handy reference during active duty for training (ADT) to help you follow class presentations, participate in class discussions, and work with map overlays.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 3. Echelons Above Division Employment Doctrine

SCOPE

Lesson 3 builds on your knowledge of the role of the corps discussed in lesson 1. You will study the echelons of command above division (theater army, numbered army, and corps). This lesson also builds on your knowledge of Army operations doctrine and tactics. This will expand your comprehension of how the corps operates on the battlefield and conducts combined arms operations.

The lesson begins with a brief review of operational level of war concepts learned in previous courses. It continues with a look at theater structure, theater organizations that support the corps, and how the corps employs echelons above corps (EAC) assets to accomplish its mission. During the final portion of this lesson: you will analyze how the corps can conduct offensive and defensive combat operations. At the conclusion of this lesson, you will be ready to begin lesson 4 and plan a new corps mission using the scenario first introduced in S320A.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

A.20 TASK: Explain how corps conduct combined arms operations.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement, with references,

STANDARD: Will explain corps operations in theaters IAW FM 100-15.

Will explain the organizations, roles, capabilities, and limitations of a typical US Army corps and its major subordinate elements IAW FM 63-3 and FM 100-15.

Will explain why and how corps phase operations and the planning considerations for offensive, defensive, and other tactical operations lAW FM 63-3 and FM 100-15.

Will explain the missions normally assigned to Army special operations forces (ARSOF) in support of corps operations, the command and control relationships normally established between corps and ARSOF units, and the methods the corps uses to coordinate ARSOF operations IAW FM 100-15 and FM 100-25.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE PHASE 1 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVES: la: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

lc: Explain the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the NCA, NSC, CJCS, combatant commanders, Service chiefs and Joint Forces.

A.30 TASK: Explain how echelons above corps (EAC) organizations support corps operations.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement, with references.

STANDARD- Will explain command responsibilities and organizations in a theater of war IAW FM 100-7 and FM 100-15.

Will describe the employment of offensive air support in support of a corps IAW FM 90-28 and Student Text 100-2.

Will correctly describe use of boundaries and command relationships in delineating areas of responsibility IAW FM 100-7, FM 100-15, and FM 101-5-l.

LEVEL: Comprehension

PJE PHASE I (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVES: la: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

1b: Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.

1d: Summarize how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.

le: Comprehend how the US military is organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint and multinational operations.

2a: Comprehend current joint doctrine.

A.40 TASK: Explain how corps are tailored for a theater and mission

CONDITION: Given a written requirement, with references,

STANNDARD: Will correctly explain a typical corps organization and procedures for assigning combat units based on operational requirements and combat support and combat service support units based on operational requirements, rules of allocation, and workload factors IAW FM 100-15 and student issue materials and study requirements.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE PHASE 1 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVES: la: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

lb: Esplain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.

2a: Comprehend current joint doctrine.

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use the lesson guide to assist you in achieving the lesson learning objectives, Follow the instructions and read the material assigned and perform the learning activities. Doing these requirements at the appropriate time and actively thinking are important for you to derive the maximum benefit from this lesson. The assignments are sequenced to provide a logical and orderly flow of information. When you complete a reading, return to the appropriate place in the lesson guide and continue to follow the instructions,

REFERENCES:

a. FM 100-5, Operations.

b. FM 100-15, Corps Operations.

c. FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Symbols.*

d. M/S320B Staff Planning Book.

e. ST 100-3, *Battle Book.*

f. ST 101-5, *Command and Staff Decision Processes.*

LESSON GUIDE

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to lesson 3! If you've kept up with your readings and are familiar with the appropriate references and concepts previously presented in S310A and S310B, this lesson will go quickly.

During this lesson, you'll study the corps from several perspectives. First, you'll look at theater structure and how a corps mission in a theater impacts on the overall tailoring of the corps. Next, you will examine how a corps interacts with other echelons of command above division to integrate the joint capabilities within a theater into the corps commander's concept of the operation. Finally, you will study how the corps employs joint, combined, and multifunctional capabilities to conduct combined arms operations. At the conclusion of this lesson, you will have the fundamental knowledge of how a corps operates within a theater of war or theater of operations.



This graphic illustrates the flow for lesson 3. The key point to remember as you complete the next section is how the strategic environment and the command structure of the theater influence corps operations. To set the stage, you will begin by looking at how a corps is tailored to accomplish its mission.

Read Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3, Theater Structure, Organizations, and the Army's Role, and FM 100-5, Chapter 4, Joint Operations. Review FM 100-15, pages 1-1 through 1-3, Corps Role in Operations, and Corps as Part of a Larger Ground Force.

Your initial study focuses on the corps role within the theater. The theater commander identifies the corps mission by developing a theater concept of operation, designating appropriate joint and combined command relationships, and organizing the theater. By organizing the theater, he designates areas where the major subordinate commanders within the theater are responsible for their operations. He designates the corps "sandbox" by defining the corps area of operations. This helps the corps commander determine his battle space and subsequently organize his battlefield to conduct operations in depth. In addition to providing this theater structure, the theater commander establishes operational requirements.

TO TAILOR A CORPS

As you should know by now, the corps is the largest tactical unit in the US Army. By design, this echelon of command is the primary means for theater and other higher echelons of command to execute operational maneuver. Also, the corps is a self-contained force organized with combat, combat support, and combat service support elements and is capable of operating over extended distances and periods of time. In lesson 1, you learned what types of units are in a corps.

What factors determine the force structure of a corps?

The simple answer is the theater commander's strategic concept, the corps mission, and the operational requirements within the campaign plan. When the theater commander comes up with his concept of the operation, he visualizes the theater structure and the command relationships required to execute his plan. Depending on the circumstances, the corps commander may have several higher commanders to answer to or just the theater commander in chief (CINC). Corps planners translate higher commanders' concepts of operation into tactical plans and orders. To do so, they must understand operational design, joint and combined command and support relationships, and the theater structure.

This next question should be a review for you. To understand some of the key points later in this study, you may need to review the different command relationships within joint operations. If you need assistance in answering these questions, refer to FM 100-5, page 4-5.

What command authority does the theater commander normally have, and what are some of his options for theater structure and command relationships when exercising this authority?

The theater commander normally has combatant command (COCOM) authority over all assigned and attached forces. Some of the theater commander's options for organizing the theater include-

- Tasking the service component commanders to conduct major operations during the phases of the campaign.
- Organizing a functional component and tasking its commander.
- Activating a subordinate unified command and designating forces for employment in a particular area.
- Organizing a joint task force (JTF).
- Tasking a single-service force.
- Exercising COCOM over specific operational forces. These forces normally report directly to the theater commander.

One of the major elements used in determining theater structure and related command relationships is the state of the strategic environment (war, conflict, or peacetime) existing in the theater commander's area of responsibility (AOR). Also, a theater commander must be flexible in structuring a theater to meet various operational requirements while conserving resources. Several methods can be used to structure a theater. A key factor in choosing one method over another depends on the state of the strategic environment. Take the next few minutes to complete a simple practical exercise to reinforce your knowledge of this concept.

The illustration below is a map of a portion of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) commander's AOR The names of the countries have been changed to alphabetic designations A through G.



Read the following hypothetical scenario, and then determine your options for structuring the theater.

Here's the situation. Iraq and Iran established a political and military coalition and began to actively support terrorist organizations in countries A, C, and D. At the same time, they began supporting an insurgency already in progress in country F. With little warning, they conducted attack with conventional forces against countries B and E. The National Command Authority (NCA) informed the CINC to assist countries A, C, and D in antiterrorism operations, help country F contain the insurgency, and defeat the Iraq/Iran Coalition's aggression against countries B and E. This also includes restoring the civilian governments and territorial integrity of

countries B and E. Meanwhile, massive earthquakes occurred in country G, requiring a dedicated disaster relief operation under control of the State Department, and the NCA has tasked the CMC to support disaster relief.

As a USCENTCOM planner in this scenario, what types of structures, command relationships, andforces might you recommend to the USCENTCOM commander to accomplish these various missions?

Use the matrix provided to record your thoughts. The items for country G are provided as an example of how to use the matrix. First, determine the strategic state. Then list the types of forces you may require to accomplish the missions described in the hypothetical scenario. You should also be able to list a recommended command relationship. If you need help, review FM 100-5, page 4-5, for a generic list of options.

COUNTRY	STRATEGIC STATE	TYPES OF FORCES	COMMAND RELATIONSHIP OPTION
A, C & D			
B & E			
F			
G **(Used as an example)**	Peacetime—disaster relief.	Primarily CSS and medical units, engineers, MPs, and CA units.	Task a single service force.

There is no school solution for this requirement. Just as you learned in brigade and division operations, commanders at all levels of command structure their areas of responsibility or operations to execute their concept of the operation.

Your completed matrix should be close to the one that follows. Don't be concerned if you came up with slightly different requirements and options.

COUNTRY	STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT	TYPE OF FORCES	COMMAND RELATIONSHIP OPTION
A, C & D	Conflict	Mobile training teams from specific types of units. For instance, MTTs from MI, SOF, and MP units might be used to help train host nation forces for internal security missions. This may also include the FBI, customs service, and the Coast Guard.	Form an AO for a specific operational force (service or functional component, JTF, single-service force, or subordinate unified command). This can be divided further into a JOA or JSOA.
B & E	War	Armored, SOF, naval, air, and marine forces	Organize theater of war (with a possible subordinate theater of operations).
F	Conflict	SOF from various services.	Form an AO for a specific operational force (service or functional component, JTF, single-service force, or subordinate unified command.) This an be divided further into a JOA or JSOA.
G	Peacetime—disaster relief.	Primarily CSS, engineer, MP, medical, and CA units.	Task a single service force.

You should have determined the different strategic states in the hypothetical AOR as shown above. This clearly demonstrates the complexity of planning simultaneous operations within the AOR. It also demonstrates the need to establish a clear delegation of authority so subordinates can accomplish their missions within the context of the theater commander's concept of the operation. You should have considered several command relationship options for each of these situations. Now you can move on to some other key concepts.

As forces arrive in theater, they must receive support and protection. When the theater commander structures the theater, he inherently considers that area requiring forces to conduct operations against a threat to accomplish a mission. He also considers the forces needed to support those units engaged against the enemy as well as the

need to support those forces. Each unit needs its own area in which to operate, but it should be close enough to provide support to another one.

What are some types of areas or zones a theater commander may designate to accomplish these tasks?

The theater commander may first establish a joint rear area (JRA), and as the theater expands and a distinctive combat zone emerges, he may designate a communications zone (COMMZ). A key point to remember is that all echelons of command are given an area in which to operate. They, in turn, must provide subordinates an area to operate in while protecting their support assets.

Now change your focus a little. You looked at the theater from the perspective of a joint planner. Now, you need to develop a view of how "army green" fits into the "purple" (or joint) arena. As you should know from your readings, the Army has three crucial roles in conducting Army operations within a joint and combined environment. These roles include joint, combined, and interagency coordination; actual conduct of operations; and support of those operations. Theater-level commanders may use a conceptual framework to assess their operational environment. Such a framework helps them identify additional requirements for command and control elements to perform critical tasks as the theater evolves from austere to fully developed. The following illustration reinforces this conceptual framework.



This figure illustrates a conceptual framework for theater planners. It shows the circumstances in which military forces may be committed to a theater, the conditions in which they may operate, and some of the influences that can affect their support. This framework can be expanded to add additional factors that will contribute to the decisionmaking process at theater level. As you can see, in the worst-case scenario, the situation is vague, the conditions are complex, and the theater is very austere.

What additional echelons of command above the division level are currently in the US Army force structure and doctrine?

The answers are corps, numbered army, and theater army.

The Army uses these echelons of command as tailored organizations to meet the operational and logistical requirements of the theater commander. As events unfold and the complexity of theater operations increases, the need for effective command and control also increases. Since you already learned about the theater army in S410, you will now familiarize yourself with the echelon of command called the numbered army. You may be familiar with those lean. mean fighting machines of the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)-First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth Armies. These headquarters primarily focus on requirements to generate forces for the Total Army-ROTC. Reserve Components, and so forth. To assist the different fighting CINCs, there are additional numbered army headquarters available-Third, Seventh, and Eighth Armies. Third Army, normally stationed in the continental United States (CONUS), is the only deployable numbered army headquarters. It focuses its efforts on the US Central Command. Eighth Army in Korea and Seventh Army in Germany are still active (at least when this course was developed). These headquarters are available to provide an additional echelon of command in those theaters during wartime. For instance, during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the theater of war expanded and the mission went from defending Saudi Arabia to ejecting the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. These two complementary missions expanded the theater's structure and eventually required a command and control headquarters to control two tactical corps. This intermediate headquarters was Third Army.

Listed below are several key points to remember about numbered armies.

- The CINC establishes or activates a numbered army headquarters as the need arises and in close coordination with the theater army (TA) commander. A numbered army is a flexible organization task organized to accomplish assigned missions.

- A numbered army may be established when operations require more than one large formation composed of multiple corps to execute separate and distinct, but simultaneous, campaigns or when focusing on different major threats. Such a situation normally results in a theater of war being further divided into separate theaters of‘ operation as well.

- The CINC may establish a numbered army as a counterpart to an allied headquarters to ensure satisfactory distribution of multinational responsibilities.

- Normally. the theater army forms or resources the numbered army headquarters from existing theater army assets.

- Since the administrative and support responsibilities of the numbered army are much less than those of the theater army, the staff of the numbered army is more austere. The numbered army staff focuses on situation assessment, estimate formulation, planning, and functional area coordination. The numbered army relies heavily on liaison representatives to maximize its effectiveness.

- The numbered army most likely would conduct support operations only if the situation forced it to operate independently of the theater army. The main reason the numbered army is activated is probably due to the need to divide responsibilities between supporting the theater and conducting combat operations. The theater commander normally establishes this division of labor as the theater develops to increase his span of control. Besides the headquarters element, the numbered army normally has a signal unit designed to interface with other communication systems within the theater. an Army aviation element to provide command and control (C^2)

aircraft and intratheater mobility for the headquarters, an MP company from the theater army area command (TAACOM) MP brigade to provide local security for the main and alternate command posts (CPs), and an intelligence support element to meet the commander's intelligence needs.

- The numbered army normally operates from a main and an alternate CP. The main CP controls current operations, collates information, integrates all-source intelligence, and coordinates logistical support. The main CP also plans future operations. The alternate CP ensures continuity and may be a subordinate headquarters. This alternate CP can become the rear CP to control logistical support assets and coordinate rear security operations if required. The rear boundary of the numbered army will often be the same as the rear boundaries of its corps.

You have just reviewed the numbered army and the Army's role in theater operations. In lesson 4, you will see an allied army group in the theater structure instead of a numbered army. This allied army group headquarters performs similar functions to those of the numbered army in US Army doctrine.

Think back to Desert Shield again to consider why a numbered army might be employed. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, we initially deployed a corps to defend Saudi Arabia and show the flag. As the NCA reviewed the situation, it adjusted its strategy to the changing situation. Defending Saudi Arabia was the initial war aim. However, with the failure of diplomacy becoming more evident, the NCA changed the war aim to one of expelling the Iraqi Army from Kuwait and restoring the legitimate Kuwaiti government. The NCA then undertook various political, diplomatic, and military actions to execute these new war aims.

While the organizational structure of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps facilitated rapid deployment of forces for defensive operations within Saudi Arabia, it lacked sufficient combat power to conduct offensive operations against the armored forces of Iraq. As a result of changed war aims, a requirement for heavy forces materialized and the mission of the theater commander changed. This also changed the theater campaign plan. This new requirement initiated the need for additional forces and an expanded theater structure. The need for these additional armored forces resulted in another corps being committed to the theater. While the peacetime corps organizations served as a starting point for theater planners, the final task organizations for each of the two corps reflected the flexibility of the tailored corps organization for a specific mission within a theater.

CORPS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

You learned about the division organizational design in S310A and S10B. ***What's the difference between the corps organizational design and that of the division?***

The division is a fixed organization whereas the corps is a tailored organization. Remember, the difference between a tailored and a fixed organization is the units organic to the organization. A division has a fixed organizational structure designed to provide the division commander with all the basic C^2, combat, combat support, and combat service support functions needed to conduct an independent operation for a short duration of time. If you exceed the design parameters of the division, the next echelon of command, the corps, must provide the necessary resources. Now, quickly review some of the planning considerations normally used to ensure that division and other subordinate commanders receive their fair share of corps assets based on their missions. Corps planners use many of these considerations when developing a corps-level task organization. Take a few minutes to complete the next requirement.

Scan FM 100-15, Appendix A, Corps Task Organization and Planning Considerations.

Now study the following illustration which shows the different components of the corps and how they provide the capabilities to perform tasks at either the operational or tactical levels of war.

Integration of the Combat Functions at the Operational and Tactical Levels of War



The corps is the largest tactical unit in the US Army. Once tailored, it contains all the organic combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities required to sustain combined arms operations for a considerable time.

The current US Army force structure design uses the division, as a fixed organization, to determine baseline requirements for a mission. If the theater commander determines a need for three divisions to meet an operational requirement as part of his concept of operation, he knows he will also need a corps headquarters. Unlike the numbered army, the corps echelon of command has both operational and support responsibilities.

In lesson 4, you will plan an operation and provide the resources for major subordinate units to execute that operation. Now, you should focus your study on how the corps allocates some of its resources to help the division commanders accomplish their mission of conducting successful close operations.

What assets might a corps provide to a committed division. What assets would an uncommitted division typically receive?

Think about this for a few minutes. The following page has a matrix to record your answers. In the spaces provided, list the types of additional corps units that the divisions might receive. Use FM 100-15, appendix A, ST 100-3, and ST 101-5 if you need assistance. FM 100-15, appendix A, has some guidelines normally used in considering what to give the divisions when formulating a task organization.

Remember, a committed division is not necessarily the main effort. In addition to providing additional assets, the corps commander can also influence his combat power allocation by providing priority of support to a specific unit. Now, think about command and support relationship options. Refer to ST 100-3 if you need a refresher. Knowledge of command and support relationships becomes critical at the corps level.

Types of Additional Assets	Committed Division	Uncommitted Division
Additional Maneuver Units		
ADA		
Chemical		
Engineer		
Field Artillery		
MI		
MP		
Signal		
CSS		
CA and PSYOP		
TACAIR		
Other Joint Support as Required		

With the exception of FA, MP, and CAS allocations, an uncommitted division, such as a reserve, may receive the same type of corps augmentation as a committed division. However, the allocated units may be smaller, MI augmentation for a reserve unit will primarily be enemy prisoner of war (EPW) and counterintelligence (CI) support. The technical support for intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) jammers and collectors will have priority to committed forces. Remember, field artillery is never held in reserve; nor are CAS and MP support.

Since you're thinking about giving additional maneuver units (usually a maneuver brigade) to a division, examine some of the areas to consider whenever adding units to another organization.

What are the main considerations when mixing a heavy force with a light force?

Some considerations a planner should consider are-

- Differences in mobility. Light forces do not have the organic vehicles to provide the same level of mobility as heavy forces. (Think about how you can compensate for this.)

- Differences in protective capabilities. Light forces rely on dispersion, use of terrain, and frequent repositioning, while heavy forces rely more on their mobility and armor protection. (How would you compensate for this?)

- Differences in combat (firepower) capabilities

If there are so many differences to be considered when mixing heavy and light forces, why would we ever want to do such a thing?

We might want to capitalize on the unique capabilities of each type unit.

By understanding the capabilities as well as the limitations of both heavy and light forces, it is easier to determine the proper command relationship that we should assign when mixing the two. The choice is usually one of either operational control (OPCON) or attached What are the advantages and disadvantages of each ?

An OPCONed unit does not receive CSS support, but an attached unit does. It is much easier for a heavy force to support a light force than the other way around. (Think about why this is the case.) The bottom line is that, everything else being equal, heavy forces should be placed OPCON (no CSS responsibilities for receiving unit) to light forces, and light forces should be attached to heavy forces. When augmenting a light force with additional units using a support relationship, understand that it doesn't increase the support burden on the light force nor does it permit the supported force commander to task organize the augmentation units. You will study more about light forces in your last tactics course. S320C.

You have reviewed the theater commander's options when structuring the theater and how it may affect command relationships. You also studied the different echelons of command above division and how a corps might provide additional assets to a division. The key point to remember is that the corps is a tailored organization whose responsibilities include both operational and logistical support to its major subordinate maneuver commands. The corps should have all the necessary combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities to execute the theater commander's concept of operation.

By now, you probably need a break. During the next portion of the lesson, you will study in greater detail how some of the different components of the operational operating systems are integrated into the tactical concept of operation. Proceed to the next requirement when you return.

Read Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3, Air Operations in NATO, and Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3, Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Operations. Also read the M/S320B Staff Planning Book, Chapter 1, General Situation and the X (US) Corps Troop List.

As you study the next portion of the lesson. you should begin to relate some of the concepts you just learned with the S320B scenario. Later, you will develop a portfolio of material to assist you as a X (US) Corps planner in the next lesson.

THEATER SUPPORT TO AN ARMY CORPS

Why do you think the LANDCENT plan called for the activation of the I and II Allied Army Groups?

The LANDCENT plan established a need for an intermediate headquarters. As forces mobilized and deployed to Europe, LANDCENT knew it required another echelon of command to control the tactical corps. In this scenario, an allied army group (AAG) is the intermediate headquarters instead of a numbered army.

Do these AAGs provide any real logistical support capabilities to the corps?

No. Remember, these echelons of command resemble the numbered army echelon of command in US Army doctrine. In this scenario, they are for operational control only.

What command and support relationships would the II AAG commander use to provide the corps with additional resources?

These are allied headquarters within NATO, and they use NATO command relationships to support the allied army group commander's concept of operation. Now, you need to quickly review a command relationship that has recently been added to our command and control doctrine.

What does the command relationship TACON mean?

FM 100-5, page 4-2, states that "tactical control (TACON) is the detailed and usually local direction and control of movement and maneuver necessary to accomplish missions and tasks." Here is an example.



During a division-level forward passage of lines, the passing brigades gain TACON over the stationary brigades at a predetermined time; for instance, 2 hours before the units are to begin their passage of lines. With this command relationship, the division can move the stationary units out of the way of the passing units. This is critical if the stationary unit is in contact with the enemy. The passing unit should have the priority for the most favorable ground to conduct its passage so the passing units can fire and maneuver. So that support is not interrupted during the passage of lines, the stationary division's artillery, air defense, Ml, and other combat support units are also TACON to the passing division.

The term "tactical control" is important for you to know. Before the publication of FM 100-5, the term appeared only in a couple of supporting FMs to describe a specific technique for conducting passage of lines. If you look on page 4-2 of FM 100-5, you will see that it is now a US Army doctrinal command relationship. The

term is also in ST 101-3, chapter 1. Command and support relationships and the use of tailored organizations with appropriate capabilities allow for flexibility on an ever-changing battlefield.

Isn't TACON the same as OPCON?

OPCON and TACON are close in definition. The key point is the purpose of the relationship and the duration of the command relationship. The intent of TACON, in NATO, is to facilitate combined operations during passages of lines, relief in place, linkup, and battle handover operations. TACON is far more limited than OPCON. The commander who has TACON over another force can directly alter the other commander's present situation, Think of a football game. The quarterback calls a play for the fullback to sweep right, Other players know they have certain blocking assignments to accomplish. As the play unfolds, the fullback sees an opening to exploit As he is running through it, he tells a lineman to pick up the block on a specific player so he can gain more yardage. The blockers who, by design, made blocks according to the play were OPCON to the fullback. The linesman was TACON. Another key difference is what the gaining unit commander can do with a unit TACON to it. A unit OPCON to another unit can further be placed in a command relationship of tactical command (TACOM), TACON, or in a support relationship. Remember, command and support relationships are the glue that allows planners and commanders to bring the different combat functions together in a plan.

The key concept to remember is that the theater supports the corps. The theater allocates strategic, joint, and combined resources to a corps so the corps can conduct major combat operations. Once the corps receives these resources, corps planners must integrate this support with the corps commander's concept of the operation,

You should recall from previous studies of FM 100-5 how use of the combat functions helps commanders build and sustain combat power. Commanders integrate and coordinate these functions to synchronize battle effects in time. space. and purpose. The combat functions of intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, logistics, and battle command are further refined by the operational and battlefield operating systems. As you continue your study of the corps, use the combat functions to organize your thoughts, You must be able to integrate the operational operating systems (intelligence, movement and maneuver, protection, fires, command and control, and logistics) with the battlefield operating systems (BOS).

As a corps planner, you must continually analyze and evaluate information from many sources, When planning a corps-level operation, it is important that you understand the commander's information requirements and where to get the information. To give you an appreciation of the problem, take a quick look at the corps intelligence system. The corps intelligence system is a good example of how the corps integrates operational intelligence with the intelligence battlefield operating systems.

If you were the G2 of the X (US) Corps, you would be responsible for producing an intelligence estimate. At the corps level, estimates are normally formal, written products. Although you will not write an estimate for this course, you will go through the mental process. By experiencing this process, you will gain a better appreciation of the requirements for planning, coordinating, controlling, and directing the various corps operating systems.

As the corps G2, what information would you include in pour intelligence estimate about enemy capabilities based on the information contained in the II Allied Army Group's periodic intelligence summary? (Enter your answers in the matrix on the following page.)

Some of the obvious capabilities are the frontal air and ground capabilities of the 2 and 4 Krasnovian Fronts. Use the matrix below to organize your answer.

Enemy Capabilities	2 Krasnovian **Front** **(in contact with 10th Corps)**	**4 Krasnovian Front (future operations)**	**TVD**
Disposition			
Composition			
Strength Committed forces Reinforcements Artillery Air Wpns of mass destruction Other enemy forces • EW • SOF • ADA			
Recent or present significant events			
Peculiarities and weaknesses Personnel Intelligence Operations Logistics CMO operations **Personalities**			

If the corps commander turns to you and say:, "I want to know if the Krasnovians can launch multiple air assaults past PL PROTON," what is this information requirement called, and how could you get the information the corps commander needs?

This is a priority intelligence requirement (PIR). FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Symbols,* defines PIR as "those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of

planning and decision making." The key point is the need for the corps G2 to correctly determine the commander's information needs

As a corps planner, you must understand the corps intelligence system. This system has three major functions that require it to translate information appropriate at the operational level of war down to the tactical level of war. These three major functions are to collect and process intelligence and to prepare intelligence reports. The II Allied Army Group's periodic intelligence summary is an example of such a report. A key responsibility of operational intelligence is to provide the commander with an analysis and evaluation of what the opposing army and front commanders are capable of executing. The corps G2 must evaluate the necessary information to give subordinate commanders and their staffs the information they need to execute the corps commander's plan, Take a quick look at the corps intelligence system depicted through out ST 100-3.

Another operational operating system that requires active interaction between the corps and echelons above the corps is operational protection, which relates to the combat function of mobility and survivability. This operational operating system provides another good example of how different theater assets or organizations provide support to the corps and eventually to subordinate tactical units during combat operations.

What are the primary engineer functions the corps engineer is responsible for planning and coordinating?

There are five functions: mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, sustainment engineering, and topographic engineering.

You studied sustainment engineering in S410. In S310B, you also looked at some theater topographic support to corps and divisions.

The use of engineers to facilitate sustainment and support of the corps is critical to a corps planner, In many austere or developing theaters, trafficability may be inadequate due to poor roads and insufficient facilities, Remember the conceptual framework for the operational environment? If a theater commander in an austere theater needs heavy armored forces to accomplish his mission, he will also need a fairly large sustainment engineering effort to facilitate his logistical support for the combat units.

Another component of operational protection is air defense.

What support does the theater give the corps for air defense?

The theater provides additional air defense support for the corps with defensive counterair support from the air component commander (ACC) of the theater and with high-to-medium air defense (HIMAD) and theater missile defense support-Patriot from the theater air defense command.

During the last few minutes, you studied some of the ways the theater supports the corps. While the corps has all the necessary capabilities to operate and support itself, the amount of support the corps gets from the theater depends on several factors. Many of these factors relate to the theater's structure, the enemy's capabilities, the command relationships within the theater, and the corps' mission.

EMPLOYMENT OF OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT IN SUPPORT OF A CORPS

One of the key elements of a corps commander's concept of operation is the control of the air environment, With modem technological advances in the areas of target acquisition and fires, commanders responsible for

conducting major land operations know their success depends on successful air operations and the need to integrate the two in terms of tempo, time, distance, space, and purpose.

You should remember from your readings that offensive air support includes tactical air reconnaissance (TAR); close air support (CAS); and in the NATO theater, battlefield air interdiction (BAI). In S310A, you learned how the system of integrating air operations with ground operations works. In S320A, you learned how the system is slightly different in a particular theater. In both cases, you only had to address how you would use the assets you were given. As a corps planner, you will have to address these issues and other factors in more detail. Highlighted below are some of the capabilities airpower provides to the corps during combat operations.

Offensive air support in support of a corps in NATO consists of-

- tactical air reconnaissance,
- close air support, and
- battlefield air interdiction (NATO only). It operates throughout the depth of the battlefield, and is a part of the corps fire and intelligence systems.

As you know, air can put a great deal of firepower on a target. However, the Air Force can provide other capabilities that a corps planner should consider.

What other capabilities are available from the Air Force for corps operations?

An area often overlooked is the use of airlift of supplies and personnel. The effects of weather are key elements in the integration of air operations with ground operations. The Air Force can also provide assistance in medical evacuation of personnel under the right conditions.

You reviewed some of the ways offensive air support can be integrated with corps operations, and you will soon apply some of this knowledge as a corps planner. You must understand the flexibility that control of the air gives you for conducting ground operations. You must also understand the corps' responsibility to identify needs to the air component commander. In theaters where the corps is the primary headquarters responsible for direct coordination with the air component commander as an equal operational/tactical headquarters, the corps' responsibilities increase significantly, especially in the area of army airspace command and control (A^2C^2). Like other command and control systems, A^2C^2 has a structure composed of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures. Corps planners must understand how these procedures both enhance the combat power of the corps and protect the force from friendly fires. A^2C^2 is one of the primary procedural and positive (P^2) controls at the corps level. Take the next few minutes to complete the following requirement.

Read in FM 100-15, Chapter 4, pages 4-32 through 4-34, Army Airspace Command and Control. Look up the following words in FM 101-5-1, and summarize their definitions in the spaces provided:

Airspace coordination area (ACA):

Air defense warnings:

Air defense weapons control status:

Coordinating altitude:

High-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ):

Boundaries and other basic positive and procedural control measures define responsibility. In previous tactics instruction, you studied the different control measures for ground maneuver and fire support coordination. Now, you will to gain an appreciation for the third dimension of the battlefield-air. Knowledge of airspace command and control is essential when planning corps operations since the corps is a primary player in airspace management. The corps commander owns the airspace over the corps area of operations and must synchronize the use of airpower with ground operations. To accomplish this, the corps staff plans for air operations during the tactical decisionmakmg process and structures the airspace to ensure effective command and control.

DELINEATING AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY ON A THREE DIMENSIONAL BATTLEFIELD

Throughout your tactics instruction, one of the constant themes interwoven through brigade and division operations is the need for commanders to establish responsibilities and structure the battlefield. By delineating responsibilities and designating where certain activities will take place on the battlefield, the commander provides direction to his subordinate commanders for executing his plan. Today, the complexity of warfare requires the ground commander to integrate air operations into his concept of operation He must also make sure his P^2 controls provide adequate protection of the force while ensuring mission accomplishment. Next, you will study how the corps does this.

The following questions are designed to inform you about airspace command and control techniques and procedures. Integrating air and ground operations is a key characteristic of how the corps fights. It is important for you to understand how A^2C^2 information flows. The information in this block of instruction will not make you an expert in A^2C^2 procedures. The intent is for you to appreciate the time required to implement air operations and other planning and coordination requirements when requesting air support.

Where is the A^2C^2 element located, who does it work for, and why does the corps need one?

The A^2C^2 element normally works under the supervision of the corps A^2C^2 officer (usually the G3 Air) in the fire support cell of the corps tactical operations center (CTOC).

The A^2C^2 element-

- Coordinates, integrates, and regulates airspace of defined dimensions.
- Is a command and control clement with organizations, equipment, personnel, facilities, and procedures.
- Provides a direct link to the airspace control authority (ACA).
- Integrates, synchronizes. and identifies airspace users, which include-

  - Fire support.
  - Air defense artillery (ADA).
  - Army aviation.
  - Special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA).
  - Heliborne electronic warfare (EW) operations
  - Unmanned aerial vehicle operations.
  - Intratheater airlift operations.
  - Amphibious operation,.
  - Joint and combined arms operations.

A key point is that this is a command and control element. Many of the decisionmaking processes and staff actions you learned previously are also performed by this command and control element.

What is the purpose of the A^2C^2 element, what is its focus, and how does it perform its functions?

The A^2C^2 element deconflicts the use of airspace by such activities as tactical air support, Army aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, air defense artillery, field artillery, and electronic warfare assets. A^2C^2 at the corps focuses from the corps rear boundary to the forward edge of the corps area of operations. The A^2C^2 element coordinates the corps' needs with the air component commander through the appropriate battlefield coordination element (BCE) to the air operations center (AOC). The air component commander coordinates and disseminates information downward to the corps through the air support operations center (ASOC) located at the CTOC.

The A^2C^2 element performs these primary tasks. It -

- Provides timely and accurate information to the commander and subordinate units.
- Facilitates and monitors the accomplishment of command decisions.
- Anticipates requirements and provides estimates of the situation.
- Determines various courses of action that best integrate air operations with ground operations to accomplish the mission.
- Integrates and implements ACA-directed airspace control measures.

Who are some of the representatives from various staff sections, liaison elements, or major subordinate units that you might include in the corps A^2C^2 element?

Representatives are normally designated in the unit standing operating procedures (SOP) and often include representatives from the following:

- G3 current operations section.
- ADA element,
- Aviation element.
- Fire support element.
- Air Force tactical air control party (TACP).
- Air and naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) (if available).
- supporting air traffic service battalion.
- G2 CM&D section (as required).
- G4 section (as required).
- Division A^2C^2 elements (as required).
- The TAC and rear CPs.
- Theater air defense brigade.
- corps AD brigade.
- A^2C^2 elements from neighboring corps (if required).

The A^2C^2 element is not a structured or formal organization. Many different staff officers involved in providing combat support and combat service support to the corps may be part of the A^2C' element on an ad hoc basis. The A^2C^2 element relies heavily on the use of positive and procedural controls and SOPs as its normal operating procedure. Often, the corps SOP tasks designated representatives from selected staff sections to perform additional duties within the A^2C^2 element. Some personnel also may be designated full-time A^2C^2 element personnel. These full- and part-time representatives are collocated to perform their A^2C^2 duties. However, they often must perform their primary staff functions first and then assist in synchronizing the airspace

requirements of their parent units and organizations with other airspace users. A typical A^2C^2 element organization at corps is illustrated below



In summary, throughout your tactics instruction you've studied how commanders at the brigade, division, and now corps level envision an operation, structure the battlefield, and use command and support relationships to resource their subordinate commanders. As warfare increasingly becomes more complicated, the need will increase for the integration of ground, air, and naval operations into the commander's concept of operation. This requires that their staffs understand the dynamics of a three-dimensional battlefield and how to structure it to accomplish the mission and protect the force.

This is a good point for another break. When you return, you will begin putting the pieces of this puzzle together by examining how the corps uses these different assets to conduct combined arms operations.

COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS

Read the M/S320B Staff Planning Book, Chapter 7, II Allied Army Group Periodic Intelligence Summary No 1. Review Chapter 2, X (US) Corps Intelligence Estimate 1; Chapter 3, Krasnovian Doctrine and Tactics; Chapter 5, LANDCENT COP CRASHING FIST; and Chapter 8, X (US) Corps OPLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG).

The ability to plan a corps-level operation requires a high degree of thinking skills focused on decision making, problem solving, and creative thinking. A corps conducting combined arms operations is something like moving a town of 100,000 inhabitants from South Carolina to Virginia. To maximize your learning activity during this portion of the lesson, you will begin a series of activities designed to build up your database of information on the mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available for conducting a corps operation. This will help you prepare for the practical exercise in lesson 4.

The information you need for these activities is found in the M/S320B Staff Planning Book, FM 100-15, and ST 101-5. Do not speed through this portion of the lesson.
you will need for lesson 4 and the exam.

A corps planner must be able to analyze and evaluate the "big picture." Remember, the corps commander In this case, the corps commander must understand the LANDCENT commander's intent. This is the starting point for the rest of lesson 3.

What was the LANDCENT commander's intentfor Phase II in CRASHING FIST? **Write the LANDCENT commander's intent here:**

As you go through the rest of the lesson, reflect on all the previous doctrine, tactics, and techniques you've studied and the different concepts you've learned. This portion of the lesson will guide you through the different planning considerations for developing a corps-level plan. At the completion of this lesson, you will be ready to apply your knowledge and produce a plan for a corps operation.

The first activity is to review how the battle has unfolded since D-day. To do this, first review the LANDCENT plan and determine if its preconditions are still valid. Think about the following major points:

- Mission:
  - Friendly.
  - Krasnovian.
- Capabilities:
  - Friendly.
  -- Krasnovian.
- Theater structure.
- LANDCENT commander's concept of operation and operational design:
  - Enemy centers of gravity.
  - Lines of operation.
  - Decisive points.
  - Enemy and friendly culmination.

Now take a closer look at paragraph 3 of the X (US) Corps plan to see how the corps planned to execute its operation. After reviewing these two plans and analyzing how the operation went based on the information in the M/S320B Staff Planning Book, continue with the next requirement.

Check your comprehension of the corps plan and scenario as you think about the following series of questions. If you need to, go back and review the staff planning book as appropriate.

MISSION

What is the X (US) Corps' mission during Phase II of the LANDCENT plan ?

"On order, X (US) Corps defends in sector to destroy the 2 GTA to cause the defeat of the 2 Krasnovian Front."

Some of the implied tasks include to be prepared to restore the German territorial integrity and to be prepared to conduct offensive operations. A limitation on the corps commander's freedom of action is the requirement to get the II AAG commander's approval prior to committing his reserve.

What do you think is the 2 Krasnovian Front's mission as of D-day?

The 2 Krasnovian Front, consisting of the 2 GTA and the 16 TA, will attack in conjunction with the 1 Krasnovian Front. The 2 GTA is expected to make the main attack for the 2 Krasnovian Front. The 2 GTA would move quickly into southeastern Germany with immediate missions west of the Elbe River and subsequent missions west of Thuringer Wald toward Kassel, Fulda, and Coberg. The 2 GTA would likely attack with two divisions in the first echelon and would likely not make extensive use of forward detachments. The array of committed forces facing the X (US) Corps would probably be two motorized rifle divisions (MRDs) (BMP2/T-80), two tank divisions (T-80), and one independent motorized rifle regiment (IMRR), supported by normal division and army artillery and combat support units of the 2 GTA. The IMRR would serve as the army's combined arms reserve force to protect the commitment of second-echelon forces and to reinforce any successful penetrations of enemy defenses. 2 GTA's attack would be supported with fixed-wing aircraft and use of chemical weapons. m-level assets such as artillery, air defense, combined arms reserves, air assault, and spetsnaz would also provide support.

Why would the Krasnovian TVD commander attack with a multiple axis form of operational maneuver? Based on Krasnovian doctrine, is this the best form to use?

Front operations are the major ground component of strategic operations in a continental theater of military operations (TVD). A TVD coordinates the operations of several fronts.

A front offensive is intended to destroy enemy military forces and to achieve operational missions in support of strategic political and economic goals. A front offensive involves much more than attacks against enemy forward defensive positions. It involves coordinated, repetitive, and intensive strikes throughout the entire depth of enemy field forces. These strikes may include-

- An initial, massive, nonnuclear air operation.
- Surface-to-surface rockets and missiles.
- Heliborne and airborne assaults.
- Deep attacks by operational maneuver groups (OMGs)
- Weapons of naval forces.
- Unconventional warfare.
- Radioelectronic combat.
- Chemical and nuclear warfare, if necessary.

The overriding aim in a Krasnovian front offensive is to prevent the war from turning nuclear. To do this, Krasnovian leaders expect high rates of advance by their attacking ground forces. They also plan to conduct strikes deep into the defender's rear area. These actions are designed to cripple the enemy's ability to effectively respond to Krasnovian attacks.

Krasnovian military doctrine recognizes two broad categories of operational maneuver: the *broad front multiple axis attack* and the *encirclement.* Encirclement operations are preferred whenever possible since an

encirclement requires fewer forces than the broad front multiple axis attack. Either method, or even a combination of the two, can be employed. The broad front multiple axis operation generally requires either significant *surprise* or overwhelming forces.

The Krasnovians would almost certainly initiate hostilities with an air operation. It would be designed primarily to destroy or neutralize our air defenses and air forces on the ground and to gain at least local air superiority. This air operation would use practically all fixed-wing assets within the theater for the first 2 to 3 days of the offensive. The ground offensive would probably follow within hours of the initiation of the air operation. After the operational goals of the air operation had been attained, significant fixed-wing assets would then he released to the various fronts in the theater (2 Krasnovian Front included) to support continuing ground operations.

A front is a wartime formation comprising several armies or separate divisions. A front's size and composition vary with the mission it receives within the overall strategic operation. A typical front may have-

- Three to five guards tank armies (GTAs) or tank armies (TAs).
- A tactical frontal air army.
- One or more artillery divisions.
- One or more surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigades.
- A surface-to-air missile (SAM) brigade.
- An air assault brigade.
- A *spetsnaz* brigade.

If required, the front may include airborne and amphibious forces. Other assets support it, including strategic rocket forces, strategic air armies, naval forces, railroad troops, and construction troops.

The front is both an administrative and an operational entity. There is no fixed front organization. The front incorporates the air and ground forces required for operations in a given area. The number of armies and separate divisions that might constitute the combat elements of a front vary widely. The front's composition depends on its mission within the context of the overall strategic operation. The combat divisions assigned to a front are further assigned to the armies or placed in a separate (or front combined arms reserve) status. This assignment depends on the nature of the operation and on the combat situation as it develops.

Krasnovian logistics doctrine will organize the combat service support or *rear service* structure of a front to meet support requirements. Front rear services must support all aspects of the front operation, including augmentation of its armies. The front structure includes transport, supply, evacuation, repair, and medical units. The rear services use road, bridge, and railroad construction units to establish and maintain the lines of communications. Road and rail traffic control units operate these lines of communication.

The 2 Krasnovian Front commander has a total of 33 ground maneuver regiments available, but only 17 against the X (US) Corps. If you look at the overall force structure and the time lines within the operation, the use of the broad front, multiple axis attack probably is not the best use of the Krasnovian forces available.

CAPABILITIES

What are the major ground maneuver elements of the X (US) Corps?

The major ground maneuver elements of the X (US) Corps are the 52d Mech and 25th Armd Divs, the 4th PzGren Div, the 4th CMBG, and the 209th ACR. This provides the corps with 11 ground maneuver brigades.

A quick evaluation of the corps combat power indicates the corps can defend against 11 Krasnovian division-sized units.

Although the corps has an acceptable ratio of one defender to three attackers, planners must also analyze and evaluate other variables such as attack helicopters, the amount and type of artillery, intelligence capabilities, command and control, the ability of the force to protect itself, and finally, the enemy's leadership.

What other capabilities could the corps request from theater?

With the possibility of the corps subsequently transitioning to the offense, the corps will likely need additional MP support to assist in battlefield circulation control. Any additional movement forward would also require the corps to reassess the high-to-medium altitude air defense coverage the corps has while in its initial defensive positions. You can also see that the corps will get additional CSS elements (a railway transportation battalion) to assist in its operation Other requirements might include additional civil affairs and PSYOP support and engineers for sustainability engineering support

What capabilities does the 2 Krasnovian Front have to conduct deep operations into the X (US) Corps rear area?

Planning at front level must support the conduct of operations deep in the enemy's rear area. Frontal (tactical air armies) aviation has the mission to engage targets deep in the enemy rear area. The 2 Krasnovian Front also has an unidentified *spetsnaz* brigade available to conduct operational reconnaissance or direct action missions against the X (US) Corps rear. Additionally, the front also has the 21 AASLT Bde. This brigade conducts air assaults or deep attacks 40 to 120 kilometers forward of the first-echelon regiments of the first-echelon divisions of the army and front These elements would be of primary concern for the divisions of the corps.

THEATER STRUCTURE

What is X (US) Corps' area of operations for phase II of the LANDCENT plan ?

LANDCENT provided the X (US) Corps with a left and a right boundary and an initial forward limit along a line From Treuenbrietzen (UT5473) to Wittenberg (UT3849) to Eilenburg (UT3705) to Grimma (US4179) to Altenbcrg (US2050) to Falkenstein (LTR1495) to Posseck (TR9280). After the III (GE) Korps conducts its rearward passage. the corps assumes control out to PL ARGON.

Where is the battlefield coordination element (BCE) located?

To answer this question, you must understand the role and duties of a BCE and the corresponding structure in NATO. The combined air operations center (CAOC) has an Army coordination element to help process requests for tactical air support This BCE liaison element monitors and interprets the land battle to keep the CAOC informed as the land battle develops and ensures the land component or corps commanders' requests are put into the Air Force system.

What are II AAG's duties and responsibilities?

Remember, the II AAG is an allied headquarters activated by LANDCENT to control several tactical corps headquarters. This gives it functions similar to those of a numbered army headquarters in US doctrine. NATO does not have numbered army headquarters. Here are some key points:

- The CINC establishes or activates a numbered army headquarters based either on the needs of the theater or as a counterpart to an allied headquarters to ensure satisfactory distribution of multinational responsibilities.

- A numbered army is a flexible organization task organized to accomplish assigned missions and is normally formed from existing theater army assets.

- The staff of the numbered army is more austere and focuses on situation assessment, estimate formulation, planning, and functional area coordination. The numbered army normally operates from a main and an alternate CP.

LANDCENT **COMMANDER'S** CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND OPERATIONAL DESIGN

How is the theater "shaping the battlefield" according to its plan?

Deep operations will delay, disrupt, and deplete the second-echelon army.

How is the LANDCENT commander sequencing operations to accomplish his plan?

First, he wants to establish a cohesive defense from the north German coast south to the Austrian and Czech borders.

Second, he wants to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) operations to determine the threat's main effort.

On completion of the covering force and battle handover of the III (GE) Korps, he wants to position long-range fire support elements well forward to support the X (US) Corps covering force operations (209th ACR and 4th CMBG).

He wants to continue to receive forces in theater to build his forces for a counteroffensive.

Next, to defend in sector, allowing for a controlled penetration of Krasnovian main effort.

The units must be flexible enough to be prepared for a boundary change, adding the 1st (GE) PzGren Div sector to the army group area if depth of designed penetration is exceeded; to conduct offensive operations toward Neuprin (UU533685) in the north, Brandenburg (UU316095) in the center, or along an axis Chemnitz (US550350) (formerly Karl-Marx-Stadt) to Dresden (VS105580) in the south; and to restore the German-Polish border and German-Czech border in sector.

NATO forces must also be prepared to operate in concert with the forces of the Czech Republic should that nation abandon its neutrality or be drawn into the conflict and to operate in concert with Austrian forces should that nation abandon its neutrality or be drawn into the conflict. (This will continue in all phases.)

What form of defense is the LANDCENT commander using, and what is the role of the X (US) Corps in the LANDCENT plan ?

The LANDCENT operational concept focuses on maintaining a mobile defense while building combat power in the rear area to prepare for a counteroffensive. LANDCENT prepares to defend in sector with three tactical corps under II AAG's command. Forward of LANDCENT/II AAG positions, III (GE) Korps will function as a covering force for 24 hours while the forward corps move into sector. III (GE) Korps will delay Krasnovian

forces east of the Elbe River for 24 hours. On order, II AAG will assume OPCON of III (GE) Korps for battle handover. Upon III (GE) Korps handover of the battle to II AAG main defense forces, II AAG passes III (GE) Korps to the rear and defends in sector.

LANDCENT objectives are to identify and contain the front making the main attack, defeat armies making supporting attacks, and protect and move counterattacking forces to achieve a positional advantage against the army in the second echelon. Activities may continue until the major reinforcing formations have closed in theater and an effective forward defense is established.

Deception efforts would continue to indicate potential weakness and failure of defense in II AAG and to conceal the location and intent of I AAG.

Concurrently, Air Forces, Central Europe (AIRCENT), will gain and maintain air superiority in LANDCENT's theater of operations and conduct joint-precision interdiction/air interdiction east of the reconnaissance and interdiction planning line (RIPL) (PL ARGON) with priority of effort forward of II AAG, shifting to I AAG after the defeat of the first operational echelon armies of 1 Krasnovian front and prior to counterattack. Offensive air support (OAS) priority is in II AAG AOR and will shift to that of I AAG on 8 hours' notice.

Does the X (US) Corps plan complement the LANDCENT plan?

X (US) Corps plans to defeat the 2 Krasnovian Front by destroying the 2 GTA as it attacks into the sector using a mobile defense. This will establish conditions for a decisive operation by having a firepower-oriented force positioned well forward. Then, with the majority of the corps' maneuver forces positioned farther back, X (US) Corps will attack to destroy remaining forces in the corps AO. The corps success will be measured by having destroyed the 2 GTA, being positioned to attack north, and establishing the conditions to allow German Korps East to attack to restore the German-Polish border.

This will be a three-phased operation. During phase I, the corps will move to initial defensive positions. After battle handover, the corps will conduct deep operations with 10th Avn Bde; 68th and 67th FA Bdes; and BAI, CAS, and IEW to destroy the two first-echelon divisions of the 2 GTA forward of PL NEUTRON while the 4th CMBG and 209th ACR establish a cover along PL NEUTRON. During phase II, the 209th ACR (main effort) will delay the northern threat second-echelon division, and the 4th CMBG will screen the southern threat second-echelon division. This will allow the corps to shape the movement of the second-echelon divisions so that the southern division will be forward (west) of the northern division as phase III starts. During phase III, the 52d Mech Div will defend in sector. The 25th Armd Div, as the main effort, and 4th PzGren Div will attack into the flanks of the remaining Krasnovian divisions within their zones. This will complete the destruction of the 2 GTA. The corps will then reconstitute in assembly areas along its north boundary in preparation for future operations to the north. No reserve is planned in phases I and II. The 4th CMBG becomes X (US) Corps reserve in phase III.

What is the Krasnovian TVD's center of gravity, and how is LANDCENT attacking it?

You really don't have enough information to determine the TVD's center of gravity. As a concept, the center of gravity of a TVD-type operation may be the transportation means to resupply and move follow-on forces.

Is LANCENT using interior or exterior lines of operation, and does it matter?

The initial phases of the campaign demonstrate the strengths of interim lines of operation used by LANDCENT. If the Krasnovian forces achieve their operational missions and objectives, then the Krasnovians

have interior lines of operation. This will give them additional strength in that they will be able to "push out" and force NATO to expend greater resources trying to restore the territorial integrity of NATO.

Does the LANDCENT plan identify any decisive points to attack that would force the Krasnovian TVD commander to change his plan ?

No. Some generic answers for this might include destruction of crossing sites and bridges over the Oder River as decisive points to force the enemy to lose time, disrupt his tempo, and expend his limited resources.

What would indicate the enemy's inability to continue with his plan?

Identifying the enemy's culmination is part of the "art" of warfare. A key measure would be the enemy's reduction in reconnaissance capabilities or operations. Another indicator might be the decreasing intensity of the enemy's fires, use of local counterattack forces, and movement of armored forces. Another indicator may be the number of prisoners the defender captures from the attacking force.

What might be some indicators of LANDCENT's inability to continue with its plan?

For the defender, culmination may be characterized by the increase in the number of personnel and equipment lost and the defender's inability to gain any local initiative.

As you reflect on the operational environment prior to hostilities, you need to define success. What is the definition for success for LANDCENT?

LANDCENT's definition of success is to deny the Krasnovians sufficient combat power west of, or in the vicinity of, the former inner-German border (IGB) and to quickly destroy as much of the attacking forces as possible to bring about an unfavorable correlation of forces and means so the NATO counteroffensive can succeed.

You have now reviewed the operational environment for this tactical problem. Now, you need to focus on the X (US) Corps plan and the significant events from D-day to D+6, which will be the vehicle used to examine both corps defensive and offensive combined arms operations. Before answering the next question, turn to chapters 10 and 11 in your M/S320B Staff Planning Book and quickly review the current situation and chronology of events.

Has LANDCENT accomplished its mission as of D+6?

No.

Now focus on how the X (US) Corps planned and executed its OPLAN, DEPUTY DAWG.

CORPS DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

In FM 100-15, read Chapter 6, Defensive Operations. Review FM 100-5, Chapter 9, Fundamentals of the Defense, and Chapter 10, Planning and Conducting the Defense.

Why might the defense be considered the stronger but less decisive form of war?

The defense has many inherent strengths. Since the defender knows the terrain, he can stockpile supplies and prepare an overall comprehensive defense plan. An attacker can overcome the inherent strengths of a defender by deceiving the defender of the location, timing, or method of the attack. The attacker maintains the initiative

if he is able to paralyze the defender's abilities to respond to the attack either physically, psychologically, or both. The defense is considered the less decisive form of war because, by remaining on the defense, you cannot impose your will over your opponent or achieve your war aims.

Within the context of the LANDCENT plan, what were some of the purposes for X (US) Corps defense?

There are several reasons for the X (US) Corps defense. Here is a summary. Military forces defend to gain strength to attack. *Some* ways to do this include buying time to hold key terrain so they are in position to attack, to preoccupy the enemy in one area so they can attack in another, and to force the enemy to expend resources more quickly than planned.

What are some of the inherent advantages of a defender that the X (US) Corps wants to exploit?

Some key elements of the corps plan's attempt to enhance the defender's advantages include knowing the terrain better than the enemy to set up planned counterattacks; allowing the enemy to think he has success and encouraging the enemy to exploit faster in one area than in the other, thereby forcing his forces to become uncoordinated: and finally, extending the enemy in time and space allowing his force to become more vulnerable to attacks.

Does the X (US) Corps plan address how it will overcome some of the attacker's advantages?

Yes, When the enemy attacks, he relies heavily on reconnaissance forces to confirm his plan. The corps plan uses a covering force to degrade and destroy the enemy reconnaissance capability. Once this is done, the enemy either continues the attack without adequate reconnaissance or momentarily pauses to reconstitute a reconnaissance capability.

In reviewing the X (US) Corps plan, what form of defense is the corps using?

A mobile defense.

Based on your review of the plan, what is your assessment of operational risk for this operation?

A clear concern would be the need to reinforce positive and procedural (P^2) controls. In phase III of the corps plan, the 52d Mech Div must bring the enemy under fire while elements of the 25th Armd and the 4th PzGren Divs are counterattacking into the enemy flank.

What are some of the corps deep operations during and after the counterattack by the 25th Armd Div?

The corps continues to conduct deep operations with corps deep fires and Army aviation. They are attempting to locate and destroy counterattacking forces and any units that might reinforce the enemy units being attacked by the 25th Armd and the 4th PzGren Divs.

What is the corps doing about rear operations, and what is the current status of the tactical combatforce (TCF)?

OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG designates a brigade composed of two battalions from the 52d Mech Div as the tactical combat force for phases I through III. For scenario purposes, the 52d Mech Div commander assigned that mission to the 2d Bde with a mech-heavy battalion task force and a tank-heavy battalion task force. The TCF is currently located in Assembly Area (AA) HASTINGS.

What are some planning considerations for transitioning to the offense? Are they apparent in the corps plan?

One of the major requirements facing the X (US) Corps as it transitions to the offense is its ability to generate combat power after the current operation. Again, the ability to reconstitute combat power is a major planning responsibility for the corps.

You've seen many references to the term "reconstitution." This term covers actions that stretch across the full range of operations What is the difference between strategic reconstitution and tactical reconstitution?

This is not addressed in the readings assigned for this lesson, but you may understand the difference, based on previous subcourses or intuitive reasoning.

Strategic reconstitution refers to the *industrial and mobilization base* of the nation. The Army's strategic reconstitution depends on the integration of national efforts to restore its capability to mobilize, deploy, and conduct future operations.

At the tactical level, reconstitution consists of the reorganization and/or regeneration of personnel and equipment to restore *combat capability.*

Before you go any further, make sure you understand this concept.

What exactly is tactical reconstitution?

Reconstitution is defined as those actions planned and implemented by commanders to restore ineffective units to a desired level of combat effectiveness, commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources and time. Reconstitution transcends normal day-to-day force sustainment actions. However, it uses existing systems and units to do so. No resources exist solely to perform reconstitution.

You have already noted that tactical reconstitution consists of reorganization an&or regeneration. But what's the difference between these two terms?

Reconstitution is a total process. Its major elements are reorganization, assessment, and regeneration, in that order.



Reorganization is action to shift resources within a degraded unit to increase its combat effectiveness. Commanders of all types of units at each echelon conduct reorganization. They reorganize before considering regeneration. Reorganization may be immediate or deliberate. Both forms may include such measures as-

- Cross-leveling of equipment and personnel.
- Matching operational weapon systems with crews.
- Forming composite units (joining two or more depleted units to form a single mission-capable unit).

With both forms, if resources, the tactical situation, and time permit, the goal is to improve the unit's capability until more extensive efforts can take place. Since reorganization involves a unit's internal activities, it is the most expedient means of maintaining combat power in the early stages of a conflict. In forward units, it remains the most expedient method throughout the conflict. It also forms a basis for regeneration efforts.

Whenever possible, normal CSS operations continue throughout the reorganization process. With this support, reorganized units may remain effective for extended periods. Commanders may be able to delay or avoid the need to regenerate.

- The unit commander normally implements *immediate reorganization* in the combat position or as close to that site as possible to meet near-term needs. Commanders use information in OPORDs (such as succession of command), unit SOPs (such as battle roster, redistribution criteria, and contingency manning standards), and assets immediately available. An example of immediate reorganization is consolidation and reorganization on the objective. when an infantry platoon seizes an objective, the platoon leader inspects his platoon. He then moves soldiers to fill gaps and directs replenishment or cross-leveling of ammunition. This is the essence of immediate reorganization; it shifts readily available assets to increase combat power.

- *Deliberate reorganization* involves more time and resources. It usually occurs farther to the rear than immediate reorganization. Procedures are similar to those for immediate reorganization; however, some replacement resources may be available. Also, equipment repair is more intensive, and more extensive cross-leveling is possible.

Assessment measures a unit's capability to perform its mission. It occurs in two phases. The unit commander conducts the first phase. He continually assesses his unit before, during, and after operations. If he determines it is no longer mission-capable even after reorganization, he notifies his commander. Higher headquarters either changes the mission of the unit to match its degraded capability or removes it from combat. External elements may also have to assess the unit after it disengages. This is the second phase. These elements do a more thorough evaluation to determine regeneration needs. They also consider the resources available.

Regeneration is unit rebuilding. This is a higher level of reorganization than the unit can do during normal reorganization without adequate personnel resources. Regeneration also involves reestablishing or replacing the chain of command and conducting mission-essential training to get the regenerated unit to standard with its new soldiers and equipment. Because of the intensive nature of regeneration, it occurs at a regeneration site after the unit disengages. It also requires help from higher echelons. Since regeneration typically requires large quantities of personnel and equipment, commanders must carefully balance these needs against others in the command.

Now, look a little closer at the process. An assessment is made to determine if a unit is a candidate for regeneration. The assessment draws on both tangible (objective) and intangible (subjective) factors.

What types of factors might you consider tangible?

This information was not in your readings, but you should be able to think of several. Tangible factors could include but are not limited to-

- Unit strength/number of mission-capable personnel.
- Number and type of casualties, including battle fatigue.
- Condition of key personnel.
- Status of weapon system crews.
- Status of major weapon systems, vehicles, and other essential equipment.
- Availability of combat support (allowing unit to continue assigned missions).
- Levels of ammunition, POL, and other critical or essential supplies.

Tangible factors are fairly quantifiable. For that reason, the unit's mission-capable strength level and equipment readiness status are usually the two main determinants when assessing the need for regeneration. Just how low does unit strength have to go before a unit is considered ineffective?

This would really depend on the overall situation and mission, including a lot of intangible factors. Therefore, the strength level required to present a credible force varies, but 60 percent is usually a good start point to adjust as necessary. When the mission capable strength level starts approaching 60 percent, commanders should start assessing (if they haven't already) the need for regeneration.

Commanders evaluate the status of major weapon systems, vehicles, and other essential equipment. At what point should status of equipment "wave a flag"?

As with personnel. the percentage required for successful mission accomplishment depends on the situation, but 70 percent may serve as an initial planning guideline.

As you can see, there are many tangible factors to assess. How about intangible factors?

The commander considers a number of subjective factors that affect his unit's ability to continue its mission, Among the most important are-

- Effectiveness of unit leadership (all leaders, not just chain of command).
- Soldier morale and personnel readiness.
- Esprit de corps and commitment.
- Discipline and unit cohesion.
- Anticipated future missions.
- Length of time unit has been in combat.
- Number and locations of any intervening rest periods.
- Nature and intensity of most recent combat experience.
- Battlefield environment (effect of terrain and weather on soldiers' mental states).
- Losses of key formal and informal leaders and unit veterans.

Formal assessment (quantifying) of these intangible factors is probably not possible. However, the commander should know his troops and be sensitive to their needs to detect the first subtle shifts in morale that may ultimately undermine his authority and destroy the unit.

The advantages to regeneration of a unit should be obvious, but what are some of the disadvantages to regeneration ?

Regeneration is very resource intensive. Units to be regenerated must be removed from their positions in the line to a relatively secure rear area. A regeneration task force (RTF) must be formed from elements under the directing commander's control. While performing regeneration tasks, RTF elements are not doing their normal missions. Regeneration requires time, especially for training and development of unit cohesion.

How do we determine which headquarters will be responsible for planning and accomplishing regeneration ?

Regeneration cannot be accomplished with organic resources. Generally, it must be done by the headquarters that controls the necessary resources (primarily CSS units), normally two echelons above the unit being regenerated. For example, a brigade should be regenerated by the corps support command.

You can agree that units arc not capable of long-term continuous combat without sustaining assistance from external sources. Personnel casualties must be replaced. Badly damaged or destroyed equipment must similarly be replaced. Even under conditions of nonintensive combat. however, Army units will become tired or degraded if left in the line for lenghty periods.

What measures short of reconstitution can be taken?

Sometimes the normal rotation of missions will give relief. A unit assigned in a reserve position may get 1 or 2 days of rest. If mission requirements can be met, it is even possible to rotate units to rest and recuperation areas in a quiet sector. These types of actions are often used to rejuvenate a unit, Unfortunately, at some point, a combat unit may reach a low point of combat effectiveness due to personnel and/or equipment losses and reconstitution must be considered

This has been a short discussion of what can be a complex and involved operation. Although reorganization can be done internally. regeneration requires much more thorough planning and synchronization and a significant investment of resources. Even though a division can theoretically regenerate a battalion, its resources are meager at best. That is why most regeneration is conducted at corps and echelons above corps.

Security operations are also important in the defense

What are some of the security missions a corps would conduct in the defense?

The corps can conduct all types of security missions in the defense. The security missions conducted by combat units arc normally screen, guard. and cover. A rear area security mission may be conducted by military police units In the defense. a cover mission seeks to destroy the enemy's reconnaissance capabilities and destroy the first-echelon regiments of the first-echelon divisions.

Read FM 100-15, Chapter 5, Offensive Operations. Review FM 100-5, Chapter 7, Fundamentals of the Offense, and Chapter 8, Planning and Conducting the Offense.

FM 100-5 states that original plans may require modification as the enemy situation changes or becomes clear. Tactical formations must be able to modify their direction of movement or orientation of defenses during operations. That is what is happening to the X (US) Corps. It is still going to conduct an offensive operation as originally planned, but in a different direction. Don't get into the actual planning of the operation or start

developing courses of action yet. What you need to do is determine what capabilities the corps has and how it might use these capabilities to conduct different types of offensive operations. Before you begin, review some basic doctrinal concepts for offensive operations.

The first concept is a corollary to the statement made about the defense being the less decisive form of war. FM 100-5 states the "offensive is the decisive form of war-the commanders' ultimate means of imposing their will upon the enemy."

It is easy to see how this concept applies during war, but what about during periods of conflict or operations other than war?

This question refers to the three states of environment described in FM 100-5, chapter 2-peacetime, conflict, and war. There is no real textbook answer here. It is logical to draw the conclusion that the political objectives you want to achieve may benefit from the application of military power in a offensive manner, but responsible to strict legal rules of engagement. Some examples of military operations during a conflict are air strikes, raids, support to insurgencies, peacekeeping, and so forth. The key point is that an offensive action may be classified as an offensive operation if it forces the enemy to react to your will.

Now, you need to study how the corps conducts offensive operations



Based on your analysis of the LANDCENT plan and the LANDCENT commander's intent in CRASHING FIST, why would X (US) Corps conduct offensive operations toward the German-Polish border?

Based on the LANDCENT commander's intent and the be-prepared mission for the corps to restore the German-Polish border, the corps should plan for a possible reorientation eastward if the battlefield situation allows for such an attack.

What are some of the reconnaissance and security issues the corps must consider during an offensive operation ?

The key security issue for the corps in this scenario is the corps left flank. The divisions would be responsible for advance guards to protect the leading ground elements. The corps might provide forward reconnaissance elements from the aviation brigade to perform a screen for the advancing divisions.

What are some of the simultaneous and sequential operations the corps must consider when conducting an offensive operation ?

A major operation the corps should plan as it conducts an offensive operation is the control of civilians and restoration of government services and public security. This could be a major civil affairs requirement. Another concern will be the possible accidental or deliberate destruction of chemical and nuclear facilities as part of a scorched-earth policy by the Krasnovians. This may require additional chemical, medical, and engineering assets combined with the civil affairs units to promote public safety and health. The major sequential operation will be transitioning to the defense once the corps occupies positions along the German-Polish border.

What are some potential targets for corps deep operations in the offense?

Remember, deep operations are designed to delay or disrupt forces that can influence the close operation. Some potential targets would include the counterattack forces, second-echelon units, and artillery groupings.

How much control would the corps attempt to impose on the division commanders conducting the offense?

The simple answer is as little as possible. One consideration is the number of control measures the corps would place on the operation overlay. The more control measures used, the more control imposed on subordinate commanders. and the more time required to conduct the operation.

What happens to lines of communication (LOCs) in the offense?

They become extended and generally more susceptible to interdiction from bypassed forces,

If the enemy is in prepared defensive positions out of contact with the X (US) Corps, which generalform of attack will the corps most likely use at the beginning of the operation?

The corps would conduct a movement to contact, with a probable sequence of an approach march, a series of hasty attacks, culminating with the establishment of defensive positions at the German-Polish border.

What form of maneuver would the corps most likely NOT use in conducting an offensive operation as a sequel to OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG?

Corps does not use the infiltration form of maneuver unless it controls a brigade-sized element to infiltrate the enemy defenses as part of a larger force conducting a penetration or frontal attack.

What are some planning considerations for transitioning to the defense at the conclusion of the offensive operation ?

The primary considerations should be to get the corps to the highest state of readiness for future operations as quickly as possible.

As the US Army continues to refine the doctrinal concepts in FM 100-5 and continues to engage in force projection operations, the use of special operations forces to support general purpose forces will increase. Just as corps planners must integrate air operations into the corps commander’s concept of operation, the same requirement applies to the integration of special operations.

At the corps level, you need to expand your thinking of how to integrate SOF operations into the corps commander's concept of operations. If you need to review the material you learned in S310A, open FM 100-15 to page 3-30 and quickly read to page 2-34.

What kind of special operations forces will the corps routinely get as part of its task organization?

Normally, corps would receive a civil affairs brigade and a psychological operations (PSYOP) battalion. Remember, corps planners should request a special operations command and control element (SOCCE) if the corps will receive rangers, special forces, or special operations aviation units.

CONCLUSION

You've completed lesson 3 and are about to begin lesson 4. During this lesson. you've examined theater organizations and structure. You also studied how a corps is tailored to meet operational requirements identified

operating systems to accomplish its mission. Finally, you looked at how the corps interacts at the operational and tactical levels to conduct combined arms operations.

studied. You will need marking pens and other materials to complete the upcoming practical exercise. If you don't have these materials, get them before beginning lesson 4.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 3. Echelons Above Division Employment Doctrine

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3. Theater Structure, Organizations, and the Army's Role

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THEATER STRUCTURE

A theater commander in chief (CMC) determines theater structure based on strategic objectives; allocation of forces; employment strategy; factors of METT-T; and presence of alliance or coalition structures. Combined operations considerations should always be prominent as the CINC considers his theater structure and command relationships. In addition to operating as part of a joint force, the Army must be prepared to conduct combined operations with land, air, and naval forces of other nations. Whereas unity of command may not be possible in combined operations, unity of effort must be accomplished.

Each CINC may assign associated areas within his theater to subordinate joint force commanders. Joint areas or zones can be designated during operations other than war and wartime. Theaters of war are established only in wartime. Multiple theaters of operation could be established within a theater of war.

Combat zones (CZs) and communications zones (COMMZs) may be established as needed. The CZ is an area required by forces to conduct combat operations (normally forward of an army rear boundary, which normally coincides with the corps rear boundary). The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, lines of communication, and other agencies required to support forces in the field. The COMMZ comprises the rear portion of a theater of operations, extending back to the continental United States (CONUS) base and including ports that flow forces into the theater.

ORGANIZATION OPTIONS

The CINC synchronizes single-service, joint, special, and supporting operations with allied and interagency activities. At times, this synchronization requirement may extend to United Nations operations. The scope of military operations in these situations may necessitate designating a number of geographic *subareas of responsibility* such as a joint operations area (JOA) or joint zone (JZ), a joint special operations area (JSOA), or a joint rear area (JRA). A subordinate theater could also be used in a larger theater for decentralizing the effort to a subordinate unified commander as illustrated below:



Subareas of responsibility are portions of a theater CINC's area of responsibility (AOR) and are usually delegated for a long term and often over large areas.

Subordinate Unified Theater

A unified commander may establish a subordinate theater (when authorized by the National Command Authority (NCA)) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with his set criteria. The designating joint force commander (JFC) of the subordinate unified command has broad responsibilities similar to those of a unified commander (less combatant command (COCOM)). US Forces, Korea, as a subordinate unified command to the US Pacific Command (PACOM), is an illustration of this type of organization.

Joint Operations Area

Joint operations areas are geographic areas created by the CINC in which a specific military mission and supporting activities are conducted. JOAs are usually established for short-term operations. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. The JOA commander's authority is limited to that required to accomplish specific tasks. US operations in Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989 offer an example of a JOA.

Joint Zone

A joint zone is a term for an area established to permit friendly surface, air, and subsurface forces to operate simultaneously. Army forces transit, but do not normally operate in, a joint zone.

Joint Special Operations Area

Joint special operations areas are restricted areas of land, sea, and airspace that the CINC assigns to a joint special operations component commander for the conduct of special operations. JSOAs may be established for short- or long-duration special operations efforts, normally when they are independent from conventional operations. A JSOA was established in the western part of Iraq during Operation DESERT STORM.

The CINC may delineate a JSOA to facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operating area. The capture of the hijacking terrorists of the *Achilles Lauro* in the Mediterranean in 1987 was in a JSOA.

Joint Rear Area

The CINC designates a joint rear area to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces that provide essential support to military operations. JRAs maybe established to sustain operations during hostilities. Depending on the level of theater development, a JRA may encompass peacetime facilities and be based on peacetime support arrangements. CINCs may also create JRAs in response to contingency operations.

In war, as in peace and conflict, the CINC may designate a joint rear area. A JRA is a specific area within a JFC's theater or JOA that is designed to facilitate the protection of installations and forces that provide combat support (CS) and/or combat service support (CSS).

Sizes of JRAs vary considerably and depend on the size of the theater, logistic support requirements, threat, and scope of the joint operation. The JRA is usually to the rear of the theater or CZ.

A JRA can also be adapted to a modem, nonlinear battlefield or to an environment of operations other than war. In such circumstances, a JRA may be segmented with isolated pockets of relatively secure support areas that collectively make up the JRA.

Theater of War

In war, the CINC may use many of the structures identified above or others as required to subdivide the theater, When the NCA authorizes combat operations, the theater commander, with NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approval, delineates an area as a theater of war.

A theater of war is defined as the air, land, sea, and space area which is or may become directly involved in the operations of war. This area should encompass only that part of the areas or countries to be involved in the war. While part of the theater is in a state of war, one should not assume that all nations within the theater are at war.

The theater of operations (TO) commander often has responsibilities similar to the theater CINC but of lesser scope. During World War II, the Atlantic/European/Mediterranean theater of war was divided into several subordinate TOs. These TOs were geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces.

Theater or Area of Operations

Within the theater of war, the CINC may establish a theater of operations or an area of operations (AO). If required, the CINC may subdivide his theater of war into two or more TOs or AOs. However, the theater commander must ensure that such divisions do not come at the expense of unity of effort. The TO or A0 refers to that portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations for extended periods.

JOINT RELATIONSHIPS

After determining the COCOM options, the theater commander delegates authority under command relationships for his subordinates. The CINC task organizes and assigns responsibilities to his subordinates. Command relationships available to him include operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), support, and coordinating authority. The CINC strives for centralized direction and decentralized planning and execution.

NATO OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL COMMANDS

During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) terminology for subordinate command relationships caused some problems. The NATO terms “operational command” and “tactical command” are similar to the Army terms “OPCON” and “TACON.” With NATO forces working for a CINC outside the NATO structure, some confusion resulted.

OPCOM (operational command) is used to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, deploy units, reassign forces, and retain or delegate OPCON and/or TACON as deemed necessary. OPCOM does not include responsibility far administration or logistics. OPCOM may denote the forces assigned to a commander.

OPCON, as discussed in joint doctrine, is a slightly broader authority than OPCOM. OPCON, in addition to the authorities stated above, includes the authority to prescribe the chain of command, organize commands and forces, suspend or reassign officers, delineate functional responsibilities, and delineate geographic AORs.

Operational control is also a defined NATO term. In NATO, operational control is the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location. It further includes the deployment of units and the retention or delegation of tactical control to those units. It does not include authority, to assign separate employment of components of concerned units. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistical control.

Tactical command (TACOM), the NATO term, is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command to accomplish the mission assigned by higher authority. This differs from TACON in that TACON involves only the necessary control of movements and maneuvers to accomplish a previously assigned mission. Both NATO and joint doctrine share the same definition for TACON.

These definitions are presented to show the potential complexity of combined operations.

SUPPORT

The CINC identifies support relationships for one force to aid, assist, protect, or logistically support another force. The supporting force gives the needed support to the supported force. The types of support are mutual, general, direct, and close.

Mutual Support

The first case, mutual support, describes actions that units render to one another against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their positions relative to one another and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.

General Support

General support provides support to a force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. General support is the most centralized support relationship. For combat units, this relationship provides the most flexibility to influence the battle and is used when the enemy situation is unclear. It is more commonly used in the defense rather than in the offense.

Direct Support

Direct support provides designated support to a specific force and authorizes the supported force to directly seek this support.

Close Support

The final alternative, close support, is that action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.

COORDINATING AUTHORITY

Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders but not an authority to exercise control. The CINC designates coordinating authority to assist during planning and preparation for actual operations. He specifies coordinating authority to foster effective coordination; however, coordinating authority does not compel any agreements.

Within the parameters set by the CINC's organization of the theater and the command relationships that he establishes, the Army organizes itself to best accomplish its missions. The CINC has the authority to direct certain Army organizational options but normally leaves internal Army organization and command relationships to the Army service component command (ASCC).

THE ARMY IN THEATER

Key to the doctrine of Army operations in theater is the organization of theaters themselves. This section discusses how theater organization is influenced by the three roles the operational level commander must perform, the environment in which he performs those roles, and the echelons of command within the US Army. The section also discusses the ASCC and the responsibilities of its commander.

Senior army leaders, using an operational-level perspective, task organize the Army to maximize its capabilities in the theater. The Army's theater organization provides the means to execute the designs of operational art while facilitating joint operations. The three crucial roles for the conduct of Army operations in a joint and combined environment are joint, combined, and interagency coordination; conduct of operations; and support of operations.

Current Army organization provides three echelons of command above the division: corps, numbered army, and theater army. Organizing in echelons offers several options in performing the Army's roles in theater. Numerous Army conventional and special organizations normally outside the corps structure can contribute to each echelon of command. The Army tailors these organizations to meet operational and support requirements.

ARMY ROLES

The senior army commander, as the service component commander in a joint organization, supports the theater joint force commander (JFC) by conducting Army operations to support or attain the objectives of the JFC. The Army contributes forces to perform combat, combat support, and combat service support activities in theater. The Army organizes, trains, and equips these land forces to accomplish all assigned missions.

Unified command and control (C^2) results in assigning forces for employment, apportioning forces for planning, and allocating forces for execution to combatant commanders. In support of the JFC, the ASCC organizes the apportioned forces to support the performance of the three operational-level roles of the commander:

- Establishing the link between joint, combined, and interagency operations.
- Planning and executing operations in support of the joint campaign.
- Executing support operations to sustain subordinate Army forces.

Although these roles may be performed by other subordinate Army commanders, they remain the responsibility of the ASCC.

Establish Joint, Combined, and Interagency Linkage

The first role of the Army in theater is to establish linkage to joint, combined, and interagency organizations. This linkage includes-

- Receiving joint, combined, and interagency direction.
- Advising the JFC on Army capabilities.
- Conducting liaison with joint, combined, and interagency organizations.
- Augmenting the joint, combined, and interagency staff as required.
- Linking with specific joint, combined, and interagency systems,
- Coordinating intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.

The commanders guidance will usually consist of the subordinate commander's missions and tasks that are expected to contribute to the higher echelon's plan. The guidance should also include the allocation of forces to subordinates and sequencing the assigned mission and tasks. Finally, the guidance will include any delegated authority, other information pertinent to the situation, and any changes that modify subordinate missions and tasks.

The senior Army commander advises the joint or combined commander on capabilities and employment of US Army organizations. The JFC looks to his senior Army commander to nominate and select specific Army units for assignment to subordinate joint commands.

The Army conducts liaison with joint and combined organizations in theater. This liaison includes lateral liaison with sister services, as well as higher and lower liaison with the appropriate joint or combined force staff and any subordinate joint or combined organizations as required. It is important for the Army to understand the capabilities that the other services bring to the theater. Such understanding enhances the opportunity for synergism within the joint force.

Similar to the exchange of liaison teams is the requirement of Army forces to augment a joint force staff or receive augmentation from joint forces when the Army forms the core of a joint staff headquarters.

The Army must also interface with joint information and control systems such as intelligence and communications. These systems require specific hardware that may be unique to the joint force headquarters and may require special Army efforts for effective joint coordination.

Army intelligence elements will closely coordinate with joint, combined, and interagency organizations to establish the mutual supporting intelligence structure required to support the joint commander's operations. The intelligence structure should assign collection capabilities consistent with available assets, conduct timely all-source analysis, and provide rapid dissemination of available intelligence information.

Conduct Operations

The second role for the Army in theater is the conduct of operations. In this role, the senior army commander serves in the joint operational chain of command, planning and executing subordinate campaigns and major operations in support of the joint campaign. He designates, sustains, and shifts the main effort of subordinate ground forces to support the joint or combined plan. His understanding of operational art is essential to the performance of this role.

Conduct Support Operations

The third role for the Army in theater is to conduct support operations. At theater level, most operational considerations will be logistical in nature. In the force-projection mode, early decisions will be highly significant as the time for combat operations approaches. Decisions such as the sequencing of arriving forces and equipment often will not be reversible.

The answer to such questions as to what is needed first-construction engineers or infantrymen, tanks or trucks-may sow the seeds of success or failure. The commander and his staff should analyze these kinds of questions, being careful not to eliminate any options before the need for such decisions is clear.

These analyses require a full assessment of the factors of METT-T and an understanding of where and how risks can be taken. Army commanders retain responsibilities for Army units through the service chain of command, regardless of the joint and combined arrangements. These responsibilities focus on the support of Army units. The ground transportation system, common classes of supply, and construction of the infrastructure are all examples of the Army's contribution to the overall theater effort.

Each joint or combined organization with Army forces has an Army commander who ensures Army support requirements are met. These support requirements, which include logistics. personnel services, and health services, are service specific and flow through the service chain of command.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Like the battlefield framework used by commanders to conduct battles and engagements, there is a similar conceptual framework for the operational environment (illustrated below).



Command includes the requirement to perform the three roles of the operational-level commander. Control is accomplished through the monitoring and performance of operational operating systems described in FM 100-5.

During conditions of peace, each regional CINC has an ASCC through which the CLNC can exercise OPCON of Army forces within theater. In conflict and war, this arrangement may change.

The first determination that must be made is the degree of participation required by Army forces. That participation can range from Army contributions to a joint task force (JTF) to the Total involvement of the Army component in theater. The assessment of the operational environment will determine how the Army organizes.

The fist option is for the ASCC lo provide an operational level command and control capability. The Army contribution to a subordinate unified command is an example of this option. This operational-level element has responsibilities within the designated operations area similar to those of the ASCC within the theater.

The deployment of Army tactical units to support a JTF would require establishing an operational-level command capability. The Army would augment the JTF headquarters or establish a separate operational-level intermediate headquarters. The complexity of the environment and degree of Army participation would determine the option selected.

A second option concerns the internal organization of the Army operational-level component. The ASCC may determine a need to consolidate functions under a deputy commanding general responsible for operations and a deputy commanding general responsible for logistics. This option reduces the span of control required of the commander. As with the first option, complexity. of the environment would determine the selection of this organization alternative.

A third option is the formation of a theater army and numbered army. This decision is made in consultation with the CINC and presupposes a highly complex operational environment with the involvement of multiple Army corps. The ASCC would remain the senior Army commander within the operations area. Joint doctrine precludes the ASCC from being the CINC or a member of the CINC's staff. The ASK has ultimate responsibility for the performance of the three operational-level roles.

While both the theater and numbered army commanders would share responsibility for the joint, combined, and interagency linkages. the theater army commander would focus on support operations, and the numbered army commander would focus on the conduct of operations and perhaps the requirements of a joint force land component.

These options provide an orderly means for the Army to accomplish the operational-level responsibilities in theater. The options also provide a means to evolve the Army theater structure as the complexity of the theater evolves.

Another set of circumstances in which the Army could be divided into separate elements requires much urgency and direct responsiveness to the CINC. Under such exceptional circumstances, the theater organization may have two or more independent Army forces operating directly under the theater CINC. These separate Army forces would focus on specific missions as determined by the CMC and ASK. The ASCC would then focus on the role of supporting the operations of Army forces. Thus, the three roles of the operational-level commander could be split between Army commanders. Commanders of Army forces working directly for the CINC focus primarily. on operations and establishing and maintaining joint and combined linkages.

The structure of the ASCC is adaptable enough to meet the three crucial roles in any theater situation. The ASCC's responsibility is to advise the CINC' of a structure that best meets the dictates of operational design.

ARMY ELEMENT AS A SUBUNIFIED JOINT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

An Army force commander may be designated a subordinate JFC. The designation may be as a subunified commander, a joint force land component commander (JFLCC), or a JTF commander. Based on the theater army structure, the Army joint force commander must reexamine his responsibilities and capabilities to perform the three roles of the operational-level commander. The establishment of a joint headquarters, under these circumstances, will be a unique extension of the joint linkage role.

As a JFLCC, the Army commander may also have direct responsibility for the performance of the three roles of the operational commander. The authority for performing the support roles may be delegated to a subordinate Army headquarters or retained by the CINC's ASCC.

As a subunified or JTF commander, the Army commander would normally expect to focus on conducting joint operations. Support of the Army forces under control of the subunified command or JTF will flow through the CINC's ASCC. Depending on the method in which the Army component is employed by the CINC, the Army operational commander may appoint a single subordinate commander responsible for executing typical logistics and administrative functions.

ECHELONS OF COMMAND

US Army levels of command include theater army, numbered army, corps, division, brigade/regiment/group, battalion/squadron, and company/battery/troop. These echelons of command provide a means for commanders to achieve operational- and tactical-level objectives. Each of these echelons has its own set of capabilities and considerations. The rest of this appendix addresses the organization, responsibilities, and capabilities of those levels above the corps.

Echelons of command above corps have evolved over time. For example, during the Civil War, the Army began evolving toward larger Army-level units with a single commander directing large forces dispersed in multiple locations. During World War I, the theater commander used an intermediate headquarters, the army, to control multiple corps. The World War II structure expanded to using field armies and army groups between the theater and corps commanders.

ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS

The 1986 version of FM 100-5 identified the command echelons above corps as being the field army, the army group, and the theater army. It is difficult to envision future US Army operations at the army group level.

Army groups are normally formed to control from two to five field armies. The field army can control a like number of corps. The formation of an army group could then control a maximum of 25 corps. With the structuring of the Army around a four-corps base, there is no need for the army group.

Should allies contribute forces to a conflict, as we anticipate to be the case, larger formations are possible. The issue then becomes one of span of control for the theater CNC. Modem forces have a significant mobility advantage over their World War II cunterparts, where the US Army last formed army groups. That mobility advantage permits smaller formations to operate over larger areas of operations. The logic then is that large formations equate to large areas or multiple areas of operation.

The theater CINC has six options to organize forces under his COCOM authority. One of those options is to coordinate establishment of subordinate unified commands for operations on a continuing basis. This option would be appropriate for theater operations involving multiple theaters of operation Multiple theaters of operation indicate operations on a broad scale, possibly involving forces from multiple corps. Operations within a given theater of operation could be managed on the field army level.

Where the subordinate unified command COCOM option is not warranted, the CMC might instead use the option of forming a JTF. The JTF option is appropriate when executing missions with specific limited objectives.

Echelons above corps organizations are the numbered army and the theater army. The numbered army performs the role of the operational headquarters. The theater army performs the role of the logistical support headquarters the theater of war. The theater army still retains the ASCC responsibilities for the remainder of the CINc's AOR That structure has the flexibility to create a separate support headquarters subordinate to the theater's army service component commander. As the scale and complexity of operations evolve, shared authority to perform the three operational-level roles will become a requirement.

Army echelons today reflect the unified command structure, increased span of control capabilities, and improved weapons technology. Corps serve as the Army centerpiece for structure and are normally the building blocks on which the Army organizes.

Subordinate JFCs may control multiple US Army corps without the need of an intermediate Army headquarters. However, senior Army commanders may elect to organize a numbered army as an intermediate headquarters when required by METT-T.

Army organizations are structured to perform the missions which they may be assigned. At corps level and below, those missions are primarily tactical. At corps-and-below echelons, units may be augmented to perform at the operational level. However, units that normally operate at the tactical level may not have the operational perspective necessary to skillfully link tactical operations to strategic objectives.

When an echelon is fully engaged at the tactical level, it cannot be expected to assume responsibility for the additional functions and command responsibilities that correspond to the operational level. It has neither the personnel nor materiel resources to perform these responsibilities. In principle, when Army organizations conduct operational-level operations, these operations will be performed by an echelon not directly responsible for commanding tactical operations. The operational-level force commander must be free to concentrate resources on performing the three roles of joint, combined, and interagency linkage; conduct of Army operations; and support of Army operations.

The theater army commanders typically serves as the ASCC to unified commands at theater level, The theater army and the numbered army add flexibility to the options available for Army organization.

During DESERT STORM, Third Army performed the missions normally given to an Army component command a theater army, and a numbered field army headquarters. As a theater army, Third Army commanded all Army forces in the Central Command theater but was not in the operational chain of command. During the initial stages of Operation Desert Shield, this type of relationship was satisfactory. However, when combat operations began during Desert Storm, a decision was made to add a numbered field army headquarters to provide operational direction over the two US Army corps (the XVIII Airborne and the VII). A more detailed discussion of Third Army's role in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM is in the article "The Gulf War," in the *Military Review,* September 1991.

The Army contributes organizations from echelon above corps (EAC) to support joint and combined operations. EAC units fight and support as well as make up a support base. EAC forces may be part of a forward presence that serves as a symbol of US national resolve. Other forces remain in the United States to provide rapid force projection to forward-deployed units or to execute contingency operations. Whatever the case, Army leaders need to be familiar with those Army forces above and outside corps that contribute capabilities to joint and combined operations.

The Army's theater structure is versatile, thereby meeting the needs of combatant commanders. The Army has a number of options for organizations based on the assessment of METT-T and the operational environment. Each theater is unique, and the theater environment is dynamic. There is no typical Army theater organization.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 3. Echelons Above Division Employment Doctrine

Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3. Air Operations in NATO

This appendix provides a quick review of how air support works in the NATO. This was previously presented in S320A. There are two reasons for you to understand the following information. First, even though the US military has a standardized doctrine for employing airpower, you must recognize that there are several other ways to effectively organize, direct, and employ airpower. This situation is no different from land combat where there are several effective methods of employing ground combat elements (note the difference between US and Krasnovian doctrine). Each system has advantages and drawbacks. What you must understand is that during your military career, you might encounter different air operations doctrines. This is especially true if your unit is employed in a multinational force. To succeed as a planner and to efficiently and effectively integrate air-power into the ground combat plan, you must learn and understand the applicable doctrine.

A more immediate reason for reading this appendix is to understand key differences between air operations in NATO and the US air support doctrine you studied in earlier tactics courses. If you are to understand the scenario of the corps planning practical exercise, you must know what types of aircraft you might be supported by, how these aircraft might be employed, and how best to build a plan to ensure airpower is available at the proper place at the proper time.

TYPEAIRCRAFT

A US division receiving NATO offensive air support will see different aircraft flying missions. In addition to US-built F-4 Phantoms, the German *Luftwaffe* operates European-built Tornadoes (primarily for air-to-surface missions and offensive air support) and the Soviet-built MiG-29 Fulcrum (normally air defense missions). They also have a slightly different tactical airlift plane: the C-160 Transall (it looks like a two-engine version of the US C- 130 Hercules). In addition to the Tornado, the British Royal Air Force operates the British-built Jaguar [air-to-surface and tactical air reconnaissance) and Harrier (close air support). They also fly a VC-10 to supplement their C-130 tactical airlift fleet. The Belgians and Dutch use mostly US-built F-16s in multirole missions. Most alliance members (except the Dutch) maintain at least some tactical airlift capability,

US Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), employs the F-15C and F-16 primarily for air defense, the F-15E and F-16 primarily for interdiction and CAS, and the A-10 primarily for close air support (CAS). USAFE also has the C-130 for theater airlift and operates the joint surveillance and target attack radar system (J-STARS) for theater surveillance. NATO operates an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) fleet for the same purpose.

DOCTRINE

NATO has its own theater-specific air employment doctrine. Tactical doctrine, both for air and ground, is found in several books called allied tactical publications (ATPs). Some key publications are ATP 35 (A), *Land Force Tactical Doctrine* (contains ground combat doctrine); ATP 40, *Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in a Combat Zone* (contains procedures for governing airspace; for example, air defense procedures and weapons control zones); and ATP 27B, *Offensive Air Support Operations* (governs the bulk of offensive ai97r support employment doctrine).

Some key differences between NATO and US tactical air support doctrine include:

- Air command and control (C^2) procedures (a discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this appendix).

- Definitions of missions

- Which commander has the final decision about the allocation of air resources

TACTICAL AIR ROLES

This discussion has used terms very similar to those you studied previously. However, in NATO, theater tactical airpower roles differ slightly from US doctrine, especially in the definition of what constitutes offensive air support (OAS). Here is a brief description of various NATO roles.

Counterair (CA) gains control of the air and protects the forces.

♦ *Offensive counterair (OCA)* seeks out and destroys or neutralizes enemy air assets.

♦ *Defensive counterair (DCA)* seeks to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles.

♦ *Suppression of enemy air defenses* (SEAD) neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy air defense systems in a specific area.

- *Air interdiction (AI)* delays, disrupts, diverts, or destroys an enemy's military potential before it can be effectively used against friendly forces and interdicts enemy formations beyond direct-fire range. AI uses destruction of critical targets to delay, divert, or render enemy formations ineffective rather than expend large numbers of sorties and munitions in an attempt to destroy enemy units. The ground commander uses AI in conjunction with long-range artillery fires to shape the battlefield and conduct deep operations.

- *Theater airlift* consists of airlift missions within the theater. It supports theater objectives by the rapid and responsive movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.

- *Offensive air support*..

♦ *Tactical air reconnaissance (TAR)*. now known as surveillance and reconnaissance, provides the commander with information on enemy locations, dispositions, movements, and results from strikes.

♦ *Close air support (CAS)* supports Army ground operations by attacking hostile targets in close proximity with, or within direct-fire range of, friendly land forces (normally done only with close coordination with the affected ground forces).

♦ *Battlefield air interdiction (BAI)* supports Army ground commanders by attacking hostile targets that affect friendly ground forces. This mission is normally flown against forces that are not in direct contact with friendly troops, but the mission requires close coordination with ground commanders.

ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD

The overall (joint, operational-level) commander of the NATO Central Region is called the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe (CINCENT). Two of his immediately subordinate commands-Air Forces, Central Europe (AIRCENT), and Land Forces, Central Europe (LANDCENT)- share the same area of responsibility. To ensure coordinated operations during wartime, AIRCENT and LANDCENT collocate to a single underground facility. All wartime air operations are jointly, planned at this underground facility by members of the joint planning cell. This graphic shows the details of how the planning groups are organized and communicate.



AIRCENT is the headquarters responsible for the overall planning and execution of tactical air operations in the Central Region and in the Baltic Sea approaches. The four combined air operations centers (CAOC) execute AIRCENT's plan for offensive and defensive tactical air operations. CAOCs are comparable to dispatch centers; they are the headquarters that actually tell individual aircraft where to fly and what target to hit. Three of the CAOCs are geographically oriented; the fourth is mobile An important point to remember is that even though a CAOC is an Air Force headquarters, all tasking decisions and orders are coordinated with the land forces they support The CAOC has an Army coordination element, the battlefield coordination element (BCE) from LANDCENT, to help process requests for tactical air support. This liaison clement monitors and interprets the land battle to keep the CAOC informed as the land battle develops.

Each day, the air commander at the CAOC publishes an air tasking order (ATO) that links airframes to preplanned missions. When required to fill immediate air requests, the CAOC supplements the ATO by transmitting an air tasking message directly to the specific unit tasked to fly the sortie(s). Because tasking is carried out at the CAOC, a corps air operations coordination center (AOCC) would contact the supporting CAOC for immediate air support.

To understand how the air effort is synchronized with the land effort to support the single joint campaign plan, you need a basic understanding of the process. You should know how the Commander, Air Forces, Central Europe (COMAIRCENT), decides what relative weight of his aircraft fly for the different major NATO commands (called allotment), what proportion of his aircraft fly what type of missions (called apportionment), and the flow of the air directive that communicates COMAIRCENT's daily decision. While you do not need to be an expert in the air tasking process, a quick description of the process and its decision makers will enhance your understanding of the system.

TASKING

In NATO's Central Region, there are four procedures that occur during the air tasking process: allotment, apportionment, allocation, and distribution.

CINCENT starts the process by providing allotment direction and guidance to COMAIRCENT. Except for allotment, tasking in NATO is similar to the US unilateral tasking process. Allotment is the shifting of tasking authority of particular aircraft assets between CAOCs. Aircraft allotted to a CAOC do not physically move but are assigned missions by the CAOC to which they are allotted. Allotment is generally conducted by squadron. An example would be a CINCENT directive to temporarily allot an asset to a different CAOC to provide a critical capability in support of the joint campaign plan. Allotment decisions are provided to the CAOCs by way of COMAIRCENT's daily air directive. The illustration below shows where decisions are made. Note the two elements subordinate to the CAOC: the wing operations center (WOC) controls the aircraft; the air defense ground environment (ADGE). a NATO term, controls the components of air defense (such as the radars and surface-to-air missile batteries)



In US operations, tactical air support generally falls under one numbered air force. The numbered air force ordinarily does not have air support divided by region within a theater of operations and, therefore, does not have to move assets from one area command to another. Therefore, planners in US unilateral operations are not required to allot.

The next concept in the planning process is apportionment. LANDCENT and AIRCENT planners at the joint planning cell jointly recommend to COMAIRCENT how best to integrate the land and air effort. COMAIRCENT then publishes the jointly agreed decision in his daily operation order. If battle conditions change prior to execution, the CAOC retains sufficient flexibility to redirect aircraft. This planning process takes time; ordinarily, the apportionment decision is made and the operation order published 72 hours in advance of

the planned execution. The next graphic illustrates the relationship between decisions, directives or orders, and the time before execution.

COMAIRCENT's apportionment decision, as in US doctrine, divides air assets into three roles: counterair (offensive counterair (OCA) and defensive counterair (DCA)); AI; or OAS. The last category differs from US doctrine. NATO's OAS category includes CAS, TAR and BAI. Like the US system, the apportionment decision is normally expressed as a percentage of total effort going to each role.



The CAOC commander performs the next element of the tasking process. Allocation is simply matching available aircraft capabilities with missions derived from the apportionment process. The CAOC ATO is the primary means of distributing the allocated air sorties. The ATO tasks air wings to provide specific aircraft with specific munitions or capabilities for specific missions at specified times. At any given time, a CAOC is involved with three different ATOs; each ATO covers a 24-hour block.

The remaining concept on the planning process is called distribution. It is the process of deciding where to use the OAS sorties provided by the ATO.

CONTROL MEASURES

NATO and US national doctrines are very similar in how they use graphics to define the battlefield. One major difference is that NATO recognizes a control measure called a reconnaissance and interdiction planning line (RIPL). This is not currently a recognized US control measure. In NATO, the RIPL defines where army groups relinquish primaiy responsibility for nominating targets. Beyond the RIPL, the air component commander is the primary player. He employs his AI resources to interdict enemy forces and attack other targets in support

of the air operation. Inside the RIPL (and outside of the fire support coordination line (FSCL)), air assets will fly interdiction missions, AI and BAI, but primarily these missions are flown against targets nominated by the ground commander in support of the land operation. Remember, in the Central Region of NATO, ground and air operations remain synchronized by the overarching guidance of the Allied Forces, Central Europe (AFCENT) (joint operational), commander's joint campaign plan.

REQUEST FLOW

The NATO air-ground operations system used to identify tactical air mission requirements, request tactical air support for ground forces, and execute tactical air missions is virtually identical to the system you studied in earlier tactics courses. The Army system combines S3 and G3 air and fire support element (FSE) personnel, organizations, equipment, communications, and procedures, from battalion to corps, to plan and request tactical air support. The Air Force system combines the tactical air control party, air liaison. and CAOC personnel, organizations, equipment, and procedures to plan, direct, and control tactical air operations.

Requests for preplanned CAS missions flow through fire support channels to the division FSE. Requests are reviewed by the G3 air, fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), and air liaison officer (ALO) for suitability as targets for air attack. The FSE may recommend attacking the target with another means. The request is then forwarded to the G3 air at corps. The G3 air evaluates the request in conjunction with the FSCOORD and the AOCC. The G3 air can approve CAS requests that do not exceed those distributed for CAS planned sorties, Approved requests are sent to the AOCC and tasked by the CAOC for execution.

Immediate missions are executed in response to requests from supported ground units to fulfill urgent requirements that could not be foreseen. Immediate missions involve using air alert sorties or diverting aircraft from other missions. Details of the mission are usually worked out while the aircraft are airborne.

Once therequest for an immediate mission reaches the division tactical air control party (TACP), it is sent directly to the AOCC at corps over the Air Force air request net. The TACPs at each Army echelon monitor the request transmission. Silence by an intermediate TACP indicates approval by the associated Army echelon. This is key-the urgency of need for an immediate mission requires an unencumbered system.

This was a quick overview of a complicated topic, but for our purpose here, it is sufficient. Proper synchronization of air-power is crucial to success on the modem battlefield. Remember to plan for it during the initial stages of the tactical decision-making process. However, the ability to influence events on the battlefield requires the effective direction and controlling of these air support assets. This is done through airspace management and Army airspace command and control (A^2C^2).

ARMY AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS

Land Component Commander Level

The ability to effectively synchronize air operations integrated with ground operations depends on the ability of an A^2C^2 element within each echelon of command to effectively interface with airspace planners of the supporting tactical air force (TAF). At the land component commander level, A^2C^2 functions focus on developing a theater airspace control plan. This theater airspace control plan includes defining broad policies and procedures for operating an integrated airspace management control system throughout the entire theater area of responsibility.

As the campaign plan is developed and major ground and air operations are planned, coordination and integration of the air and ground operations are achieved. Subsequently, implementation instructions and procedures are provided in the appropriate operation plans and operation orders.

Each CAOC plans, directs, and controls all tactical air (TACAIR) resources within its area of responsibility. Within this Air Force facility, there is an Army element provided by the land component commander (in this case, initially the LANDCENT commander). This Army element expedites the exchange of information through face-to-face coordination with the corresponding sections within the CAOC.

For instance, the BCE air defense and A^2C^2 section coordinates Army air defense and airspace activities with the operations and plans sections of the CAOC. This eschangc of information provides a seamless flow of information between the appropriate air defense and operational headquarters throughout the theater. Some of the specific AC duties the BCE performs are:

- Coordinating Army/Air Force airspace user requirements

- Integrating Army airspace user activities with the CAOC's AV plans.

- Advising the CAOC of the combat plans, operations. status of other BCEs. A^2C^2 elements. and air traffic service (ATS) elements and significant activities affecting the joint use of airspace, and advising the airspace control authority (ACA) of the impact of joint airspace control measures or restrictions on the conduct of ground operations.

- Representing ground force interests in developing and approving airspace control measures and restrictions.

- Receiving Army requests for airspace control measures and restrictions for staffing and approval

- Monitoring the integration of ground commanders A^2C^2 standing operation procedures (SOPs) into the CAOC's airspace control plan.

This information linkage between the land component commander's headquarters, corps, and BCE at the air component commander's CAOC depends on a reliable and responsive communications system. This communications system includes secure voice, data distribution, facsimile, and message communications.

A^2C^2 at Corps

The corps A^2C^2 element is organized based on requirements to conduct A^2C^2 tasks to support future operational planning, conduct current operations, and perform specific functions within each command post (CP) of the corps. Below is a table showing the specific functions allocated to each of the CPs throughout the depth of the corps area of operations.

Operations in Depth	TAC	Main	Rear
Deep	None	Accomplishes all future operational planning Exercises airspace control responsibitities	None
Close	Exercises airspace control responsibilities	Accomplishes all future operational planning	None
Rear	None	Accomplishes all future operational planning Exercises airspace control responsibility	None

The diagram below shows the organization of the corps A^2C^2 element at the main command post



A^2C^2 at Division

The organization of the A^2C^2 element at the division tactical and main command posts is similar to that at corps. The location of the A^2C^2 element and the tasks it performs are similar to those at the corps with the following exceptions:

- The primary division focus is on conducting battles and engagements in the forward portion of the combat zone (from the division rear boundary forward to, normally, the FSCL established by corps).

- The primary task is synchronizing all airspace users of the combined arms team and supporting sister services with the close battle.

The diagram below shows the organization of the division A^2C^2: element at the main command post.



FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 3. Echelons Above Division Employment Doctrine

Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3. Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Operations

IEW OPERATIONS

The operations element of the corps military intelligence (MI) brigade is the key to command and control (C^2). The MI brigade S3 supervises the employment of brigade assets and directs and coordinates the efforts of the operations center staff

When deployed, the operations center is made up of the S2 and S3 sections of the MI brigade and the technical control and analysis element (TCAE) organic to the operations battalion.

The TCAE exercises technical management of the signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic warfare (EW) assets of the brigade. It maintains an extensive technical database and has a SIGINT processing and reporting capability.

The operations center deploys with the brigade CP and normally locates near the corps main CP.

MANAGEMENT

The brigade S3 is the brigade mission manager. Under his supervision, the operations center plans, directs, and controls the employment of the MI brigade. Many of the considerations governing the employment of assets directly affect both the mission and asset management functions. Close coordination with the operations center, the subordinate units, and the support elements at the corps tactical operations center (CTOC) is essential.

Unit commanders carry out asset management in response to mission taskings received from the MI Brigade corps collection management and dissemination (CM&D) section.

In its collection management role, the CM&D section ensures that orders and requests are received and understood by the collection agency. The CM&D section monitors collection operations so that needed information is collected and reported in a timely manner. It modifies the collection plan as old requirements are satisfied or as new requirements are generated.

PLANNING AND TASKING ORGANIZATION

The planning and tasking organization ensures that assets are committed effectively to satisfy corps information requirements. Employment principles are-

- MI resources are not in reserve, although they may support a unit held in reserve.

- Centralized control and decentralized execution allow subordinate elements maximum flexibility to execute tasks.

- Rapid dissemination.

- Multidiscipline support.

MI assets are always placed where they can most effectively contribute to destroying the enemy.

In any employment profile, the means must be provided to rapidly disseminate time-sensitive information. Procedures are stated by field SOPS, specified in taskings, or dictated by the tactical situation. Every effort is made to use multidiscipline support to satisfy mission tasking. This ensures the most complete and accurate response possible.

The operations center directs the employment of brigade assets to meet the mission tasking formulated by the CM&D section. Factors to be considered before tasking assets include-

- Mission priority.
- Asset availability.
- Asset capability.
- Tactical situation.
- Current and planned missions
- Asset status.
- Flexibility.
- Economy of effort.
- Terrain.
- Weather.
- Asset security needs.

Mission requirements throughout the corps are likely to exceed the capabilities of available assets. Decisions on the relative importance and priority of tasks are based on the principle that each asset is engaged in the highest priority task it can perform, Tasking priorities reflect the mission priorities established by the commander, G2, and G3. These tasking priorities must be flexible, subject to changes in the stated priority, and based on the corps commander's intent.

ASSET TASKING

Through correlation and refinement: mission tasking is translated into asset tasking. Specific assets are identified to accomplish each mission. Instructions are prepared and communicated to the tasked elements.

Tasking directs one or more operating elements of the brigade to prepare for or carry out specific operations. It also can assign or change support roles, depending on mission requirements.

Tasking instructions must be clear and concise yet convey all information necessary to accomplish the task. They must be keyed to the specific needs of the tasked asset Tasking instructions include the following information as a minimum:

- Task objective.
- Resources.
- Coordinating and reporting instructions.
- Time requirements and constraints, or when the operation is to be conducted.
- Background and supporting information.

Tasking is transmitted from the MI brigade operations center to the operations centers of the MI battalion tactical exploitation (TE) and MI battalion aerial exploitation (AE) and to the key elements of each company. The task is then passed to specific assets for accomplishment.

OPERATIONS CENTER AND CTOC SUPPORT ELEMENTS

The requirements levied by the CM&D section of the CTOC support element form the basis for all brigade operations. Through communications with the CM&D section and the ah-source production section (ASPS), the operations center-

- Receives mission tasking based on the IEW needs of the corps commander.
- Coordinates tasking and priorities.
- Reports accomplishment of assigned missions.
- Has access to all-source intelligence products, to include order of battle information produced by the ASPS.

OPERATIONS CENTER AND TCAE

The TCAE is the focal point for the exchange of SIGINT and EW combat information and intelligence in the corps area, To ensure that information is available when and where needed, the TCAE establishes technical data links with the following:

- Echelons above corps (EAC) (to include TCAE and all-source analysis elements) and intelligence elements of other services.
- TCAE at the division and below.
- TCAEs of adjacent corps.
- Adjacent allied EW units.

The TCAE depends on EAC for communications to interface with the national SIGMT system. This requires development of a data base.

The TCAE provides technical data to the TCAEs at the divisions, armored cavalry regiment (ACR), and separate brigades to support their current and planned operations. There is a dedicated link between the TCAE and CM&D to cue analytical efforts, informally exchange information, and coordinate intelligence production. Data received from these elements is added to the technical database and integrated for further analysis and reporting.

Data is exchanged and operations are coordinated with adjacent corps by the TCAE. In some instances, the adjacent corps may be from an allied nation. However, coordination is critical, regardless of the nationality of the unit.

Coordination is especially important for electronic countermeasures (ECM) operations near a common boundary. Communications may be established through the multichannel system, through EAC, or by using organic equipment.

FUNCTIONS

The operations center provides the brigade commander with centralized control and coordination of current tactical operations of the brigade. The functions of this operations center are the same as those performed in a divisional maneuver brigade or division artillery operations center. They differ only in the uniqueness of the brigade mission and the staff expertise required to manage it.

Command and support relationships guide how the MI brigade will be organized for combat and define the degree of control and responsiveness required to accomplish the IEW mission as derived from the corps mission. Refer to ST 101-3, chapter 1, for a description of the current command and support relationships for the US Army.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR TASK ORGANIZATION OF ELEMENTS OF THE CORPS MI BRIGADE

MI brigade elements with a direct support (DS) mission are immediately responsive to the IEW requirements of the supported unit. DS is the most decentralized of the four standard IEW missions. It is not commonly used for brigade elements.

MI brigade elements with a general support (GS) mission provide support to the corps as a whole and are immediately responsive to the IEW requirements of the corps commander. GS is the most centralized IEW mission. The MI battalion (AE) and certain elements of the MI battalion (TE) normally are held in GS of the corps.

Use of the reinforcing mission extends the IEW capabilities of MI units or staff sections. Reinforcing MI elements remain under the command of the MI commander assigning the reinforcing mission. The Ml unit being reinforced exercises operational control (OPCON). The reinforcing mission permits increased support to specific maneuver units without giving up complete control of brigade assets to the supported elements. Elements of the Ml battalion (operations) routinely reinforce the corps G2 and G3 and the MI brigade S3. Task-organized elements of the MI battalion (TE) reinforce the IEW capabilities of the MI units at the divisions and major subordinate commands as appropriate.

Ml brigade elements assigned a GS reinforcing mission provide support to the corps as their first priority. They also support and reinforce another MI unit as a second priority. This mission provides additional flexibility to meet rapidly changing tactical situations.

TASK ORGANIZATION

The MI brigade commander directs the task organization of the brigade to accomplish the IEW mission. This is derived from the corps commander's concept of operation and from tasking from the G3. Task organization ensures that the best possible use is made of the limited resources available to the brigade. The MI brigade commander must clearly understand the missions of the corps and its subordinate elements in addition to the brigade mission. The brigade is task organized to support these mission objectives. Brigade elements are assigned objectives that directly and indirectly contribute to the corps mission.

The brigade commander organizes the limited available resources with emphasis on the area where the corps main effort will take place. However, resources also must be allocated to adequately support secondary efforts.

INTELLIGENCE IN COMBAT OPERATIONS

Intelligence is the key to planning and executing corps combat operations. It is a dynamic process that continues throughout an operation. The corps commander uses intelligence sources to develop his concept of the operation, and the G3 uses it for the initial task organization, deployment, and direction of resources to fight all phases of the battle. It also provides the basis for redirecting the corps effort when needed.

The corps G3 coordinates the corps offense. Surveillance operations locate threat forces in the corps areas of interest and operations. EW, long-range fires, and maneuver in depth are used to attack threat forces in the area of operations (AO) whose delay or disruption is important to the success of current corps operations.

In offensive operations, the deep attack disrupts, isolates, immobilizes, and weakens defenders in depth. As the deep attack continues, it prevents the reorganization of coherent defenses by blocking the movement of threat reserves and the escape of defending units. In defensive operations, the deep attack prevents the threat from concentrating combat power against the corps and alters combat ratios at the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Such actions create opportunities for offensive action by the corps.

Major corps defensive operations separate attacking echelons; protect maneuvers taken by the defender; and degrade threat command, control, and communications (C'), combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Once the means of attack have been determined, the IEW system provides the optimum time. Sections of the CTOC support element use sensors and other available sources to determine the best time of attack and monitor the effects of interdiction. Long-range weapons are scarce, and targets need to be chosen carefully, C^3, key logistics centers, units, or terrain targets are those which, if targeted, will most likely degrade the threat's capability.

The basic corps battle plan is to accomplish its missions through either defensive or offensive operations as prescribed by the theater-army group-commander. In either case, the operational concept of the corps is based on three principal requirements:

- The corps controls key engagements in the close arena.

- The corps denies the threat the ability to concentrate combat power by attacking follow-on forces at operational depths.

- The corps conducts successful rear operations to retain freedom of action

The basic corps defensive plan is to determine where the threat attack will occur. The corps then takes actions to prevail in key engagements in the close arena. It denies the threat the ability to concentrate combat power against forward divisions by disrupting the tempo of follow-on forces. The corps commits reserves, if available, to gain positional leverage through counterattacking in depth.

Corps actions are developed to realize these ends. The unit uses either fires or maneuver or both with EW, deception, and other forms of combat power. Initial or covering force actions aid in situation development.

Using organic surveillance assets, reports from the covering force, and information provided from the EAC, the corps staff determines the axis and strength of the threat main attack. These same IEW assets locate and track

the second-echelon divisions of the attacking army within the corps area of interest. From this information and knowledge of threat doctrine and behavior. projections are made.

The corps projects assembly area locations, occupation. and dwell times for follow-on forces. It also projects the time and place of second-echelon commitment and probable routes of march to join the close operations. As the attacking army's follow-on forces move toward the FLOT, search areas for reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) assets are specified. These are based on projected threat locations and activity relative to the corps plan. The corps may seek intelligence on a specific target which has been predicted and designated for attack. It may confirm a specific phase of predicted enemy activity which is a key trigger for initiating friendly operations.

As targets for attack arc acquit-cd, the), are matched against appropriate predesignated attack systems for engagement during predetermined times Targets requiring attack by precoordinated air assets arc supported by joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) operations. As in defensive operations, counterattack operations provide the corps the opportunity to wrest the initiative from the threat. Corps focuses on deep operations and the second echelon and reserves. Deep operations require corps synchronization of intelligence, maneuver, and fire support to destroy enemy units in depth or to seize key terrain.

Fires directed against follow-on forces or reserves at operational depth disrupt threat offensive operations. This forces the threat force to alter its plan. Effective command, control, and communications countermeasures (C^3CM) are employed. Threat C^2 systems arc monitored and, if required. destroyed, Given the corps commander's concept-to exploit the threat commander's decision-making process by deceptive and disruptive means-it may be more beneficial to protect the threat C^3 facilities. Deception measures and electronic jamming operations may create ambiguity and interrupt the threat commander's transmission of combat orders.

Also. as in defensive operations. control of close operations is key to a successful corps offensive battle. The corps committed divisions accomplish this task by maneuvering to avoid threat strengths. The corps commander structures close operations to entrap the threat through a series of battles directed
at supporting the broader theater campaign. Even more so than in defensive operations, offensive operations depend on the part played by the corps staff and supporting collection systems.

Tasks in a corps offensive are the same as those of a defensive operation. They locate threat follow-on forces and deny the threat commander's concentration of forces against the corps committed divisions. If the corps is committed to an offensive battle from a theater reserve posture. initial intelligence situational data is quickly provided by theater and other committed forces.

The corps staff develops probable enemy responses to the offensive. The corps then plans and executes effective joint fire packages. These deny the threat the ability to concentrate forces and interfere with friendly maneuver elements.

Intelligence support is neccssary to focus the corps commander's concept of the operation. It also helps to detect and attack key targets in support of combat operations. Intelligence is supported by intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and key IPB products. These are event and decision support templates; the full range of available sensors: and national, theater, and corps assets. They provide battlefield evaluation, targeting. and technical information as part of the G2's and the all-source estimate of the battlefield. Given the picture of the battlefield produced by each of these efforts. the commander is in a position to project friendly operations.

The corps G2 describes specific threat options to allow the G3 and the FSE to identify specific threats and the times when they will interfere with friendly operations. Planning and coordination necessary to detect and

attack these specific targets are accomplished early enough to cause required sensors, weapons, and C^2 systems to be set in motion at the appropriate time.

Sensors are capable of supporting target engagement and, concurrently, provide continuous battlefield situational updates. The corps interest in relevant targets is reinforced as the corps transitions from target planning to attack execution. The named areas of interest (NAB), target areas of interest (TAIs), and routes must be updated to support the situation development and subsequent battlefield planning and decision making. NAIs and TAIs are essential to facilitate target development and target attack.

Situation development supports target attack and, conversely, target attack supports situation development. These activities are not mutually exclusive and do not require discrete sensors. Situation development forecasts threat activities which will have a high probability of interfering with corps operations. It identifies the specific observable parameters to aid in their detection, focuses the collection management effort that tasks specific sensors to detect them, and helps predict when such threat targets will be detectable.

Once the corps has determined what it must do to seize battlefield initiative, the "when", "where", and "how" details are described. These details project how the threat is expected to respond to the friendly operation. Accordingly, the most probable responses are examined to identify the time and space boundaries. Identifying these specifics further highlight those threat capabilities which must be attacked. This requires the G2 to have a thorough understanding of the threat doctrine and norms. Then, given the factors of METT-T and the commander's concept, the G2 can make a disciplined assessment of the threat's probable responses. This assessment is made using a backward planning sequence.

This sequence begins by describing the threat's response at the general level and works down to the detailed level-that is, after first describing general battlefield functional areas that the threat could be expected to use (for example, maneuver, close air support, artillery, air defense), these areas are further examined. Threat operational templates are used to determine the time and space parameters associated with them. This serves to limit the number of threat responses that need to be further considered in determining where on the battlefield they could occur and to establish the general timelines within each function.

Once probable threat battlefield functional responses have been examined, specific threat capabilities, weapon systems, and units are examined in more detail. This avoids having to conduct a detailed examination of every weapon system and unit.

This more detailed examination results in the identification of specific threat targets and target sets, as well as their observable characteristics. It is then determined which of these observables is detectable, what detection means are available, what means are available for attack, what payoffs are to be gained, and what costs are involved. The most threatening targets are dealt with first. Attack priorities are those targets which represent the greatest threat and which the corps can effectively attack. Thus, these attacks provide the greatest payoff and leverage for the operation to succeed.

The target's observable features are then matched with appropriate detecting sensor systems and the most appropriate attack means. Friendly capabilities are determined to counter the threat's most probable efforts to interfere. Once sensors and attack means are identified, tasking or warning orders are issued. This ensures that the means to detect and to attack the relevant threat capabilities are in position at the right time and place. This planning, focused by the projection of friendly operations, is predictive in nature.

Advanced planning and early coordination are initiated in detail only after specific threat capabilities have been converted to relevant targets (units and weapon systems). These targets are then described in terms of time

and space parameters, prioritized in terms of their potential to interfere with friendly operations, examined for their detectable observables, and evaluated to determine the most appropriate ways of minimizing their interference. Coordination includes all the supporting functions that are required to successfully degrade a specific threat capability, but it focuses primarily on ensuring that required sensor systems and attack means are in the right place at the right time, tasked to detect and attack specific relevant targets,

For the sensors, this requires the corps intelligence collection plan to be continuously updated and annotated. This, in turn, allows for more precise focusing of collection by the CM&D section. This is not difficult since the use of threat operational templates, or any other listing of specific threat system observables, will indicate the nature of the observable behavior as well as identify the sensors that can be used to detect it.

Operational availability of sensors is also assessed since corps, theater, and national sensors contribute to the all-source estimate of the situation that enables the corps to project its operation in battle planning. This same battle planning enables the G2 to describe the threat's responses and identify specific enemy capabilities that could interfere with the friendly operation. Organic sensors are tasked directly, while theater sensors are requested to be in the required location at the required time to detect specific observables. Whether organic or theater sensors are to be used, the corps G2 initiates such action through the corps collection management element. Specific request channels may differ slightly by area or command.

A similar process occurs in fire support planning. Once relevant targets are identified, organic and supporting deep attack assets are considered in constructing a plan for fires. Warning orders for organic weapons are dispatched to permit executing units to make initial computations and to determine weapons mixes, warheads, launch units, launch sites, and so on. Theater air interdiction assets, unconventional warfare, or special operations forces (SOF) are requested through channels established for the particular theater. Identification of corps requirements, especially air interdiction, can thus be accomplished early enough to influence the daily air tasking order or to at least determine which theater air interdiction attack resources can be expected to be available. This also provides for the early exchange of required information.

At this point, some 12 to 36 hours before an attack is expected, the basic planning for deep attack is accomplished. However, this is a continuous process repeated every 12 hours or so. This projects, confirms, predicts, and freshens engagement opportunities 24 to 72 hours in advance.

During this same period, the corps deep attack elements are actively involved on a dynamic battlefield. Friendly projections are modified to adjust to the changing battlefield situation. Friendly objectives and the operational availability of sensors and weapon systems are expected to have changed. And, of course, the corps is concurrently involved in detecting and attacking targets identified in previous targeting periods.

Because targets almost never appear precisely as anticipated, adjustments to account for threat behavior must be made. The need for such adjustments is anticipated, even though the specific details cannot be planned in advance. Experience in using deep attack targeting helps to predict areas which produce higher or lower confidence levels for planning. Future predictions are adjusted accordingly.

Uncertainty in planning is compensated for in that the actual attack is not based on the prediction. Rather, it takes place only when the forecast threat occurs within projected engagement timeframes. The specific threats become the trigger events for the attack when detected by friendly sensors. They are attacked using the means determined by anticipated planning.

The key point here is that even though the target engagement may not be exactly as projected, the planning for target attack still bounds the problem in time and space and relates the targets to a friendly operation. Thus,

the timely execution of an attack against any threat that can interfere with that operation has far greater flexibility and responsiveness than if no planning had been done.

If, during the execution phase of the deep attack, the forecast threat behavior does not occur, no attack is initiated. If an unanticipated but more threatening enemy activity is detected and is determined to have greater potential for interfering with corps operations than the planned and detected threat behavior, then the new target is attacked by means already in motion. If a planned threat target has been detected and attacked but still continues to interfere with the corps operation, that target can be reattacked in minimum time.

During this time, any last-minute coordination is completed with the higher headquarters. airspace control. and Air Force support elements (through the battlefield coordination element at the air operations center (AOC)). When Air Force strike activity is jointly employed with corps attack systems. the AOC controls the timing of the air attack. With close coordination between the CTOC and AOC. ground and air-launched strikes are synchronized.

At the corps deep attack delivery unit, final tactical tire control actions are completed. Firing units are deployed from hiding positions to tiring positions, and final firing computations are completed at the firing site. Just before firing, the sensors again confirm activity and update on locations and directly notify the executing control element.

Depending on the nature of the target, type of sensor. and capability of the attack system. the specific activities at the corps firing unit during the final target update vary. For sitting targets. where the targeted features are electromagnetic emitters, the sensor may confirm the latest location of a target just before launch. Once the attack is launched, the sensors may observe the target and provide information on the effects of the attack. If additional attacks are necessary, the CTOC will reinitiate the execution sequence in priority with other activity.

In most cases, lethal C^3CM and SEAD attacks accompany attacks of moving targets to support the protection of friendly aircraft and stress threat C^2 systems at the same time his combat assets are under attack.

Target information from long-range surveillance unit (LRSU), unconventional warfare. or SOF assets located in the threat rear area is used to identify either a moving or sitting target. Additionally. such information contributes significantly to the completeness of the all-source intelligence that supports battle planning. III cases where LRSU, unconventional warfare, or SOF assets are tasked. the corps has already informed these elements of the role they are to perform. The corps has described the target, identified the general location and time of the projected engagement, and predesignated appropriate quick fire channels. The SOF liaison element at the CTOC. called the special operations command and control element (SOCCE), provides the means for planning. coordinating, and controlling the SOF assets.

Deep attack opportunities are both highly critical and relatively infrequent. Their exploitation requires limited corps deep attack resources. Therefore, execution control and timing arc critical if the desired effects of massing air and ground elements of sensors and attack means are to be achieved. Synchronization in planning is wasted if synchronization in execution does not also occur. The methodology used to ensure this coordinated planning and execution is achieved is called the decide, detect, and deliver (D3) process.

In general, the probability of engagement success is proportional to the effort made within the CTOC. This effort is conditioned by the threat level the target represents to corps operations. Further. it depends on the corps resources required to accomplish the engagement and the level at which the confirmed event is assigned by the

corps. In most cases, an engagement against a large threat moving force (regiment or above) is a highly threatening relevant target. It requires the use of critical corps deep attack resources (weapons and sensors).

To be successful, deep attack targeting at corps requires specific and timely coordination between the corps and supporting tactical air forces in the battle planning and engagement phases. Such coordination involves elements within the corps staff, EAC, BCEs, and the AOC. This targeting concept specifically facilitates such coordination at the 24-hour (+) planning timeframe, at any time between the initial planning and final execution, at 30 minutes before launch, and at the last-minute update before launch.

Synchronization in the deep attack starts with the availability of deep attack information. This information provides a common and coherent view of the battlefield within the corps and with the corps and higher and joint headquarters.

A coherent view of the battle situation is used by the commander to formulate a concept of operation and by his staff to identify and recommend tasks to coordinate the integration of the specific battlefield functions. The commanders concept guides those who plan and control subordinate actions that execute these tasks by providing the necessary frame of reference to appropriately focus and sequence fire support. Further, this frame of reference shapes the intelligence collection and processing activity to acquire the technical information necessary to detect and identify relevant observed threat behavior and to trigger specific targeting execution.

The information that provides the common view of the battlefield is battlefield situation information (deciding), target information (detecting), and technical information (delivering). Relevant threat observable information is common among these categories, but each category will also have different functional needs for information in terms of timeliness, quality, and level of detail.

Using the general battlefield picture provided by battle situation information, the commander projects achievable future operations. identifies potential interfering targets, directs the collection of relevant technical information, and confirms potential targets within required time, accuracy, and detail dimensions. The battlefield situation information provides successively more detail over time. More knowledge permits sharper focusing of collection activity. The greater the degree of detail available for the battlefield situation, the greater the clarity and definition of the perception of the battlefield. In addition, decision makers can quickly identify target and technical information needs to further focus collection and analysis.

The G2 is the primary source for battlefield enemy situation and deep attack target information. The G2 and FSE interact on a continuous basis to-

- Identify and nominate potential targets.
- Expedite the collection of sensor detection data.
- Identify target execution trigger events (this is the use of NAIs, decision points, and TAIs).
- Establish quick-fire channels.

The term “battle planning” includes all activities that contribute to the corps’ successful accomplishment of assigned missions. These activities range from the commander’s concept of the operation and intent and the detailed level of operational planning, through coordination and control, to execution. Battle planning in its broadest application includes logistical sustainment and personnel management which support deep operations. Battle planning here purposely highlights those command, functional staff, unit, and executing systems interoperabilities and technical connectivities immediately applicable to deep operation activity.

This focus is on the activities involved in planning for the decision and for the operation. In this appendix, battle planning does not include target engagement. The difference between battle planning and target engagement is that target engagement is the execution phase of a single-phased, coherent deep operation.

Distinctive treatment of battle planning and target engagement is necessary to emphasize the differences between them in functions, timelines, sensors, communications, decisions, and actions. More important, the use of separate phases provides a clear distinction between the planning phase and the engagement phase. The planning phase emphasizes intelligence and advanced planning. In the engagement phase, observed enemy activity provides the triggering mechanism to transition into an attack mode using sensors, quick fire communications channels, and weapons coordinated in the planning phase.

The decide, detect, deliver, and assess sequence is more appropriate than the detect, decide, deliver, and assess process because it is active rather than reactive. A reactive process results in defeat. To dominate the opponent, the commander is supported by a process that focuses on his own objectives. Because of the time required to execute large-scale and joint operations, future operations are projected.

Feasibility, availability, and affordability of means are equally important in selecting projected options for deep operations. A wide range of systems is available today, and several new capabilities are being fielded. It is likely that there will always be a combination of old and new systems. These conditions always demand careful analysis and evaluation in developing options for deep operations. Additionally, this mix requires careful planning to launch different executing forces and functions at the approximate times so that they collectively produce their combined effects at the required time and space. This is synchronization-the process that results in the concentration of combat power at the required time and space.

Different targets have unique detectable observables and vulnerabilities to specific weapons effects. Multiple sensors and weapon systems frequently are combined for successful attack. This makes planning and execution more difficult and may limit operational availability. Each sensor and weapon system, by necessity, has different time considerations. Joint systems also operate within service-unique procedures.

For example, the corps could not expect to receive a human intelligence (HUMINT) report of an enemy division's pending move from a tactical assembly area in deep operations and then expect to arrange for airborne sensors to assist immediately in delivering effective long-range fire against that target. Similarly, the corps would not have a high probability of success in attacking moving columns if the tire support and quick fire channels to attack the target were not arranged in advance. Similar conditions would also exist for attacking sitting targets, C^2, and SEAD. Time is also an enemy. In deep operations, time is defeated by anticipatory planning and advanced coordination.

Combining multiple sensors and weapons (in accordance with "attack packaging") requires forward thinking and backward planning to provide the necessary time to accomplish coordination. Projecting future operations in some detail provides the required commander's guidance. This guidance enables all the elements of the command to have a coherent focus on the objective in both space and time. With specific guidance and adequate time and detail for coordination, the commander can concentrate combat power at the decisive time and place.

Deep operations are a joint effort. The available joint systems give the corps the additional means for successful deep operations in support of operational objectives. Joint interoperability is essential.

Successful functional interoperabilities in deep operations require feasible operational concepts. Concepts of operation are feasible only when they ensure compatible operational interfaces, procedures, and technical

connectivities of the units and systems to be employed. These procedures and connectivities are frequently theater specific. The concepts, therefore, must be adapted to the unique conditions of each theater.

The combination of functions most frequently and directly related to deep operations are intelligence (eyes), C^2 (brain), the appropriate forms of combat (fist), and communications (nerves). To ensure that deep operations are inherently linked to the rear and close operations of the corps battle, these functional areas must start with, converge at, and end with the commander. The commander focuses and conditions the required functional interoperabilities with his operational concept. The commander's planning establishes the who, what, where, when, and how considerations that executing elements must accomplish to achieve the essential synchronization. Coordination, accomplished principally by the staff in its planning for the operation, creates linkage to exercise control of discrete functions and integrate them with the other executing elements to establish the tasks and timing of combined systems efforts.

The scope of the command and coordination activities will change somewhat, depending on the corps objectives and METT-T. In most cases, combined and joint objectives are translated into specific corps mission requirements, with combined and joint resources integrated with organic corps capabilities. Operational availability of such resources depends on the importance of the corps mission, as well as the efficiency with which the corps identifies its specific needs-early enough to initiate the advanced coordination required.

Such coordination is especially critical where executing elements that do not habitually operate together must combine to achieve the required effect. For example, think about integrating US reconnaissance and strike activities with organic, joint, or combined operational level fires and maneuver or packaging a sustaining logistics and a protective air defense capability to accompany a maneuver beyond the FLOT.

At the operational level of warfare, units seek to win battles and campaigns. As such, the tactical and operational levels of war overlap in fighting battles. Battles are often the province of divisions and normally of corps and may extend for days or weeks. They are multidimensional, incorporating both land and air forces throughout the width and depth of the battlefield.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Cop Planning Practical Exercise

SCOPE

This lesson allows you to apply your knowledge of the tactical decisionmaking process (deliberate method) at the corps level. The lesson enhances your effectiveness as a staff officer at echelons above division by having you analyze a tactical and logistical problem while constrained by time, distance, space, and resources. After you develop and analyze feasible courses of action, you will prepare a fragmentary order (FRAGO) and an operations sketch to communicate your recommended course of action (COA) as approved by the corps commander.

The scenario for this lesson continues the one from S320A. It is important that you read and understand the scenario-related material in the M/S320B Staff Planning Book. The lesson includes a series of sequential learning activities. These will provide you several opportunities to evaluate your understanding of the doctrine and your ability to plan portions of a corps-level operation and the associated logistical considerations required to conduct the operation.

You will work as a planner for the X (US) Corps, using the tactical decisionmaking process explained in ST 101-5 to solve a tactical problem not envisioned in the original X (US) Corps operation plan (OPLAN) DEPUTY DAWG. If you are not familiar with the deliberate decisionmaking procedures of the tactical decisionmaking (TDM) process, review the appropriate material in ST 101-5. Review FM 34-130 as required to refresh yourself on how the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process supports decisionmaking.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

A.00 TASK: Explain US Army doctrine for organizing and employing a corps.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement, with references.

STANDARD: Must explain US Army operations doctrine for organizing and employing a corps at the operational and tactical levels of war by defining the relationships of the structure of modem warfare; Army capabilities with joint and combined forces; the principles of war with the tenets and combat functions of Army operations doctrine; and the structure of the battlefield and general doctrine for offensive, defensive, and other combined arms operations IAW FM 100-5, FM 100-7, and FM 100-15.

Must explain how the US Air Force is integrated with US Army ground operations IAW FM 90-28, FM 100-103, FM 100-15, and Student Text 100-2.

Must explain doctrine for large unit operations and the elements of operational design IAW FM 100-5, FM 100-7, and FM 100-15.

Must describe corps combat operations doctrine, to include employing a corps as part of a larger ground force and corps force projection operations IAW FM 63-3 and FM 100-15.

LEVEL: Comprehension.

PJE PHASE 1 (lNTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVES: la: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

lb: Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed,

Id: Summarize how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities,

le. Comprehend how the US military is organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint and multinational operations.

2a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.

2c. Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.

B.00 TASK: Plan logistical support of combined arms operations at the corps level.

CONDITION: As a staff officer, given a tactical scenario; higher headquarters plans and commanders' intent; a concept of the operation; data bases for consumption rates; friendly unit logistical status, locations, and movements; and a written requirement, with references.

STANDARD: The plan must be logistically feasible, correctly apply doctrine and tactics, and be justifiable through persuasive presentation of logic and reasoning applied in appropriate staff estimate and decision-making processes as described in FM 63-3, FM 100-5, FM 100-15, FM 101-5 (FD), and Student Text 101-5.

The plan must include integration of direct and general support units; management centers; and command and control headquarters involved in the tactical logistics functions of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems IAW FM 63-3, FM 100-5, FM 100-15, and Student Text 101-6.

LEVEL: Synthesis

PJE PHASE 1 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVE: la: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

Id: Summarize how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.

C.00 TASK: Plan combined arms operations at the corps level

CONDITION: Given a written requirement, a tactical situation in a mature theater with maps and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products, a higher headquarters operation order (OPORD) or operation plan (OPLAN) and intelligence estimate, higher commanders' intent, and commander's restated mission and planning guidance, with references.

STANDARD The plan will be tactically feasible and logistically supportable IAW FM 63-3, FM 100-5. and FM 100-15; will correctly apply doctrine and tactics; and be justifiable through persuasive presentation of logic and reasoning applied in staff estimates and decision-making processes as described in FM 101-5, Student Text 101-5, Student Text 101-6, and student issue materials

LEVEL: Synthesis.

PJE PHASE 1 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVE: la: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

1b. Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.

1c. Explain the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the NCA, NSC, CJCS, combatant commanders, Service chiefs and Joint Forces Commanders (JFCs).

2a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.

2c. Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.

C.10 TASK: Apply the tactical decisionmaking process,

CONDITION: Given a written requirement, a tactical situation with maps, and a higher headquarters operation order (OPORD) or operation plan (OPLAN), with references.

STANDARD: The decisionmaking process must include analyzing and determining the mission, developing courses of action, analyzing and comparing courses of action, and recommending or communicating a decision IAW FM 101-5, Student Text 101-5, and student issue materials.

Must correctly apply the problem-solving process using sound logic and reasoning, with a resulting recommendation that is doctrinally sound, supportable, and feasible.

LEVEL: Application.

PJE PHASE 1 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVE: la: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

C.20 TASK: Prepare combat orders.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement; a tactical situation; appropriate maps; the commander's restated mission and planning guidance; appropriate staff estimates; war-game notes and completed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products; and the commander's decision, intent, and concept of the operation regarding a course of action, with references.

STANDARD: The order must correctly communicate the commander's decision based on the time available and the essential elements of the commander's decision (mission, concept of operation, concept of support, and task organization) and include the information that subordinate commanders will need to accomplish their missions within the framework of the commander's intent.

Must conform to the doctrine outlined in FM 63-3, FM 100-5, and FM 100-15.

Must appropriately conform to the guidance for content and formats contained in FM 101-5 (FD), Student Text 101-5, and student issue materials.

Must correctly use graphics, symbols, and terms JAW FM 101-5-1 and Programmed Text 100-1.

Must comply with the guidelines for substance, organization, style, and correctness IAW FM 101-5 (FD), Student Text 22-2, and Student Text 101-5.

LEVEL: Synthesis.

PJE PHASE 1 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) LEARNING OBJECTIVE: la: Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use the lesson guide to assist you in achieving the lesson learning objectives. The lesson guide gives instructions on a series of directed readings and learning activities. Doing these requirements at the suggested time and actively thinking are key to achieving the maximum benefit from this lesson and preparing for your exam. When you complete a reading, return to the appropriate place in the lesson guide and continue to follow the instructions. If the lesson guide requests that you write a response to a question or complete a practical exercise, you should do so for the learning value.

REFERENCES:

a. M/S320B Staff Planning Book.

b. FM 100-15, Corps Operations.

c. FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols.

d. ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes.

e. PT 100-1, Military Symbols and Graphics.

f. Maps.

Joint Operations Graphic (JOG) Series 1501, Germany, sheet NM32-2 (Kassel), edition 4-DMG, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, Germany, sheet NM32-3 (Halle), edition 4-DMG, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, Germany, sheet NM32-5 (Frankfurt Am Main), edition 3-DMG, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, Germany, sheet NM32-6 (Erfurt), edition 5-DMG, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, Germany, sheet NM32-8 (Mannheim), edition 6-DMG, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, Germany, sheet NM32-9 (Numberg), edition 5-DMG, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, GDR, sheet NM33-1 (Leipzig), edition 4-GSGS, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, GDR, sheet NM33-2 (Gorlitz), edition 4-GSGS, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, GDR, sheet NM33-4 (Karl-Marx-Stadt), edition 5-DMG, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, GDR sheet NM33-5 (Prague), edition 3-GSGS, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, Czechoslovakia-Austria, sheet NM 33-8 (Jihlava), edition 4-CSGS, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, GDR, sheet NM33-7 (Pilsen), edition 3-GSGS, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, GDR sheet NN32-11 (Hannover), edition 5-DMG, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, GDR, sheet NN32-12 (Magdeburg), edition 4-DMG, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, GDR, sheet NN33-10 (Berlin), edition 4-GSGS, 1:250,000.
JOG Series 1501, GDR, sheet NN33-11 (Frankfurt An Der Oder), edition 3-GSGS, 1:250,000.

Post the map sheets arranged as listed below:

NN32-11	NN132-12	NN33-10	NN33-11
NM32-2	NM32-3	NM33-1	NM33-2
NM32-5	NM32-6	NM33-4	NM33-5
NM32-8	NM32-9	NM33-7	

g. *Overlays.* Post the overlays listed below on acetate (or other clear material) over your map.

Overlay 4-1 (sheets 1 through 4), Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay.
Overlay 4-2 (sheets 1 and 2), Current 10th (US) Corps and Krasnovian Situation.

LESSON GUIDE

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to Lesson 4! Now you get to put a lot of your knowledge and skills to work.

decisionmaking and fundamental corps-level doctrinal concepts. Lesson 4 puts you back in the X (US) Corps fighting the Krasnovian forces in Europe, a developed theater. In S320A, you were a division-level planner; now you are a corps-level planner. You'll start the lesson with a quick overview of the current situation, the current status of the corps, and expected enemy actions. You will also review the deliberate decisionmaking procedures

(FRAGO), produce an operation sketch, and develop a task organization.

SPECIAL SITUATION

You are now a corps planner located at the X (US) Corps main command post (CP) plans cell in Sonderhausen, Germany. During this lesson, you will develop a sequel to the current plan being executed, As you develop a plan to get the X (US) Corps to accomplish its new mission, you will function in the staff positions indicated in the lesson requirements. You are here to learn how to apply the tactical decisionmaking process, not specialize as a G2 or G4. As you work the practical exercise, you will develop your own solution for solving this tactical problem. That's OK. There are different ways to accomplish the same mission. Now take a few minutes and review the scenario. Start with a review of the OPLANs and significant

Read chapters 6 and 10 and review chapter 11 10 of the M/S320B Staff Planning Book.. It contains a comprehensive chronology of events. You should also scan chapters 3,5,7, and 8 of the M/S320B Staff Planning Book to determine what scenario background information each contains.

You should be aware of the following elements of the scenario:

- Although the scenario is the same as in S320A, you are now at the corps level. For this tactical problem, you are a member of the corps G3 plans cell, developing plans for sequels to the current operation order or totally unforeseen branches to the current operation.

- Although the new mission may not be exactly one envisioned in the original plans (CRASHING FIST and DEPUTY DAWG), it is a logical adjustment to the events as they unfold on the battlefield and is within the overall concept of the LANDCENT commander's concept of the operation and intent.

- The enemy is conducting an operational pause to restructure offensive capabilities before resuming the offensive. The LANDCENT commander is not going to waste operational reserves in conducting a limited objective counterattack against the 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts. He has decided to use the forces in contact to

regain as much German territory as possible. This allows him to use the I AAG to continue preparing for a counteroffensive against the second strategic echelon. This counteroffensive will be designed to destroy the Krasnovian TVD and force the Krasnovians to the peace table

The sketch below shows the current situation for the X (US) Corps. You arc still in phase III of DEPUTY DAWG



320B-4/8-1

X (US) Corps Situation as of 220001 Aug 199_.

The next sketch shows the Krasnovian situation within the X Corps commander's area of interest.



Krasnovian Situation as of 220001 Aug 199_

If you are unfamiliar with decision graphics, refer to FM 101-5-1 and PT 100-1. Decision graphics quickly communicate a unit's status, *They are not meant to be used for detailed and quantifiable calculations.*

In reviewing the enemy situation, note the flexibility of the army, front, and TVD commanders. Although the Krasnovian main attack failed, the Krasnovians are attempting to adjust to the events on the battlefield just as the 11 AAG and X (US) Corps commanders are changing their plans to reflect events on the battlefield.

Before you continue, briefly review the tactical decisionmaking process in general and the deliberate decision-making procedure specifically. Refer to ST 101-5 for more information on the tactical decisionmaking (TDM) process. This is an extract of FM 101-5, Chapter 4, The Tactical DecisionMaking Process.

Turn to Chapter 12, X (US) Corps Staff Planning Worksheet, in your M/S330B Staff Planning Book and follow along in ST 101-5 as you review the TDM process, focusing on deliberate decision-making procedures (DDMP).

As you remember from your previous tactics instruction, the tactical decisionmaking process is a logical process to solve tactical problems. ST 101-5 describes three different methods (deliberate, combat, and quick) that further refine the TDM process to accommodate such variables as time, purpose, and resources available. The common denominator, and key point to remember, is that the basic four components of tactical decision making are the basis for all these procedures.

What are these four basic components?

Mission analysis, course of action development, course of action analysis and comparison, and decision or recommendation. Now review the deliberate decisionmaking procedure by starting with mission analysis.

Deliberate Decisionmaking Procedure (DDMP)-Mission Analysis.



This chart illustrates the starting point in the deliberate decisionmaking procedure. A similar chart can be found in ST 101-5, page 1-5. Also highlighted on the chart are the relevant commander and staff actions associated with the key step of *mission analysis*. During mission analysis, the commander and his staff must determine the essential tasks to be performed, the overall purpose to be achieved by acomplishing these assigned tasks, and any limitations on the unit's actions. Soon you will conduct mission analysis for the X (US) Corps.

Quickly turn to the appropriate appendixes in the M/S320B Staff Planning Book as you go through the next portion of the lesson. This will help you to familiarize yourself with the references and where you can find the information you need to complete the practical exercise.

When you begin your mission analysis, you will need to read and understand the LANDCENT commander's intent. You have a copy of the LANDCENT Plan CRASHING FIST (Staff Planning Book, chap 5) and the basic X (US) Corps Plan DEPUTY DAWG (Staff Planning Book, chap 8). II Allied Army Group FRAGO 4-1 (Staff Planning Book chap 6) gives you a new mission. The receipt of FRAGO 4-1 starts the decision-making process and mission analysis. Focus on the specified, implied, and essential tasks and any constraints affecting the X (US) Corps. This is no different from what you did during S310B or S320A. Only the factors of METT-T have changed. If you need to, review ST 101-5, chapter 2, to ensure that your mission analysis is complete.

You may be wondering about the 11 steps of the procedure and the amount of detail you are required to go into. Look at Chapter 12, X (US) Corps Staff Planning Worksheet, in the M/S320B Staff Planning Book. This worksheet is designed to keep you focused and *ensure you complete the key elements.*

Regardless of whether the G3 or chief of staff prepares the proposed restated mission, *the commander approves it.* The commander may modify the mission statement as he and the staff progress through the TDM process and gain more insight. The restated mission becomes the basis for all subsequent estimates (where it is paragraph 1) and becomes paragraph 2 of the operation plan or order. The final mission statement is approved by the commander when he approves the plan or order. It contains the "5 Ws": WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY.

The G3 normally disseminates a warning order to subordinate units so they may begin planning. A copy also goes to adjacent, higher, and supporting units to keep them informed. When the commander approves the mission, he will normally provide some initial planning guidance to his staff. The items listed below are the items recommended in ST 101-5. Many commanders will not cover all these points initially for several reasons. In fact, some points are rarely covered until the commander completes more of his own estimate of the situation. This is often referred to as the commander's initial planning guidance, or simply, commanders guidance.

COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE

Purpose

- **Implants the commander's vision into the staff members's minds.**
- **Focuses the staffs efforts by specifying or eliminating options for or from analysis.**
- **Normally focuses on close operations.**
- **Provides broad guidance for deception operations and sustainment priorities.**

Whether broad or detailed, it may contain the following elements:

- **Enemy courses of action**
- **Restated mission**
- **Intent (initial)**
- **Concept of operation (initial)**
- **Deception objective**
- **Risk**
- **Priorities**
- **Time plan**
- **Type of order to issue**
- **Type of rehearsal to conduct**
- **Endstate**

This is not a complicated process. But if you think it is, here is an analogy that relates to everyday life.

You come home from work and your spouse says, "I don't want to make dinner tonight." You now have a new mission or problem to solve. You quickly determine the nature of that statement, what it implies, and what kind of limitations may be involved. You again think quickly on your feet and determine the essential task--take your spouse to dinner tonight! You restate the mission, "OK, in one hour (WHEN), you and I (WHO) will go out to eat (WHAT) at a restaurant (WHERE) so you/we don't have to make dinner tonight (WHY)." Your spouse says

great, and then gives the following guidance, "I want a steak for dinner, at a place with a nice atmosphere, but informal. I don't want to go to a place where I have to get dressed up."

The commander may issue planning guidance several times throughout the TDM process. As the chart on the previous page indicates, the planning guidance is critical because it *focuses and directs the attention of the staff* and *begins to articulate the commander's vision for success* into the staff members' minds. The commander often states planning options he desires his staff to consider or avoid. Once the commander decides on the restated mission, he normally provides his initial intent to the staff based on his own estimate of the situation and current analysis of METT-T. The commander often provides additional guidance later as more information becomes available.

Now take a look at the second of the four essential steps of decisionmaking, *course of action (COA) development.*

COA DEVELOPMENT

- **Guidelines:**
  - **Develop two or three COAs (more if time available)**
  - **COAs consider—**
    - **Mission and commander's guidance**
    - **Task organization and CCIRs**
    - **Battlefield organization**
    - **Command and support relationships**
    - **Use of weapons of mass destruction**
    - **Logistics**
  - **COAs should be different in—**
    - **Use of reserves**
    - **Task organization**
    - **Main effort**
    - **Scheme of maneuver**



COA development is at the core of all estimates. This chart highlights some key considerations when developing courses of action. While the commander often formulates COAs in his mind, the G3 will develop several possible COAs based on the commander's guidance and provide them to the rest of the staff. The commander may suggest in his planning guidance that one or more specific COAs be developed and analyzed. He may determine which enemy COAs to consider. The number you develop should be manageable based on the time available. Time permitting, G3/S3 planners would develop several feasible friendly COAs to counter each enemy COA. Each friendly COA developed must be capable of being carried out against the most dangerous and most probable enemy COA. The G3/S3 normally takes the lead in formulating the COAs, complying with guidance from the commander. ST 101-5, chapter 3, explains in detail the COA development steps shown here. *Key point: The ability to quickly formulate COAs is a critical staff skill.*

Again, think of how this process proceeds as the analogy continues; your spouse gave you several items to consider in developing your COAS. You scan your local IPB databases, the yellow pages of the telephone book, the local weather forecast, and your trusty city map. You then identify four or five places where you can get a juicy steak in a nice atmosphere with an informal setting.

Having developed several COAs, the commander and staff analyze each COA.

COA ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON

Course of action analysis and comparison consist of—

- **War gaming (determining a COA's strengths and weaknesses).**
- **Operational analysis and risk assessment (determining ways to reduce personnel and equipment losses).**
- **Comparison of COAs to determine which one best accomplishes the mission.**

"A staff may conduct a quick initial analysis in each of their respective fields of interest to identify COAs that are infeasible. . . . After discarding such COAs, the staff, led by the CofS. . . begins detailed analysis."— FM 101-5 (Draft)

The third major step of the decisionmaking process is COA analysis and comparison. Depending on available time and echelon of command, this is either a formal or an informal process. While the staff performs its analysis, the commander normally analyzes several options mentally as part of his own estimate of the situation. He may interact with the staff members as they conduct COA analysis and comparison. Three major activities occur during COA analysis and comparison. COA analysis is conducted through war gaming, a mental visualization of the operation from start to finish. War gamers use an ACTION-REACTION-COUNTERACTION methodology between a given enemy and friendly force and visualize the probable actions the two forces may take as they interact during critical events. For instance, a US brigade moving through its zone of attack unexpectedly meets a moving Soviet-style regiment. The commander and his staff visualize how these two units would respond during this meeting engagement. They use their experience, knowledge of tactics, and some general war-gaming guidelines to help them determine the most likely reactions to a critical event. Then they develop a counteraction and ensure there are appropriate resources available to execute the counteraction. To develop this visualization skill, staff officers and commanders must know US doctrine, tactics, capabilities, and be familiar with the enemy's style of fighting. You will have the opportunity to war game COAs later in this lesson as a corps plans staff officer.

If you need more information on the methods or techniques to use during COA analysis and comparison, refer to ST 101-5, chapter 4.

After war gaming, planners should assess risks to reduce the force's exposure to fratricide. This is a new area of doctrinal emphasis. Having war gamed each friendly COA against each probable enemy COA and assessed risks associated with anticipated major events, the staff then compares the results of all feasible COAs. This comparison is done to End the best friendly COA against the enemy COA of greatest concern to the commander. The flexibility of friendly COAs versus multiple enemy options should also be assessed. The staff may use significant factors (based on the commander's guidance, the principles of war, the tenets of Army operations doctrine, or any other relevant factors) to compare the COAs. This brings us to the last of the four major steps, *the decision.*

You might be wondering about risk assessment and what it involves. This concept is not necessarily new. The staff has always had the responsibility to inform the commander of the risks associated with a particular COA. The staffs assessment of operational risk often focused on operational aspects, such as how much of the command would be combat effective by the time it reached the objective. This has been expanded to include an assessment of the unit's procedural and positive (P^2) controls and minimizing fratricide. If you want more information, refer to ST 101-5.



This brings us to the last of the four major steps of the decisionmaking process. After the staff analyzes and compares COAs, it objectively briefs the commander with a recommended COA. This recommendation provides a consolidated staff position that should be obvious to everyone if the staff members have conscientiously integrated their analysis and evaluated all essential information during the TDM process. The commander may agree with the recommended COA, modify it, or select a different COA. His experience, coupled with the results of his own estimate, will guide him.

Once the commander makes his decision he will elaborate on the chosen COA by clearly specifying his intent and the concept of operation, to include the scheme of maneuver and supporting fires. The previously generic WHO in the COA will be specified (main effort, supporting effort, reserve, and so forth).

Consider the restaurant analogy. You mentally war game each option or restaurant you think you may want to go to. You might even assess the risk of having to negotiate heavy traffic as a variable that addresses risk to

driving to a particular restaurant. After determining several different variables (menu, time, routes, cost, the weather, and so on), you compare each COA. Then you determine the best option and present your recommendation to your spouse. You recommend restaurant "A" based on a set of decision criteria. If your spouse agrees with your decision criteria and your evaluation of the choices, you'll probably get agreement and a quick decision. If, on the other hand, there is a difference of opinion, your spouse may reject or modify your recommendation.

After the commander makes his decision, the staff prepares the operation order or plan based on the commander's concept of operation and intent. You will prepare a FRAGO to communicate the commander's decision for the X (US) Corps tactical problem.

Additional information about operation order formats can be found in ST 101-5, chapter 6.

Commanders and their staffs are constantly confronted with new tactical problems. You will complete the four major steps of the tactical decision-making process you just reviewed-mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis and comparison, and decision-as you solve the X (US j Corps tactical problem.

You begin mission analysis by making an initial assessment based on your current situation. You also determine a set of reasonable assumptions about the operation. Begin your practical exercise by developing some initial facts and assumptions. You should already be familiar with the terrain aspects of the area, but you will need to understand where the different units are and how the battle transpired up to this point. Also remember the information available in ST 100-3. Experience suggests you may need to review organizational information as you develop your plans.

If you haven't yet done so, assemble the course map sheets and post overlays 4-1 and 4-2 before continuing (see page 4-4 of the lesson guide for guidance on assembling the map sheets).

Review applicable portions FM 100-15, ST 101-5, and the M/S320B Staff Planning Book as required.

What is your assessment of the situation?

- Mission
- Enemy
- Troops
- Terrain and weather
- Time available

Go to the map and identify the current location of the units. If you are using paper markers to identify units, you might place the status of each unit on the marker so you have a quick reference system. Then, determine how far it is between PL PROTON and PL X-RAY. If you turn to ST 101-5, chapter 4, you can quickly compute how long it would take to drive the distance. Knowing the distance from PL PROTON to PL X-RAY will give you the distance the units must move in the upcoming operation. This will help you reverse plan the operation and determine the time available to issue orders and begin the operation.

It's time to start your mission analysis. **If you need to review the mission analysis steps in detail, turn to ST 101-5, chapter 2.**

MISSION ANALYSIS

What is thepurpose of mission analysis?

Simply put, mission analysis produces an understanding of the mission and the purpose to be achieved.

What do the commander and staff do during mission analysis?

The commander and staff exchange information. How long this takes depends on the time available between mission receipt and execution.

What are specified tasks? Implied tasks? Essential tasks?

A specified task is something that a higher headquarters OPLAN or OPORD tells your unit it must do. An implied task is not spelled out in writing, but is deduced-such as a hasty river crossing or clearing a village in your area of operations. The important idea is that out of the many tasks that you will identify for your unit, only a select few (doctrine doesn't specify how few-one or more) will define success in accomplishing your mission. We redefine these as the essential tasks. We must evaluate each task against this standard. Does this task really define overall mission success? While the staff or the commander may identify them, the commander must approve the essential tasks. The essential tasks become the WHAT element(s) in the mission statement.

What are limitations?

ST 101-5 uses the terms "restrictions" and "constraints" to articulate limitations to the commander's freedom of action. Some typical examples are tasks in a higher headquarters order that specify: "move no earlier than..." or "retain a reserve of at least ____ size." Time is often a limitation (the time available to plan or complete a certain task). There will always be limitations on your freedom of action. Some of the limitations require you to do additional tasks that will require your resources. Other limitations forbid you to take certain actions that may affect your ability to accomplish the task the way you would like to. When you begin mission analysis, you must be aware of limitations on your freedom of action. A controlled supply rate (CSR) is a good example of a constraint.

Now, focus on the major outcome of mission analysis, the *restated mission*. Briefly highlight the elements of the restated mission. ST 101-5, chapter 2, states:

"The restated mission comes from mission analysis. To complete a restated mission statement, the commander must understand and use precise terms. The commander and staff must explain missions as tasks and purposes which translate into specific actions which the assigned unit must perform."

The important thing to remember is the need to understand the higher commanders' intent and identify specified and implied tasks to determine essential tasks. You should also remember that evolving doctrine also includes changing terminology. The term "C^2w" (step 7 of mission analysis in ST 101-5) stands for command and control warfire. This is a new doctrinal term replacing C^3CM (command, control, and communications countermeasures). It includes those considerations to protect friendly C^2 systems and counter the enemy's C^2 systems.

Turn to Chapter 12, 10th (US) Corps Staff Planning Worksheet, in the M/S320B Staff Planning Book and begin the mission analysis portion of the practical exercise. Complete part I of the staff planning worksheet. Write out your restated mission before proceeding in the lesson guide.

You should have determined a mission statement similar to this:

On D + 8, H-hour, X (US) Corps attacks in zone to secure PL X-RAY NLT 260430A Aug to destroy remaining divisions of the 2 GTA; 00 defends along PL ARGON to defeat the first-echelon army of the Krasnovian second-echelon front.

The restated mission contains the elements WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY. The element why must sufficiently present a clear, concise purpose for the operation. This purpose is expanded in the commander's intent. Some commanders explain the purpose very succinctly while other commanders provide a greater amount of detail. ST 101-5 shows the latter technique. Either technique is acceptable once the commander approves the restated mission! As a general rule the restated mission is written in a single sentence. There is no prescribed format for writing a restated mission statement; like all communicative skills, it is an art. There are many ways to state the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY. For example, "X (US) Corps attacks D-day, H-hour.. ," or "H-hour, D-day, Corps attacks..." convey the same elements and both are acceptable. Do what is logical for each situation. Don't include routine or SOP-type tasks in the mission statement such as establishing liaison, refueling vehicles, and so forth. The key point is to make sure you understand the restated mission before going further.

The corps chief of staff arrives with the commander. He wants you to provide him with your recommended restated mission.

At the conclusion of your briefing, the corps commander approves your recommended restated mission. The restated mission approved by the corps commander is now the basis for staff estimates.

The corps commander now provides you with his initial planning guidance.

"Our immediate mission is to secure PL X-RAY and to render any remnants of the 2 GTA in our zone of attack combat ineffective. It will probably require two of our divisions to secure terrain-oriented objectives in the vicinity of PL X-RAY. I consider the northern objective to be the most critical based on the terrain. As our objectives are secured, we need the corps reserve positioned so it can respond to penetrations in either the northern or southern portions of the corps zone. Based on my conversation with the II AAG commander, we don't have the go-ahead to secure PL ARGON. Plan to use TACAIR, attack helicopters, and fires between PL X-RAY and PL ARGON while we secure our LOCs and continue to prepare and thicken our defenses along PL X-RAY.

"I am concerned about our northern boundary, since this may become an exposed flank as the operation progresses. I am willing to accept risk on our southern flank. We must maintain the strictest operational security as we plan and execute the attack, but I don't envision any elaborate deception efforts.

"Time is critical. The attack must kick off in a little more than 48 hours, and it must be well synchronized. If the enemy commander gets enough forces forward in time to reinforce the defending regiments, we will need additional forces to conduct the attack. Another concern is reorienting and extending the corps main supply routes. It will be critical to ensure units moving to the east do not interfere with each other's movement routes during this operation. Put some thought into how the corps must be oriented in the end state with a probable defensive sequel. I consider follow-on offensive operations to be unlikely.

"We will have to keep our planning simple and share information with our subordinate commanders and staffs. They will need every bit of available time to plan and reorient. The order will be disseminated as a FRAGO."

At this point, the corps G3 would send a warning order as a "heads up" to subordinate and adjacent units. You have now reviewed the current situation, the higher commanders' intent, and concept of operation and defined the problem by determining the restated mission One of the areas that you need to consider when determining possible solutions to the problem is deception. Deception planning is an area that corps-level commander and his staff will often address in their planning.

What is the commander's deception planning guidance?

You are correct if you noticed that he hasn't given any. This does not necessarily mean he is not going to use deception, it only means that he may not see a possibility to use it based on his own estimate of the situation and little available time.

Before you go any further, take a look at deception and think about how it might be used in this practical exercise. To this point in your tactics instruction, you've only touched on the subject of deception. Now you'll cover some deception planning considerations and techniques. You will focus on concepts highlighted in appendix 1 to your lesson 4 lesson guide and how deception planning at the corps level is different than at the brigade or division levels. Complete the next requirement, and return here.

Read Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4, Deception.

DECEPTION

Throughout military history, some commanders have used deception to confuse an enemy commander to gain an advantage. After World War II, the US Army forgot what it had learned firsthand about the use of deception as an integral part of the art and science of war. Many commanders thought advances in high technology had made low technology techniques such as deception obsolete. Another factor was the amount of resources needed to effectively plan and execute deception. During the seventies and early eighties, many units trained with limited resources and could not actively address the training requirements needed to conduct a deception operation. Think about your past assignments and field exercises. How did your commander employ deception? What actions did your unit use to deceive the enemy force about your strength, location, or intentions? Think about these issues as you continue this lesson.

The following is the definition of battlefield deception from FM 90-2.

"Battlefield deception consists of those operations conducted at echelons theater (Army component) and below which purposely mislead enemy decision makers by-

- Distortion.
- Concealment.
- Falsification of indicators of friendly intentions, capabilities, or dispositions."

Later, when you think about distortion and falsification, think about the role of the news media and their capability today to present real-time reporting via satellite communications. During the 1980s, there was increased interest in how the former Soviets planned and executed deception in large-scale combat operations. As the US Army developed its own form of operational art, senior Army commanders began to understand how

strategic deception helped set preconditions for successful campaigns, and successful operational-level deception set preconditions for tactical success. A goal of deception is to portray strength where there really isn't, while successfully hiding actual troop concentrations by using good operations security (OPSEC) and moving at night. Since the Soviets placed such a high emphasis on deception, our study of their use of deception had a major impact on revitalizing our own interest in deception. Here are some examples of deception at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

• World War II	Pearl Harbor	Extensive cover and deception plan (Japanese)
• World War II	Darwin	Use of desensitization (Japanese)
• World War II	D-Day	Law of small numbers (Allies)
• World War II	Opn Barbarossa	Law of small numbers (Germans)
• Korea, 1950	Invasion	Use of desensitization, timing (N. Koreans)
• Cuba, 1962	Missile Crisis	Law of small numbers (Soviet Union)
• Vietnam, 1968	TET Offensive	Use of desensitization (N. Vietnamese/VC)
• Israel, 1973	Yom Kippur War	Use of desensitization (Eygpt/Syria)

As the Army began to reexamine deception and analyze its role in the tactical and operational levels of war, certain historical examples highlighted on this chart provided certain maxims and techniques. Depicted here are some techniques described in appendix 1 to your lesson 4 lesson guide. Note the list of counties having successfully used deception. Since deception helps set the conditions for decisive future operations, it often is considered part of deep operations. This list highlights some of the myths and truths regarding deception.

MYTHS AND MAXIMS

- Magruder's principles-the exploitation of perceptions.
- Limitations to human information processing.
- Cry-wolf.
- Jones' dilemma.
- A choice among types of deception.
- The husbanding of assets.
- A sequencing rule.
- The Importance of feedback.
- The Monkey's Paw effect.
- Care in planned placement of deceptive material.

Many of these are described in your reading You probably remember the large-scale amphibious training exercises held just before ground operations began during Operation DESERT STORM. Not only did coalition forces conduct these training exercises with CNN reporters aboard ship, but President Bush reinterated in speeches that coalition objectives were to get the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait not attack Iraq There is still speculation concerning whether or not this was deception. However, these actions reinforced Iraqi perceptions that an amphibious assault was imminent, thereby forcing the Iraqi High Command to divert troops from the zones where coalition forces were actually planning the main attack. The Iraqi troop concentrations along the coast provided the very necessary feedback that these false indicators of an imminent amphibious invasion did work.

What are the components of battlefield deception operations?

The components are objectives, target, story, events, and plan (see appendix 1 to your lesson guide).

Based on your analysis of the current OPORD and the intent and concept of the operation for the upcoming operation, is a deception plan being executed?

The original deception plan did not work as well as the LANDCENT commander desired. An unintentional consequence of deception activities may have been to portray weakness in the X (US) Corps sector by the nature of the mobile defense (the bulk of the combat power was held to the south, positioned to attack the flank of the Krasnovian penetration). With units in contact and special operations and reconnaissance forces still operating throughout the corps and theater area, deception is often difficult to execute once hostilities begin. Those who have studied deception operations often state that deception at the operational or strategic levels of war are most effective prior to hostilities. However, even with resource constraints, the corps, a tactical headquarters in this scenario, might employ some deception techniques to facilitate repositioning combat power toward PL X-RAY to defend against the second strategic echelon.

If II AAG has not given the corps a deception plan with specific tasks to be executed, what are some ways the corps commander could develop his deception plan?

The commander really has three options:

• He can keep his deception plan to himself and integrate it into the guidance and intent he gives the staff.

• Another technique is to keep it "close hold" using selected ad hoc staff members to develop and integrate a deception plan into the overall concept of the operation.

• Finally, he can develop a complete deception plan, and openly task subordinate units or elements to supply resources to execute the deception.

What is the planning process for developing a deception objective, story, and target?

The decisionmaking process to develop a deception plan is basically the same as the TDM process

Based on the current situation, what are some of the pros and cons of the corps' attempting to deceive the enemy of the corps' mission? Should the corps staff even consider deception in this case?

There is no right or wrong answer. Technically, the battlefield deception element would conduct its mission analysis, COA development, and analysis and comparison for a deception plan. The plans cell would work closely with the deception planners to ensure the deception activities don't inadvertently give away the operation. Corps G3 planners should, as a matter of course, plan to hit the enemy from an unexpected direction or try to make the enemy believe that a supporting attack is the point of main effort.

In this instance, the corps commander has correctly realized that there would not be enough time for the Krasnovian TVD or front commander to collect intelligence on a deception story, then act on his reading of the battlefield. Therefore, he has not provided you with any deception planning guidance because he does not want you to be distracted from the essential task facing the corps.

Successful deception also does not guarantee battlefield success. Successful deception may provide a margin of success in accomplishing the mission more effectively, or it may have unforeseen, undesirable consequences. A consideration in any deception effort is the amount of resources available to conduct the deception plan and the time needed by the enemy to collect and evaluate intelligence before taking action. Remember, if the enemy does not receive the message, or decides to ignore it, then your deception will most likely fail.

Thus far, you have overviewed the scenario, reviewed the TDM process, studied the current status and situation of the corps, and briefly examined deception planning considerations. Next you will develop two course of action sketches and statements. You will also look at deep operations and risk assessment. You will need to understand these concepts more fully when you conduct your course of action analysis. After you complete the deep operations portion of the lesson, you'll begin course of action development. You should take a break here. The next block of instruction is important, and you probably should devote 2 or 3 hours to it.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

Take the next few minutes to develop your COAs for the corps attack. During the next part of the lesson, you will complete your course of action development. The two COAs provided in chapter 10 of the M/S320B Staff Planning Book were developed by the commander as possible schemes of maneuver for the initial part of the attack. You should come up with COAs that are significantly different from these and which secure PL X-RAY, At the end of this section of the lesson, you must have a minimum of two COAs ready to analyze and compare. Later, you will review the concept of risk assessment.

Complete part II of the X (US) Corps Staff Planning Worksheet (chap 12 in the M/S320B Staff Planning Book.)

CORPS DEEP OPERATIONS

Your COAs should include some aspect of deep operations. Take a few minutes and review corps deep operations with a quick self-assessment.

The corps uses an air assault to capture a key communications hub deep in the enemy's rear area beyond the current forward line of own troops (FLOT) to force the enemy commander fight in two different directions as part of the corps concept of operation. Is this a "deep operation "?



Write your answer here.

This question has no right or wrong answer. By definition, deep operations do not focus on a location, but against a specific target to influence future close operations. If the intent as portrayed in the sketch is to force the commander to "turn out" of his current positions because of the threat to his rear, then it may be more of a vertical envelopment as part of the close operation. Attacks to interdict enemy units moving toward the air assault element would probably be considered deep operations. Since you are role playing the corps plans cell, you have the responsibility to synchronize in time, space, resources, and purpose any deep operations for this new mission. Be sure you consider deep operations in your COA.

Deep operations help the corps commander set the stage for successful close operations for the corps main maneuver elements, the divisions. As a division commander fights his battle, he depends on the corps to delay or disrupt additional forces that could influence the outcome of his brigade battles. When the corps extends the battlefield in time and space, the enemy force is placed under constant pressure. Some benefits of deep operations are shown below.

DEEP OPERATIONS

- Are directed against enemy forces and functions beyond the close battle.
- Influence future close operations.
- Benefits include-
  - Expand the battlefield In space and time.
  - Create opportunities to seize the initiative.
  - Throw the enemy "oft stride."
  - Deny enemy and preserve friendly freedom of action.
  - Break enemy morale.
  - Reduce enemy strength.

What does the corps have to conduct deep operations?

FM 100-15, chapter 2, discusses deep operations in detail.

When if comes to logistics, what is the major difference between supporting deep operations and supporting close or rear operations?

When force operate forward of the FEBA, they do not always own the territory between the FEBA and the FLOT. This means that there might not be a land line of communications (land LOC) and forces will have to rely more on an air LOC.

Take a minute or two and consider how the COSCOM supports deep operations. CSS units participate in, but do not really provide, CSS to deception operations. Electronic warfare also is not a major consumer of CSS, and units don't provide CSS to Air Force aircraft, but the COSCOM does have support responsibilities to the other deep operations assets.

How does the COSCOM support artillery involved in deep operations?

The artillery doesn't usually occupy and fire from positions forward of the FEBA, but since it will probably be placed farther forward than normal, there might be a need to pre-position more ammo. The CSR may

need to be adjusted to allow these units to tire in support of deep operations and still have sufficient ammo available for subsequent missions that follow immediately.The artillery units are otherwise supported as usual.

How about attack helicopters?

Forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) are usually set up as far forward as possible. Since helicopters can fly back and forth across the FEBA, CSS is not normally provided from locations forward of the FEBA.

How about special operations?

Special operations forces are a different story altogether. Because of the variety of missions and possible forces included, this discussion of supporting special operations forces will take place in S320C. That leaves only the ground maneuver forces to provide with CSS. This can be accomplished with corps augmentation/task organization if the situation is such that CSS units can be placed near or with the maneuver forces. If this is not feasible, CSS must be provided over an air LOC.

What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of using an air LOC with either Army helicopters or Air Force aircraft?

Advantages include-

- Responsiveness of support-airlift/airdrop can be quick and accurate.
- Normally not restricted by terrain or distance.
- By passing/overflying enemy forces.

Disadvantages include-

- Requiring air superiority or at least air parity.
- Can depend on weather.
- Only realistic for limited quantities of supplies and equipment.
- Limited or no backhaul capability.
- Requiring time and equipment to rig for an delivery (airdrop).

As you can see, deep operations can often be challenging to support, so why would the corps want to conduct deep operations in the first place?

By conducting deep operations. the corps sets the conditions for gaining or maintaining the initiative, depriving enemy freedom of action, and preserving the corps and subordinate commander's freedom of action.

Can you think of any other reasons for conducting deep operations?

Deep operations are designed to nullify the enemy's numerical advantages and firepower, disrupt his C^2 by causing his plan to become disjointed, destroy his logistical support, and break his morale by denying him freedom of action to carry out his plan. The ability to execute deep operations depends on the commander's evaluation of the different factors of METT-T and the time. space, resources, and purpose of the deep operation.

As a member of the X (US) Corps plans ceil, what are some functions you wouldperform in C^2 for deep operations?

This question is critical, and you should be able to answer it. There isn't a textbook answer. See FM 100-15, page 4-12, for specifics on the deep operations coordination cell (DOCC). Summarize your thoughts about command and control of deep operations functions. Then think about what units are available to perform these functions. Use the matrix provided to record your answers.

	A^2C^2	C^3CM or C^2 Warfare	Signal
Deep Operations			
Types of units to perform the task			

How can space operations help the corps conduct deep operations?

This information is in FM 100-5, pages 2-16 to 2-18.

The four military space functions are force enhancement, force application, space control, and space support. Space operations give the corps commander the ability to get near real-time information on what might be happening throughout the theater, particularly in the enemy's rear area. This information is useful in selecting good interdiction and high payoff targets. The commander can request Sister Service assistance in tracking and engaging these targets. Space operations enhance capabilities for obtaining imagery, intelligence, weather and storm tracking, early warning of changes in the enemy's plan, and navigation and communications capabilities. For deep operations, the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP) provides the corps commander reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition support hundreds of kilometers forward of the FLOT.

With the reality of increasing joint operations, planners at echelons above division must understand the available systems and capabilities of all the services so they can effectively integrate them into the corps commander's concept of operation. As you develop your COAs, look at how the different services or joint organizations can enhance the ability of the X (US) Corps to execute its mission.

What additional missions or capabilities can the Air Force provide to corps deep operations during this operation?

Hopefully, some of the answers you came up with included air interdiction, reconnaissance, airlift, and close air support for maneuver forces conducting deep operations.

What additional missions or capabilities can Army special operations forces provide to support the corps' deep operations during this operation?

Civil affairs, PSYOP, special reconnaissance, special air operations, direct action, and search and rescue are some of the more obvious ways Army special operations forces can support the corps' deep operations.

The corps is the primary planner, coordinator, and executor of deep operations in Army operations doctrine. Deep operations set the tactical environment for divisions as they conduct the corps' close operations and the detailed destruction of enemy forces. They extend the battlefield in time, space, resources, and purpose. The measure of success for deep operations is the leverage they create in division and brigade battles and

engagements. If the corps is unable to effectively limit the enemy commander's freedom of action, then future close operations (where you must win) are at risk.

CONTINUE COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

ST 101-5, chapter 3, explains how to develop COAs in detail. The following is a brief summary.

- Relative combat power is not an exact science. Analysis of friendly-to-enemy force ratios may give the planner some insight into types of operations that may be feasible for both sides.

- COAs are conceived without judging merit, but in accordance with the commander's guidance about specific COAs to examine or avoid.

- Maneuver forces are arrayed beginning at the expected point of initial contact-in this case, to the east, These are initially kept generic, with the type force determined after further development (mech, armor, balanced). ST 101-5 describes arraying forces two levels down; that is, division planners would array battalions. This is done merely to envision how a subordinate one level down should be resourced. There are, however, other techniques--arraying only one level down and "fine-tuning" the COA during subsequent analysis.

- The force array is expressed in terms of a scheme of maneuver describing how the organization will defeat the enemy or accomplish the mission through maneuver. This is easy to portray in offensive COAs. The complete scheme of maneuver will include how all air, ground, and reserve maneuver forces maneuver against enemy forces approaching and entering the unit's area of operations. Remember that attack helicopter units arc considered maneuver forces.

- Next, subordinate command and control headquarters are allocated (generically) to provide span of control over forces two levels down. Then, the minimum necessary maneuver and fire control measures are included. The total of these steps is summarized in a COA sketch with an accompanying statement. Together. these will address WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW, and WHY, plus the generic WHO-type forces only. The main effort should be identified. *The planner should use the degree of detail necessary to adequately communicate the COA.* Some commanders are more comfortable with a broad approach to COA development while other desire a more detailed approach. COAs must be suitable IAW higher commanders' intent and focused on mission; *distinguishable,* significantly different from one another in terms of the scheme of maneuver, main effort, use of reserves, task organization, or day versus night execution; *complete; feasible,* in terms of time, space, and means; and acceptable, in terms of costs in personnel, time, or position.

- The ability to rapidly develop feasible, tactically sound COAs is essential to decision making. The starting point is the scheme of maneuver. A good technique to follow is to draw a basic COA sketch after looking at the area of operations on a map and mentally completing the COA development steps to create a scheme of maneuver, You then can develop the details and narrative statement as time permits.

Now describe how each course of action differs from the others. Remember, don't compare or analyze them, but explain their differences in terms of scheme of maneuver, use of the reserve, main effort, day versus night execution, and so forth. Also review the criteria for completeness of each COA.

Some additional considerations are-

- Does the COA comply with commander's planning guidance and the scenario (appropriate subordinate units depicted)?

- Is the COA feasible and complete? Does it address deep, close, and rear operations?
- Does the COA address the size, composition, purpose, and positioning of the reserve?
- How is security addressed in the COA?
- Does the COA designate a main effort and include appropriate command and control measures?
- Are the symbols correct LAW FM 101-5-1?
- Can you look at the sketch and understand what it conveys?

If you still need additional information regarding COA development, refer to ST 101-5, chapter 3.

Criteria	COA 1	COA 2	COA 3
Use of reserves			
Task organization			
Main effort			
Scheme of maneuver			

You should have developed at least two COAs. As you developed these courses of action, you processed a great deal of information about this tactical problem. In formulating a course of action, you most likely used concepts you internalized in your previous experience or tactics instruction. The more you do this, the easier it becomes.

As the G3 completes the scheme of maneuver, other staff officers begin to conceptualize how they will organize assets to support a particular scheme of maneuver. The G2 provides the different threat models or enemy courses of action that the staff will use to analyze friendly COAs. The G4 provides updated information on the projected status of units at the time the operation will begin. Meanwhile, other staff officers obtain information needed to meet the commander's critical information requirements about the future operation

As you go through this lesson, continue to reinforce these general concepts.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Now, spend a few minutes on another important subject for commanders and planners to consider before executing an operation-risk assessment. Risk assessment involves a constant analysis and evaluation of critical events in which soldiers and equipment will be committed.

Think back to your precommissioning leader development classes. Do you recall being asked which is more important, the mission or the soldiers? You probably decided one is an integral part of the other. You best accomplish your mission by taking care of your soldiers and vice versa. Now think back to your studies in S310A about the elements of combat power-maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. The concept of command responsibility for mission accomplishment and force protection is not new. The impact of technology has made this even more critical.

Technology has extended the battlefield. There are now weapon systems and target acquisition capabilities with effective ranges beyond visual recognition. Extended ranges, coupled with increasing mobility and the ability, to program automatic and instantaneous responses, make friendly units more susceptible to friendly tire than ever before. Eventually, them may be technological answers to these problems. Commanders and planners must be more aware of their technological capabilities when maneuvering units and planning tires. This requires an objective review of P^2 controls.

A commander must determine two forms of risk. The first is risk to mission accomplishment, or operational risk. The second is risk to the force as a whole and personnel and equipment in particular. Risk analysis is inherent in a commander's responsibility to generate combat power, particularly the component of protection. Part of this assessment is determining both the benefits of accomplishing a task or critical event and the cost in resources to do so. While this is normally a mental process when time is constrained, the emergence of high tech fire and target acquisition systems requires a more detailed analysis during deliberate planning.

Be prepared to provide your risk assessment later in the lesson. You should determine your assessment based on your own reasoning and thoughts about the different C0As. This assessment will be reinforced throughout the rest of lesson 4 with some leading questions about P^2 controls-the use of tire coordination measures, A^2C^2 considerations. visual recognition techniques during periods of limited visibility, and so forth.

What are some techniques to control maneuver and fires during an attack where two friendly forces converge?

The procedure for determining the validity and applicability of P^2 is provided as a four-step procedure. Think about control measures. SOPs, fire control measures, air defense control measures, and use of dynamic minefields. You may wish to review the dynamic situation with the 25th Armd Div attacking in front of the 52d Mech Div as it approaches the northern boundary with 209th ACR. What would be some of your concerns as a troop leader at the company level? How could the soldiers in the 4th PzGren Div recognize soldiers of the 25th Armd Division as they began their attacks'? Review the boundaries, phase lines, limits of advance, restrictive fire control measures, coordination points, and so forth listed in the OPLANs. Are sufficient controls addressed for this type of operation? Remember, the corps is a major player in structuring the battlefield, including providing adequate measures for subordinate commanders to protect their forces.

Because of foreign military sales and proliferation of US and other nation's military hardware to different armies throughout the world, risk assessment is related to the problem of positively identifying friend or foe. For instance, Iraq had Soviet, Brazilian and French armored vehicles, along with Soviet and South African artillery. They also had some US equipment captured from the Kuwaitis during the invasion. Such situations make

identification of a friendly unit or vehicle very hard when a decision must be made quickly to fire on that vehicle.

What is the impact of conducting combat operations on a nonlinear battlefield?

The impact is significant when coupled with the issues you just examined and the fact that our nation will not tolerate fratricide. You must understand how complex modem warfare is and some of the ramifications for poor planning and coordination.

Corps operations involve using many different intelligence, fire support, and maneuver systems, often under control of sister services or command of our allies in a coalition. Corps-level planners must assess risks to soldiers and equipment when planning operations. These risks must also be evaluated against mission accomplishment. The more complicated a scheme of maneuver, the more complicated the coordination to support that scheme of maneuver with fires and other CS and CSS assets. Likewise, deep operations and other battlefield activities, if poorly planned, increase the chances for fratricide.

Now that you've developed courses of action to solve the corps tactical problem. you must analyze each course of action. First, review the corps organization and determine what assets are available for this operation. As you war game each course of action, apply your knowledge of command and support relationships to develop a proposed task organization. This will help you to initially plan for organizing CS and CSS assets to support the scheme of maneuver. *Do not continue in the lesson guide until you have developed at least two courses of action for the X (US) Corps.*

CORPS ORGANIZATION AND JOINT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE

In lesson 1, you examined the overall corps organization. As you know, corps organizational structure is tailored to a specific theater and mission. Take the next few minutes to review how the X (US) Corps is organized and what Sister Service or joint capabilities are available to enhance the corps' capabilities as it accomplishes the mission assigned by the II Allied Army Croup.

Review chapter 1 of the M/S320B Staff Planning Book. Then review chapters 5, 6, and 8. List the number of units available to the corps in the matrix on the next page. Then proceed in your lesson guide.

Types of units	Current operation	Future operation
Maneuver brigades		
Atk helicopter bns		
FA bns		
AD bns		

LANDCENT and II AAG asked the corps to plan employment of special operations forces during the upcoming operation Since you've already seen how special operations forces can help the corps conduct

deep operations (strategic reconnaissance, terminal guidance, and so forth), what other types of missions could be assigned to SOF to help accomplish the corps mission?

As the corps attacks east, elements of the civilian population may want the old East German regime back. During the occupation by Krasnovian forces, state security forces may have come into the occupied area, replaced existing civilian authority, and destroyed democratic institutions. Is this a problem for the corps commander or the German authorities? Remember, one of the hardest missions for VII Corps in DESERT STORM was restoring basic services and caring for refugees after hostilities ceased.

Think about your own experiences in regard to this situation. Perhaps you participated in a humanitarian or disaster relief operation where the Army provided medical, field sanitation, security from looters, or other functions much like a temporary government.

How would command and control of these units work if LANDCENT gave the X (US) Corps both ranger and special forces units for the next 30 days to help the corps defend along PL X-RAY?

This question reinforces previous instruction on the special operations command and control element (SOCCE) first presented in S310A. The key point is that you should know the need for such an element and the responsibility the corps has to request one if these units are part of the operation in the future.

While the use of special operations forces gives the corps additional capabilities, integrating operational fires with the corps tactical plan is crucial for successful deep and close operations. Several corps systems can see and shoot far beyond the FLOT. In your previous tactics instruction, the integration of TACAIR with ground operations focused primarily at close air support for the brigade and the division. In this tactical problem, there is a critical need to plan battlefield air interdiction to help delay the second strategic echelon divisions and destroy certain critical targets to further reduce the movement rate and combat effectiveness of the oncoming Krasnovian forces. Both CAS and BAI are offensive air support missions.

In addition to the US Air Force's ability to provide aircraft to bomb Krasnovian units, what other capabilities could the corps use during the upcoming operation?

Your response should have included the use of tactical air reconnaissance, SEAD, and counterair by the Air Force. You could also consider how theater airlift could support the X (US) Corps attack, but aircraft may not be available for this.

From your previous instruction on space operations, how would the corps get support from the US Space Command (USSPACECOM) for this operation?

The generic answer is that the corps would request specific information from II AAG. It would be their responsibility to coordinate and consolidate all such information requirements. In the case of USSPACECOM, supporting the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), those capabilities that can be directed to assist in this operation would be put in priority at a higher level. The key point is not what telephone number the corps uses to get a satellite picture of a specific target, but what kind of information the corps commander requires. If he doesn't request this support from higher headquarters, he won't get it.

As a corps planner, you must understand what joint systems are available and how they could best be employed to give the commander additional capabilities to accomplish his mission. These additional assets give the corps commander the ability to extend the battlefield. So far, you've focused on how sister service and joint

organizations can help the corps accomplish its mission. Now focus your study on how to organize the corps' assets to accomplish the mission.

what should be considered when developing a task organization?

If you need to review task organization, refer to ST 101-5, chapter 6, and ST 100-3, chapter 1.

COA analysis will provide better insight on how to organize other CS and CSS assets to support the maneuver elements. The commander's planning guidance is a good place to begin. Designating the main effort is another key factor. Task organizing enables the commander to resource the main effort and provide mutual support and flexibility to meet unforeseen events (branches) or future operations (sequels). Planners must clearly understand the mission, the commander's guidance and intent, doctrine, tactics, and the current status of available forces.

You've studied about organizing field artillery for combat in your previous tactics classes. What should be considered when task organizing other combat support assets such as engineers, air defense, and military police?

ST 100-3, chapter 2, provides some good basic ground rules. The corps must balance providing dedicated resources to subordinate units with the need for "sharing" resources among the rest of the force or keeping them in general support. For instance, there are three types of military intelligence (MI) battalions in the corps MI brigade. Only the Ml battalion (tactical exploitation (TE)) supports the divisions. As a planner, you need to know what those capabilities are and what support relationships are appropriate.

Analyzing a COA can take considerable time. When you complete war gaming, you begin to envision where and when assets will be needed on the battlefield. This facilitates building the corps task organization once the commander makes his decision.

Remember, corps allocates resources to the divisions so they can conduct successful engagements and battles. As you learned in previous tactics courses, the division is a fixed organization. Additional assets are required from corps-level units to enhance the division's capabilities. This is the real purpose of the corps-to bring together those systems that can have strategic and operational impact on tactical forces. The corps establishes the environment for successful close operations by adequately resourcing its divisions while retaining enough capability to conduct the necessary deep and rear operations.

Another outcome of your war game is battlefield organization. In organizing the battlefield, you must consider the enemy's capabilities and systems that can influence your freedom of action. Your evaluation of these capabilities helps you better envision the corps area of interest. Proper use of control measures is needed to structure the battlefield and identify specific battlefield activities.

CONTROL, MEASURES

Take a few minutes to review some of the control measures depicted on the sketches in FM 101-5-1 (for example, actual FEBA trace versus general location, planned and proposed battle positions, and so on). You may find it useful to review the programmed text on graphics and symbols if you do not have a basic knowledge of control measures.

Control measures delineate to subordinates where they can operate, where they can't, and who is in charge. Control measures can also designate where certain types of activities must happen on the battlefield. This has

been a consistent theme throughout your previous tactics instruction. In this lesson, you'll examine one of the most important control measures corps uses -the fire support coordination line (FSCL).

What is afire support coordination line?

If you are unfamiliar with fire control measures, quickly review ST 100-3, chapter 4. The FSCL is a permissive fire control measure, usually designated by a corps, to allow all supporting fire systems to engage targets expeditiously beyond the FSCL. However, coordination between the Air Force and Army firing units is important. Coordination is defined as informing and/or consulting with the appropriate tactical air component. If this coordination cannot be done, it normally does not prevent the Army firing units from engaging the target.

What are considerations for placing the FSCL?

FSCL placement is coordinated between the two component commanders. In this scenario, the corps fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) would recommend the location of the FSCL to support the scheme of maneuver, The recommended FSCL would be sent to the corps air operations coordination center (AOCC). The AOCC would transmit this information to the battlefield coordination element (BCE) located with the combined air operations center (CAOC). The FSCL then becomes part of the air tasking order (ATO) and is used by all command posts to portray where targets can be expeditiously engaged by air and ground systems. Other considerations include the following:

- The FSCL should be beyond the area where the corps plans to shape the battlefield with its deep operations. If the corps wants to selectively target certain high payoff targets as part of its deep operations, then the FSCL should be beyond where the corps plans to identify (NAIs) and engage expected targets (TAIs and engagement areas). If corps deep operations are primarily focused on general equipment or facility destruction to delay or disrupt the enemy's progress, the FSCL may be placed closer to the FLOT or LD/LC.

- Ths FSCL should be placed on easily identifiable terrain features.

- Corps is willing to accept duplication of effort that may result in dual targeting beyond the FSCL.

If you place corps long range surveillance company (LRSC) teams beyond the FSCL, what coordination measure could you use to reduce the risk of hitting them with friendly fires?

A restrictive fire area (RFA) or a no fire area (NFA) are appropriate restrictive fire control measures for this situation.

Look at control measures as a form of communication between commanders, their staffs, and other headquarters. If you want to control subordinate unit actions by dictating a certain activity or constraining freedom of action, you communicate that by using the appropriate control measure.

Your primary focus during the last few minutes has been the placement of the FSCL. The plans cell determines where the FSCL will be. During offensive operations, the plans cell will normally designate an initial FSCL and a series of on-order FSCLs to become effective at specific times or on order to match the progress of the corps attack. Often. these FSCLs are phase lines with an annotation of when the phase line becomes the FSCL.

Before you analyze your COAs, let's review a couple of points.

ANALYZE COAS

Analysis begins with a preliminary assessment of enemy capabilities. The commander uses his experience and judgment, beginning with those enemy maneuver capabilities he believes are highly probable. Other enemy capabilities are often combined with maneuver capabilities. A war gamer should consider these enemy capabilities for each friendly COA analyzed.

The G2 develops the known and suspected enemy situation based on an ongoing IPB process. Using this information, the corps ah-source production section (ASPS) provides the G2 with information needed to develop different threat models, or enemy COAs, for the staff to use during war gaming. The process of refining this data into meaningful information for the commander and his staff is called situation and target development. During war gaming, the G2 must "think enemy."

As you go through COA analysis, record your results. You can use whatever method you want. Do not compare your COAs to each other yet.

The following chart highlights some basic rules for war gaming. These will work whether the war game is very formal or just a mental process. The key rule is to avoid comparing COAs to one another at this point.

WAR-GAMING RULES

War gaming has several general rules:

1. Remain unbiased.
2. Accurately record advantages and disadvantages.
3. Continually assess feasibility—reject any COAs that prove infeasible.
4. Avoid premature conclusions.
5. Avoid comparing one COA with another during war gaming.

Steps in the war-gaming process:

- Gather the tools.
- List all friendly forces.
- List assumptions.
- List known critical events and decision points.
- List significant factors.
- Select war-gaming method (belt, box, or avenue in depth).
- Select a recording technique (narrative or sketch-note method).
- Conduct the war game (action-reaction-counteraction) and assess the results.

Shown here is a step-by-step methodology for quick war game reference. These steps are described in ST 101-5, chapter 5. The planner should always remain objective and appropriately modify the initial COA developed to incorporate changes.

- War gaming also identifies areas where enemy forces can be targeted (called target areas of interest or TAIs), decision points (DPs) associated with each means for engaging the enemy in the TAIs, and other areas where intelligence collection assets should be focused (called named areas of interest, or NAIs). These will be graphically portrayed on a decision support template (DST).

- This is all linked to the command& critical information requirements (CCIR). Having identified some vulnerable elements of the enemy force to attack and located some DPs, the CCIR define information the commander needs and deems critical for a specific COA. This becomes a focus for generating priority intelligence requirements.

- Another point: A synchronization matrix that portrays key friendly actions, enemy actions, and counteractions could be used by a staff to record the war-game results. Applicable battlefield operating systems and time lines could be included. There are other techniques to record or display results. These items and an example of a division synchronization matrix are provided in ST 101-5, chapter 5.

- As reviewed in the decisionmaking process overview, operational risk assessment would probably take place after war gaming. Critical events in a COA would be looked at and potential risks assessed. Additional procedural control measures would be incorporated into the COA as necessary.

Considerable insight can be obtained from a visualization of the battle from start to finish. Identifying the key actions, reactions, and counteractions as well as decision points and assets required are some of the things derived from war gaming. War gaming should also reveal probable follow-on missions, or sequels. Use any method or recording technique IAW ST 101-5. Here is an example that illustrates the ACTION-REACTION-COUNTERACTION sequence used to visualize a critical event in a COA.

Look at your course map and overlays:

Assume that you are war gaming a prospective COA in the current scenario which has a X (US) Corps division attacking in the north as the main effort. Assume that the corps has supporting attacks to fix the four Krasnovian regiments it will initially encounter as it crosses the LD/LC. The ACTION is the northern division's crossing the LD/LC and proceeding relatively unimpeded.

What might the Krasnovian REACTION be? Your thoughts should include a flank attack by the 13 independent Motorized Rifle Regiment (IMRR) centrally located in the X (US) Corps zone of action. Current intelligence provides a location of the 13 IMRR on overlay 4-2, but this unit was not depicted in the M/S320B Staff Planning Book sketches. Consider this an "intelligence update."

If the 13 IMRR moves to attack the X (US) Corps main effort in the flank, what options or COUNTERACTIONS, does the corps have? Your consideration of potential counteractions should have identified CAS (since it will be in proximity to forces in contact), FA (MLRS or ATACMS), attack helicopters from the corps aviation brigade, and possibly commitment of some or all of the corps reserve to preserve the momentum of the attack. Mentally apply this ACTION-REACTION-COUNTERACTION methodology to some critical events in each of your COAs. There are also different tables you can use to provide you with some planning data as you conduct your war game. If you still need more information on war gaming, review the material ST 101-5, chapter 5. It will give you a good overview of how to war game a course of action.

Complete Part III (COA Analysis) of the X (US) Corps Staff Planning Worksheet (chap 12, M/S320B Staff Planning Book).

SPECIAL SITUATION CONTINUED

You are still a corps planner in the X (US) Corps main CP plans cell. The corps G3 has just arrived at the plans cell. He wants to know your COA analysis and comparison results as soon as possible. He hands you a tentative outline of information to be included in your analysis. Since you are a CGSOC graduate, he wants you to compile the other staff members' input. After you complete your COA comparison, you should complete a risk assessment. The commander wants each COA compared against the following decision criteria-flexibility, supportability, and simplicity. These are already listed on the X (US) Corps staff planning worksheet. The G3 knows you are well qualified to determine additional decision criteria. Such criteria could include:

- **Specific elements of the commander's guidance.**
- **Critical events.**
- **Tenets or principles of war.**
- **Observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA).**
- **Any other significant or decisive factors (configuration for follow-on missions, and so on).**

There is no magic list of significant factors applicable to all situations. Comparison may follow any technique that will allow a recommendation to be reached.

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

Your objective is to reach a conclusion on the best COA (the one having the highest probability of success against the enemy COA of greatest concern to the commander). In the comparison step, you weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages or consider all the COAs collectively using some common criteria and judgment.

A good technique for a staff to use in doing the comparison is to prepare a decision table or matrix using either the advantage-disadvantage format or a manageable number of criteria. (If you need to review this part of tactical decision making, refer to ST 101-5, chapter 5.) You may use narrative, pluses and minuses, or weighted numbers. However, remember that this isn't an exact science, so *try to keep it simple!* Select the criteria first, then do the comparison. Try to avoid forcing a certain COA to come out better. A visual presentation of the COA comparison is routinely used to recommend a COA for the commander to approve. If the staff has done a good job, it will quickly become apparent which COA will be recommended. This can be presented informally or in a more formal decision briefing. ST 101-5 emphasizes the role of the chief of staff/executive officer in leading the staff in identifying the best COA to recommend to the commander,

A system of displaying relative comparison of each factor using "+", "," or "0" is easily used to visually portray that a certain factor is *relatively* better, worse, or has no major impact either way, The staff officer briefing the decision table would explain the relative merits or advantages disadvantages of each COA. Another technique might be to rank order the COAs relatively for each factor (1 = best; 2=2d best; 3=3d best). Weighting the criteria is another available technique.

What do the logisticians use for criteria when they compare COAs?

Spend a few minutes reviewing some logistics criteria for COA comparison. There is no standard or "approved" list of criteria. The logisticians must consider all those things that may affect their ability to sustain the force before, during, and after that particular COA. The following are some examples of possible criteria:

- Projected casualties.
- Projected consumption of classes III and V.
- Adequacy of fueling assets and fuel supply.
- Effect of CSR.
- Potential impact on maintenance status.
- Probable impact on transportation operations.
- Sufficiency of transportation assets.
- Availability of road networks.
- Length of supply routes.
- Movement restrictions.
- Security of routes from bypassed enemy units or enemy recon elements.
- Adequacy of support area(s).
- Potential threat to support area(s).
- Ability to support future/continued operations.
- Requirement for and/or ease of CSS unit displacements.
- Time available to conduct support operations.
- Possible effects of attachments/detachments on support operations.

Complete the risk assessment and COA comparison portions of part HI of the X (US) Corps Staff Planning Worksheet.

RECOMMENDATION AND DECISION

Staffs would present their recommended COA and demonstrate their logic and analysis of why they are recommending that specific COA to the corps commander. A format for this decision briefing is provided in ST 101-5, chapter 5.

SPECIAL SITUATION CONTINUED

The G3 reviews your work. He wants you to fill out the outline and fax it to the commander and the chief of staff now. Time is becoming critical and the divisions need to know when to begin moving. You review this outline. It looks pretty familiar. It looks a lot like the format used in ST 101-5. You prepare by reviewing and listing the assumptions used so far in the process, collecting your COA statements and sketches, and reviewing your war game notes.

Complete the outline for the decision briefing by making brief notes on the matrix provided on the next page.

Briefer	Subject
G3 Planner	1. Intent of higher HQs (two levels up). 2. Restated mission. 3. Status of own forces.
G2 Planner	1. Updated intelligence estimate (terrain, weather, and enemy situation).
G3 Planner	1. Summary of each COA. 2. Advantages and disadvantages of each COA. 3. Recommended COA.

As the staff reaches a conclusion regarding a specific COA, it will make a coordinated recommendation to the commander. The CofS ensures this occurs. The other staff officers provide their information to the commander, but all agree with your recommendation. The fax is sent to the commander at his forward location. After waiting for a few minutes (Can't you take a hint-take a break!), a message returns from the corps commander.

The commander has been mentally conducting his own estimate. He considers all known information including the staff recommendation and makes his decision.

SPECIAL SITUATION CONTINUED

The radio operator hands you the phone. The corps commander says "Good job! I concur with your recommendation. Prepare a FRAGO based on this COA for the corps. Here are some additional items to include for my concept of the operation. The attack must feature speed. We must also apply overwhelming combat power in decisive blows against the remaining regiments of the Krasnovian divisions defending along PL ROD. Our plan must have the flexibility to work against multiple enemy options. Success in our end state will be measured by having destroyed the enemy in our zone, getting to PL X-RAY with enough combat power to defeat the oncoming two divisions between PL X-RAY and PL ROD, thereby completing the destruction of the 2 GTA and setting the conditions for future operations. I'll be back at your location in an hour to review the FRAGO with the chief of staff and the G3."

You reflect on the commander's elaboration of the purpose; desired end state in terms of friendly forces, enemy forces, and terrain; and generally how the force as a whole will achieve this. He also addressed *what results are expeded* (PL X-RAY secured rapidly, with remnants of the 2 GTA destroyed in our zone); clarifying *thepurpose of the operation* (to establish a strong defense to block the Krasnovian second strategic echelon; and *generally how you as the commander visualize achieving the end state* (tie back to commander's planning guidance and tailor to the particular COA you have made your decision on). You now have enough information to write the commander's intent for the FRAGO. Make sure you frame the corps commander's intent within the contest of the II AAG commander's intent.

DEVELOP THE CORPS FRAGO

The commander's decision marks the transition from the end of the planning process to the beginning of the directing process. The rest of this lesson focuses on the next major task: *communicating the decision.* Communicating the commander's will to the corps is critical. If you do a great job of planning, you must also do a great job "getting the word out." You should be familiar with the overlays and paper products normally associated with this task. While technology is making other ways available to get the word out (tactical facsimile machines, satellite conferences, and so forth), the requirement is still the same. The overall name for this stage is directing. Planning consisted primarily of figuring out what the subordinate units needed to do. Directing tells them what to do, and controlling is what the command does later to ensure subordinate units do what they were told to do.

Shortly, you will complete a practical exercise involving organizing and locating COSCOM assets (corps support groups) to support this operation. Following this, you will complete a FRAGO. You have already done most of the creative steps. You will put the approved concept into the proper format. Remember, the best decision is ineffective if you, the staff, cannot produce and disseminate a clear, concise order.

Before you proceed, take a few moments to review a particular portion of the order: subparagraph a (Concept of Support) to paragraph 4, SERVICE SUPPORT. Put yourself in the role of a G4 planner about to write the concept of support for the corps FRAGG based on the COA you recommended (and the commander approved).

The concept of support is how logistical requirements are going to be supported before, during, and after the operation. It is the flow of logistical actions and responsibilities that the logistics planner visualizes as he or she war games the COA and integrates logistics units and support operations with the operational missions and scheme of maneuver of the combat force. This is done by the logistics staff planner as part of the integrated course of action development process as he/she completes the logistic estimate.

Paragraph 4 is a short written summary of this plan of support. It is a comprehensive, but very concise, visualization of how tactical logistics functions support the scheme of maneuver. It is primarily written for the combat arms and combat support commanders and staff. It does not include the technical or detailed instructions that CSS units need. Such details would go in subparagraphs, a service support annex, or a service support plan or order. The concept of support does not include routine, doctrinal, or constant information that can be found in the SOP.

While you should *consider* all six tactical logistics functions in the context of actions accomplished before, during, and after the operation, you should include *only* those that are critical, non-SOP, or unusual. You should also include the commander's priorities of support for before, during, and after the operation. Priorities could include personnel replacements, maintenance repair and evacuation (by unit or by system), fuel and ammunition, road network use by unit or commodity, and any resource subject to competing demands or constraints. If the operation is phased, the "during" portion of the concept should also be phased.

What are some sources of information for developing the concept of support?

Information is found in many locations, and comes from several sources.

- Information comes primarily from the completed logistic estimate, including the results of war gaming.

- During mission analysis, the CSS planner determines the unit's current materiel and personnel posture before the operation begins. This, with the commander's priorities, determines which units and items of equipment should receive priority before the operation.

- War-gaming information sources should include-
  - ♦ Commander's intent.
  - ♦ Concept of operation.
  - ♦ Higher headquarters concept of support, service support annex, service support order or plan (if applicable), and service support overlay.

- The G4 is responsible for developing the concept of support, but he or she must also coordinate with the G1, G5, support command organization, and other special staff officers to determine their significant information (if any) that should be included in the concept of support.

For more information, refer to ST 101-5, chapter 10. The format provided in this manual is a good one, but it should not be used as a cookie cutter to stamp out COAs that lack originality or distinction. ST 101-5, chapter 10, contains information about the service support overlay. Be sure you are at least aware of the example.

As you can see, ST 101-5 contains a lot of information on the concept of support. Keep it handy and refer to it as required. You might want to take a break before starting this next portion of the lesson.

COSCOM TASK ORGANIZATION PRACTICAL EXERCISE

Get right to work by organizing the corps support groups (CSGs) to support your COA. You should also identify major CSS unit (battalion size and larger) locations on your planning overlay. Also, show the corps main supply routes (MSPs) that you would plan to support your COA as well as ASPs/ATPs which are run by the CSGs. This next part of the practical exercise should take you approximately I hour.

SPECIAL SITUATION

You are now the G4 plans officer for the X (US) Corps. The G3 and G4 will meet with the COSCOM commander and his staff to discuss the upcoming operation. The G4 wants to provide the COSCOM commander with an analysis of how the upcoming operation will generally affect the COSCOM. While the COSCOM commander and his staff will develop specific orders for movement and support, the G4 wants you to provide a general allocation and positioning plan to facilitate terrain management and security for COSCOM elements during the attack toward PL X-RAY.

Refer to the listing of additional COSCOM units provided to X (US) Corps in 11 AAG FRAGO 4-1 (located in chap 6, M/S320B Staff Planning Book). Use the solution to the lesson 2 PE, 10th COSCOM Organization, as an example of typical forward CSG structure. These are the only logistics units in the scenario at this point. When you complete your task check and see how you organized and placed the CSGs against the following decision criteria.

- Did you allocate one CSG per committed division?
- Were forward CSGs placed near good road/rail networks. just behind division rear boundaries?
- Did you organize with-
  - ♦ At least one tailored CSB to operate in the vicinity of the DSA (to support nondivisional units in that division are)?
  - ♦ Appropriate CSS units behind the division rear boundary to provide area support to nondivisional units behind the division boundary?
  - ♦ GS supply and reinforcing DS maintenance and field services to committed units'?
- Did you organize the rear CSG with functional battalions to support corpswide and with one or more CSBs to support units in the rear CSG area of responsibility?
- Did you consider who would support a division in reserve (if this applies to your COA)? When a division is placed in reserve, that division receives GS supply support and field services from the appropriate CSG on an area basis. The forward CSS units that would normally provide this support are, at least for the moment, not responsible for providing that support to the reserve division and, therefore, may be available to assist or reinforce other CSS units while they prepare for future operations.

No medical units should be allocated to the CSGs. These are assigned to the medical brigade that supports the entire corps rear area.

Now turn the page and see how you did.

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This is the probable result of task organizing the COSCOM to include the additional CSS units provided in 11 AAG FRAGO 4-1 (see chap 6, M/S320B Staff Planning Book). Changes in alignment of old structure or new structural entities are in bold type. Rationale for most of the changes should be obvious, but comments are provided where necessary. You would place the corps support groups (CSGs) to support the COA approved by the commander.

10th COSCOM (No changes required in **HQ/CMMC/CMCC)**

80th Med Bde
- 826th Med Det Vet Svc (HQ)
- 827th Med Bn Log (Fwd)
- 82d Med Gp
  - 84th MASH
  - 809th CSH
  - 810th CSH
- **83d Med Gp**
  - **85th MASH (unit moved from 84th Med Gp just to balance span of control)**
  - **811th CSH**
  - **812th CSH**
- 84th Med Gp
  - 817th CSH
  - 818th CSH
  - 819th CSH
  - 802d ASMB
  - 8403d Med Co Holding
  - 833d Med Bn, Dent Svc
    - 8259th Med Co Dent Svc
    - 8260th Med Co Dent Svc
    - **8261st Med Co Dent Svc**
  - 825th Med Bn Evac
    - 855th Med Co Gud Amb
    - 856th Med Co Gnd Amb
    - **860th Med Co Gnd Amb**
    - **861st Med Co Air Amb**
    - 863d Med Co Air Amb
    - 864th Med Co Air Amb
    - 865th Med Co Air Amb
    - 820th Med Co Cbt Stress Control

13th CSG (FWD)
- 13th CSB
  - 593d Ord Co (Convl) (GS MOAD/PLS)
  - 714th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
  - 741st Trans Co (Mdm Trk Cntnr/Cgo)
  - 273d QM Co (Sup) (GS)
  - 9012th Maint Co (DS)
  - 9013th Maim Co (DS)
- 90th CSB
  - 220th QM Co (Petrl Sup)
  - 721st Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)

235th QM Co (Sup) (DS)

293d QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
9017th Maint Co (DS)

199th CSB (located in division area)
9011th Maint Co (DS)
271st QM Co (Sup) (DS)
291st QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
580th Ord Co (DS) (MOAD/PLS)
759th Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)

14th CSG (FWD)
14th CSB
594th Ord Co (Convl) (GS MOADS/PLS)
707th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
748th Trans Co (Mdm Trk Cntnr/Cgo)
239th QM Co (Sup) (GS)
9015th Maint Co (DS)
9016th Maint Co (DS)

91st CSB
221st QM Co (Petrl Sup)
722d Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
253d QM Co (Sup) (DS)
292d QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
9018th Maint Co (DS)

198th CSB (located in division area)
9014th Maint Co (DS)
208th QM Co (Sup) (DS)
294th QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
581st Ord Co (DS) (MOAD/PLS)
735th Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)

20th CSG (REAR)
129th CSB
260th Maint Co (DS) (Hawk)
249th Maint Co (DS) (Msl Spt)
237th Maint Co (DS)
9025th Maint Co (DS)
9027th Maint Co (DS)

138th CSB
251st QM Co (Sup) (DS)
238th QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
9028th Maint Co (DS)
9029th Maint Co (DS)

932d Avn Bn (AVIM)
700th Avn Co (AVIM)
701st Avn Co (AVIM)
702d Avn Co (AVIM)

33d QM Bn (Petrl Sup)
229th QM Co (Petrl Sup)

260th QM Co (Petrl Sup)
724th Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
725th Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)

55th Ord Bn Ammo (DS/GS)
590th Ord Co (Convl) (GS MOADS/PLS)
591st Ord Co (Cowl) (GS MOAD/PLS)
20th S & S Bn
257th QM Hv Mat Sup Co (GS)
258th QM Co (Adrp Sup)
259th QM Co (Adrp Equip Rep & Sup)
298th QM Co (Rep Parts Sup) (GS)
20th Collection Co (MA)
290th QM Co (Sup) (GS)
180th TMT Bn
729th Trans Co (Hv Trk)
777th Trans Co (Hv Trk)
778th Trans Co (Hv Trk)
779th Trans Co (Hv Trk)
780th Trans Co (Cgo Trf)
781st Trans Co (Cgo Trf)
182d TMT Bn
734th Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)
733d Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)
709th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
710th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
746th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
747th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)

The following "new" CSG, with three CSBs, supports the additional division. The actual designations of units is not important. The composition (type units) of the CSB located in the division area should be as shown (DS units only). The rest of the companies can be divided between the other two CSBs in just about any manner as long as the "habitual support relationship" between the PLS truck company and the ordnance (ammo) company as well as the POL truck company and QM (Petrl Sup) company are still maintained (both in same CSB).

19th CSG (FWD)
19th CSB
592d Ord Co (Convl) (GS MOADS/PLS)
712th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
745th Trans Co (Mdm Trk Cntnr/Cgo)
250th QM Co (Sup) (GS)
9023d Maint Co (DS)
9024th Maint Co (DS)
127th CSB
228th QM Co (Petrl Sup)
723d Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
212th QM Co (Sup) (DS)
253d QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
9026th Maint Co (DS)

197th CSB (located in division area)
9022d Maint Co (DS)
248th QM Co (Sup) (DS)
295th QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
582d Ord Co (DS) (MOADS/PLS)
753d Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)

Would you want to move the rear CSG at this time?

No. It is still within acceptable distance to provide reinforcing support to the forward CSGs. Also, you would not want to try to move the rear CSG if, at the same time, you were displacing the forward CSGs by echelonment.

What changes did you make to the corps MSRs based on your COA ?

MSRs should be on primary roads, with at least one leading into each division area of operations.

Now that you as corps planners have looked at one important aspect of planning combat service support, there are a few other related areas to mention.

Good operations security is often coupled with innovative logistic deception techniques, These include the maximum use of factory buildings and houses to hide supply, maintenance, and transportation support operations. You might also consider setting up supply points in unorthodox configurations or positions. Use empty ammunition boxes, fuel drums, and unserviceable items to help represent supply point activity where there isn't any. This also requires false vehicular traffic to make a more realistic picture. One way to do this is to use civilian trucks, buses, and cars to transport supplies (depending on the enemy's rules of engagement).

Who are some of the players who would coordinate the positioning of the forward CSGs and other units in the corps rear?

The first point is that this is not one of the responsibilities that the corps plans cell has at the main CP. The corps rear CP operations cell, through the subordinate rear area operatons centers (RAOCs) of the corps, coordinates the positioning of units throughout the corps rear area. The corps deputy commanding general is the rear operations commander. This illustrates some of the division of labor among the various command posts.

The RAOCs also group units into bases or base clusters to increase mutual security. Such bases/base clusters are responsible for self-protection against Level 1 threats and limited Level II threats. The corps rear CP operations cell also designates corps response forces to respond to attacks by Level II threat forces. Normally, the corps MP brigade gets this mission, often augmented with additional combat and CS assets. The G3 normally will designate a tactical combat force (TCF) to defeat Level III threat forces that exceed the capabilities of the MP brigade. If such a force is committed, it will be controlled by the rear operations commander via the corps rear CP. However, the corps commander may choose to accept risk by not designating a TCF based on his overall assessment.

SPECIAL SITUATION

You are now the assistant G3 plans officer. It is your responsibility to write the FRAGO for this operation. The G3 wants a FRAGO with an operation overlay and an accompanying task organization. (Include the task organization of a TCF only if your COA designated one.)

Complete part IV of the X (US) Corps Staff Planning Worksheet.

Some additional guidance:

- Use the worksheet in chapter 12 (part IV) of your staff planning book to write the appropriate paragraphs of the corps FRAGO. As a minimum, write paragraphs 2, 3, and 4. There is no need to prepare an intelligence annex, service support annex, or task organization. Remember that this is a FRAGO, not a complete OPLAN. The standard is to include only those changes from OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG.

- You will prepare a corps task organization and an operation sketch (depicting all control measures, logistic support areas, boundaries, and displacement of the three corps CPs).

- Follow the format found in ST 101-5, chapter 3.

This almost completes the X (US) Corps practical exercise. There is one last thing to do. You are still a plans officer for the X (US) Corps. Your shift begins at 260100A Aug 19, and you are reviewing the significant events leading to the current situation as part of the shift change procedures for the plans cell. The corps historian provides you a copy of his narrative of the current operation.

Turn to appendix 1 to lesson guide, lesson 5. Take a few minutes to read this. It will take you forward in time to a new tactical problem and set the stage for the exam. This new tactical problem carries forward and builds on the planning you just completed.

CONCLUSION

During this lesson, you have applied the tactical decisionmaking process to solve a corps-level tactical problem. You have gained additional staff experience, refined your written communication skills, and applied some new techniques and tactical concepts to a corps-level tactical problem in a developed theater.

Next, you will complete the S320B examination. Read the lesson guide for lesson 5 and its appendix in your preparation for the exam.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Corps Planning Practical Exercise

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. Deception

BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION FUNDAMENTALS

Revitalizing the "Lost Art"

History has shown that there is a potential payoff to be gained by using battlefield deception. Wise military planners throughout history have used deception. It is a low cost and effective way to cause the enemy to waste his efforts. Imaginative use of deception, coupled with aggressive training, improves combat effectiveness at all levels. Throughout our military history, though, commanders viewed deception only as a warfighting need.

Today, commanders use little deception in planning, directing, and conducting combat operations. As a result, many deception-related skills that have served our Army well in the past have been forgotten and, where remembered, have not been made part of our warfighting capabilities Armywide. This is caused by the following factors and the myths discussed later in this appendix.

- Advances in technology are perceived to make successful deception more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

- Commanders are reluctant to devote scarce resources. including time. to tasks that are considered less essential.

- Force modernization, being primarily focused on high-cost force structure and materiel initiatives, has pushed low-cost, perceived intangibles like deception further into the background.

During the early 1980s, both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Army (DA) attempted to revitalize the art of deception as a sustained warfighting capability To that end, DA published FM 90-2 to pursue deception as a low-cost, high-payoff methodology to achieve operational advantage.

The advantages of deception have been proven in all wars in which the United States has been involved. Accounts as far back as the Revolutionary War describe instances where deception was used with great success. General George Washington used deception to great effect before and in support of the Battle of Yorktown Only 40 years ago, World War II General Daniel Noce advised soldiers to study deception during peacetime and be prepared to use it in war.

NOTE: The information in this appendix is based on FM 90-2, *Battlefield Deception,* October 1988. It augments information found in FM 100-5, FM 100-15, ST 100-3, and ST 101-5.

Myths

The following myths contribute to reasons why deception is not more widely used and understood:

- *Surprise comes from luck.* Experience has taught us that surprise can be greatly enhanced by deception. Studies of military encounters since 1914 show that deception almost certainly results in surprise. On the other hand. if deception is not used, surprise is achieved only about 50 percent of the time.

- *Deception plays a trivial part in warfare and is not for real soldiers.* This myth is dispelled by the writings of such leaders as General George S. Patton. In 1945, he wrote that he believed deception and cover should be a normal part of the planning for any campaign.

- *Tremendous growth in intelligence collection capabilities has destroyed the possibility of deceiving a sophisticated opponent.* The truth is that the greater the collection capability an opponent has, the greater the opportunity to feed him specifically designed false information. Additionally, historical studies show that tactical warning of attack was provided in about 78 percent of all military encounters studied since 1914. Even so, if deception was successfully used, the enemy ignored the warning and was surprised by the attack.

- *Deception iv only for combatants.* In the 1973 Middle East War, the Egyptians brought the Israelis to the brink of defeat in 5 days. The Egyptian attack was aided by 150 deception ploys in economic, political, and military forms. A team of 40 people began working in February, 1973 on the Egyptian plan for the 6 October invasion Combat operations were preceded by construction projects, false reports, and many other noncombat activities.

Battlefield Deception Definition

Battlefield deception consists of those operations conducted at the theater (Army component) and below echelons that purposely mislead enemy decisionmakers by distortion, concealment, and falsification of indicators of friendly intentions. capabilities. or dispositions.

Battlefield deception is used to induce enemy decisionmakers to take operational or tactical actions that are favorable to, and exploitable by, friendly combat operations.

The goals of battlefield deception, when discussed within the context of mission-oriented requirements, depend on the METT-T. The following goals. therefore. are general enough to apply to most situations regardless of the echelon or conflict intensity levels:

- Coordinate operational deceptions to maintain coherency of deception story portrayal at strategic and army echelons.

- Mask an increase in or redeployment of forces and weapon systems that the enemy has spotted.

- Block the enemy’s perception and identification of new weapons or forces being introduced into combat.

- Distract the enemy’s attention from other activities.

- Overload enemy intelligence collection and analytical capabilities.

- Create the illusion of strength where weakness exists.

- Create the illusion of weakness where strength exists.

- Condition the enemy to particular patterns of friendly behavior that are operationally exploitable at the appropriate time.

- Contuse enemy expectations with regard to the size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE), and intent or style of mission execution to effect surprise in these areas.

Deception Maxims

Achievement of the above goals relies on deception maxims or principles that are supported by historical deception-related evidence. Other principles come from social science, decision analysis, and game theory. Still others are anecdotal in nature, and although they meet the test of common sense, they are generally untested in the formal sense. Nevertheless, they have served as useful theoretical guidelines on which this doctrine has been built. The 10 maxims follow:

- *Magruder's principles-the exploitation ofperceptions.* It is generally easier to induce an enemy to maintain a preexisting belief than to present notional evidence to change that belief. Thus, it may be more useful to examine how an enemy's existing beliefs can be turned to an advantage than to attempt to change the enemy's beliefs.

- *Limitations to human information processing.* The two limitations to human information processing that are exploitable in the design of deception schemes are-

  - *Law of small numbers,* which is the name given to describe one weakness in intuitive inference-best guesses.

  - *Susceptibility to conditioning,* which is the frequent inability of targets to detect small changes in indicators, even if the cumulative change over time is large. This is the basis for the use of conditioning as a deception technique.

Conditioning or desensitizing has an important place in the design of deception schemes. There are many instances of its successful application.

- *Cry-wolf.* Repeated false alarms (cry-wolf) have historically contributed to surprise. There is no doubt that cry-wolf is an established element in indications-and-warning intelligence work. This method of desensitizing an enemy before an attack has been very effective.

- *Jones' dilemma.* Deception becomes more difficult as the number of channels of information available to the target increases. However, within limits, the greater the number of *controlled channels,* the greater the likelihood the deception will be believed.

- *A choice among types of deception.* Where possible, the objective of the deception planner should be to reduce the uncertainty in the mind of the target, to force the target to seize on a notional world view as being *correct-not making it less certain of the truth, but more certain of a particular falsehood.* However, increasing the range of alternatives and the evidence supporting any of many incorrect alternatives-also known as increasing the noise-may have particular use when the target already has several elements of truth in its possession. It is convenient to classify deception into the following types:

•• A (ambiguity) deception increases doubt in the target's mind and lowers the probability of a correct perception by taking from or adding to alternatives.

•• M (misdirection) deception reduces uncertainty in the target's mind by having the target become convinced of a particular falsehood.

Either form of deception can be accomplished, incidentally, by telling only the truth. Deception schemes used in practice are usually combinations of A and M types, with one or the other being dominant. Such was the case. at Normandy. The multiple attack locations in the initial stages are evidence of A deception. In the end phases, however, Normandy was predominantly an M deception. Historically, deception professionals seem to have preferred M deception. After all, who can resist the ultimate triumph of "the sting"?

• *Axelrod's contribution: the husbanding of assets*. There are circumstances where deception assets should be kept in reserve despite the costs of maintenance and risk of waste, awaiting a more fruitful use.

• *A sequencing rule.* Deception activities should be sequenced to maximize the portrayal of the deception story for as long as possible. In other words, red-handed activities-indicators of true friendly intent-should be deferred to the last possible instant.

• *Importance offeedback.* A scheme to ensure accurate feedback increases the chance of success in deception. This principle is virtually self-evident. Perhaps the most dramatic example of the role of feedback in wartime deception was the intelligence provided by Ultra, the top-secret espionage and cryptographic breakthrough that enabled the British to read the German codes. Ultra information was a key element in the success of the Allied invasion of Normandy.

• *The monkey's paw*. Deception efforts may produce subtle and unwanted side effects. Planners should be sensitive to such possibilities and, where prudent, take steps to minimize these counterproductive aspects.

• *Care in designing placement of deception material.* Don't make things too easy. Apparent windfalls are subject to close scrutiny and often disbelieved. The enemy must be made to work for the information.

Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures (C^3CM)

Battlefield deception is an important foundation to the C^3CM or command and control (C" warfare doctrine for Army operations. Our potential adversary's ability to perceive and manage the battlefield with clarity and certainty accents the importance of planning and integrating a C^3CM strategy into our combat operations. Battlefield deception is employed in concert with the three other components of C^3CM: jamming, operations security (OPSEC), and physical destruction.

This combination is designed to influence, degrade, or destroy enemy command, control, and communications (C') capabilities while protecting friendly C^3 from similar enemy efforts. The successful attack of adversary command and control systems requires an integrated application of all available assets.

Components of Battlefield Deception Operations

Battlefield deceptions are planned in a manner similar to the planning of standard combat operations. Each component of deception is applicable at operational and tactical levels but varies in scope. The components of battlefield deception follow:

- *Objectives.* The deception objective is the ultimate purpose of the deception operation. It is presented as a mission statement. The objective specifies what action or lack of action the enemy must be made to take at a specific place or time on the battlefield as a direct result of the friendly deception operation.

- *Target.* The target of battlefield deception operations is the enemy decision maker. He has the authority to make the decision that will execute the deception objective desired by the friendly commander. Battlefield deception targeting can occur in two ways:

  - The enemy decision maker may be personally targeted with deception operations if his behavior patterns are known and predictable.

  - The enemy commander may be doctrinally targeted if the deceiver does not know the enemy decision maker's behavior patterns.

The deceiver will then focus on the intelligence collection and decision cycle processes. These provide the information on which prejudgment and decisions are made.

- *Story.* The deception story is the friendly intention, capability, or disposition that the enemy is to be made to believe.

- *Plan.* The deception plan outlines which specific operations, displays, or secrets must be used to convey the deception story to the target. It takes the form of a standard operation plan (OPLAN). It is included in the deception annex. Some deception tasks contained in the deception annex should be moved to paragraph 3 of the OPLAN or operation order (OPORD) or other supporting functional annexes.

- *Events.* Deception events are friendly indicators and actions that present specific parts of the total deception story to the enemy's intelligence sensors. Some deception events, given the enemy and friendly situation, can be described as nonaction or delayed action in nature. An example would be delaying the forward movement of logistic bases or artillery support until shortly before a deliberate attack.

The following chart shows the difference in scope of the deception components at various levels of deception employment.

DECEPTION/LEVEL	THEATER	CORPS	DIVISION
OBJECTIVE (Cause inappropriate enemy response to friendly:)	Actions in communications zone. Orientation/disposition of major forces. Far deep intent. Activity behind enemy lines. Special weapons.	Actions in corps near area (CS, CSS). Maneuver of subordinate div. Special weapons. Corps' deep intent.	Division's intent. Maneuver of front troops. Close, rear, and deep operations.
TARGET The enemy commander controlling:	Strategic-level controlled weapons. Front/strategic reserves. Assets. OMGs. Special troops.	Front/CAA operations. Army/front reserves. OMGs. Army second-echelon forces.	Division, army regiment operations. Division second-echelon forces. Division, army reserves.
STORY	Longer period to be processed by enemy. Present theater capabilities, doctrine, and intentions. Joint/combined operations. Strategic intent.	Formulated in operational mission planning. May be received from theater. Enhance capability to perform mission in corps area of operations.	Normally received from corps. Portray division capabilities/ augmentation. Not normally independent operations.
EVENT	Broad in scope. Use of national, theater, joint, and combined assets. Planned by theater deception element/joint/combined deception staff element.	Executed by corps combat, CS, CSS assets. Planned and limited execution by deception-specific units.	Executed by organic, attached, OPCON CS, CSS assets. Portray division capabilities/ augmentation. Not normally independent operations. Planned and limited execution by deception and specific units.
PLAN	Developed by theater deception element. Executed by corps and its subordinate assets. Incorporate national, theater, joint, and combined assets.	Developed by corps deception element. May be integrated into tasks given to supporting and subordinate units. No reference to deceptive intent. (Deceptive intent provided in deception annex only.)	Developed by division deception element. May be tasked to supporting or subordinate units without reference to deceptive intent. (Deceptive intent provided in deception annex only.)

Deception component purpose by echelon of command

DECEPTION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Deception operations are not ends in and of themselves. One does not conduct deception operations merely to deceive. Deception supports the operational or tactical mission.

The operations officer (G3/S3) is the primary staff officer responsible for deception planning within the command. This duty falls to him as the executor for operations. Deceptions are as much a function of operations as real plans and are part of the operational scheme chosen to accomplish the mission.

Techniques

A unit will use its normal staff organization and mission planning techniques to plan for and supervise the execution of deception operations, The battlefield deception elements are activated within corps and divisions. They are critical elements in accomplishing the deception mission of the unit. They provide the G3 with the necessary expertise to perform the planning, target selection, and coordination needed for deception success. The deception elements deploy and operate as integral parts of the G3 staff. However, when security is essential. other organizational techniques may be considered. Three other techniques used in conducting deception planning are commander only, close hold, and ad hoc staff.

Planning techniques can be different each time, depending on existing conditions. For example, if the battlefield is fluid and fast moving, less control will be required in a stable situation where opponents can continuously observe one another. The time available. unit location, security posture, nature of the true operation. and action selected as the primary deception vehicle will also affect the selection of the technique. Each organizational technique has different advantages.

Sequence

The sequence of actions in making and executing decisions involves a series of separate actions or steps performed concurrently by the commander and his staff. Knowing this process will help to understand the function of the estimates, their relationship within the decision-making process. and the coordination that occurs between a commander and his staff before a decision is reached.

The commander decides how elements of his command will accomplish missions. He issues timely orders to control the operations of his forces. The staff helps the commander arrive at and execute decisions. Operational decisions are usually of such fundamental importance that the commander personally influences the preparation of orders directing their execution.

Process

Though estimating and planning operations are continuous, they arc put more into focus on receipt of a mission. Normally, higher headquarters assigns the mission, but the commander may develop or deduce it. The mission or task to be accomplished initiates the decisionmaking process. The commander may initiate his mission analysis at this point.

Based on knowledge of the latest facts and the current situation, the staff provides the commander with all the information available. Using this information, the commander completes his mission analysis, restates the mission, and issues his planning guidance.

The restated mission and planning guidance are the results of mission analysis. They provide the necessary staff direction for concurrent planning by providing a framework for making studies and estimates. The amount of planning guidance given varies with each mission, the volume and validity of information available, the situation and the experience of the commander and staff. Planning guidance does not occur at one specific time in the planning process. However, initial guidance should precede the preparation of the staff estimates. For the staff to properly include deception planning in its staff estimates, the commander needs to consider the following when developing his initial guidance:

- Should deception be considered in support of the main objective?
- Is the enemy susceptible to deception?
- What percentage of friendly forces can be used to support deception?
- Should deception be used to support supplementary missions?
- Are units used to support the deception effort needed for the success of the main objective?
- If yes to the above, what is the maximum time allowed for the units to stop their deception efforts and redeploy to the main objective area'?
- Does the success of the operation depend on the success of the deception?

Having received the commander's planning guidance, staff members can focus their individual efforts on the problem to be solved. This involves considering all circumstances affecting the situation and a systematic analysis and evaluation of possible ways to accomplish the task or mission. Staff officers furnish information, conclusions, and recommendations through preparation of an estimate. The development of individual estimates requires staff officers to consult with each other to ensure the coordination of all factors affecting the situation. The operations officer's estimate is the key staff estimate and incorporates the conclusions of the other staff estimates. It becomes the coordinated staff recommendation. The operations officer is responsible for the preparation of the deception estimate.

The following is a sample of a commander's planning guidance for deception: "I want the staff to consider the use of deception to support our mission. I want at least one deception course of action for each actual course of action. For planning purposes, we can commit one armored task force to support deception, with the normal artillery and logistic support slice. I want them to be able to stop deception operations and support the main attack within 4 hours of the order to do so."

Deception should be considered in each course of action. Deception estimates should be integrated into each cause of action. For each course of action a separate deception staff estimate needs to be prepared. In analyzing the courses of action for presentation to the commander, the course of action that presents the greatest opportunity for success will be chosen. Deception operations have a greater potential for success if they are planned in depth as an integral part of the decision-making process. By understanding from the start the potential of deception as well as understanding the costs involved, the commander and staff have a greater possibility of successfully using deception to support the actual mission.

The following outline shows the tactical deception planning process.

Step 1 - Situation Analysis

- Current and projected friendly situation.
- Current and projected enemy situation.
- Target analysis.
- Analysis of friendly and enemy projected situation.
- Stated desired situation.

Step 2 - Deception Objective Formulation

- Deception objective: enemy action or nonaction that causes desired situation.
- Mission objective: what friendly forces must accomplish.

Step 3 - Desired Perception

- What the enemy must think to make him act.
- Deriving suitable perception:
  - ♦ Estimate enemy's current perception.
  - ♦ Determine what enemy should perceive.

Step 4 - Deception Story

- Information conveyed to the target that will cause him to form a desired perception.
- Develop options.
- Analyze options.

Step 5 - Deception Plan

How we plan to convey the story.

Using the deception process, the planner analyzes the situation and formulates a tentative deception objective at this time. It is important to remember that this process is in support of an actual course of action, The following discusses the five steps in the deception planning process.

Step I-Situation Analysis

Current and Projected Friendly Situation

The planner writes down the military objective the deception plan is intended to support, looks at available forces and operation plans, and lists friendly assumptions.

To facilitate data gathering, the planner or the officer in charge of the battlefield deception element should be a member of the planning staff.

Current and Projected Enemy Situation

The intelligence officer must gather and provide objective data (how forces are deployed, order of battle), subjective data (doctrine, historical precedents), and assumptions about the enemy (who the decisionmaker is, what his perceptions are, and what he expects us to do). Based on the enemy decisionmaker's perceptions, a prediction of future enemy actions. and a comparison of future friendly and enemy courses of action, a statement of the desired situation is developed.

A typical example of a desired situation statement is: "To have outnumbered friendly forces cross one of two red controlled bridges while encountering minimal enemy defenses."

In formulating the deception objective, it is critical to know the time involved in running a deception operation. If you determine that you don't have enough time, planning of this deception concept must stop. You must begin formulating an alternate deception objective.

Step 2-Deception Objective Formulation

This step is the most important element of the deception planning process. In developing the deception objective statement, it is important to understand the fundamental difference between it and a mission objective statement. A mission objective statement states what friendly forces are tasked to accomplish. A deception objective statement states the action or nonaction that the target must take to bring about the desired situation. It should be simple and concise.

An example of a deception objective statement is: "I want the defending enemy regimental commander to move his reserve forward to Hill 123 NLT H-2."

Elements

The following are elements of a deception objective statement:

- Who will perform the act (a threat commander with the power to bring about our desired situation)?
- What act is to be performed?

- When will it be performed (when is the target to act or nonact, and how long does this need to be maintained)?

- Where will it be performed (the geography of the deception)?

- Whom is the target to affect (not friendly forces)?

As the operations officer determines the possible courses of action, he passes them to the other staff officers. The intelligence officer refines the intelligence estimate in light of the courses of action and plans for support of deception operations.

Step 3-Desired Perception

In general, perceptions are based on an individual view of reality and the current situation, as well as a lifetime of experiences. One's perceptions of the world drive one's actions. However, truths consistent with one theory may also be consistent with other theories.

Desired perceptions are the view the target must hold to execute the action stated in the deception objective. A desired perception should present a threat or opportunity to the target. Desired perception statements have three elements:

- Who must hold the perception (usually the target)? In this regard, the target's view of reality or his perception is influenced by multiple sources of information.

- What is the perception about (normally a threat or an opportunity)'?

- When must the deception be held and for how long (normally driven by the deception objective)?

The following questions must be considered when evaluating desired perception choices:

- Is it believable to the target?
- Does it present an opportunity for the target?
- Does it reduce or increase the threat to the enemy (perception)?
- Can we maintain the perception for the required amount of time?
- Will other operations compromise the deception or support it?

A typical example of a deception perception is: "The enemy regimental commander must believe that when blue forces attack, they will mass and use bridge A to secure their primary objective-hill 123. He must believe this not later than 72 hours prior to commencement of blue offensive and must retain this belief until commencement of blue offensive."

Step 4-The Deception Story

The deception story is that information conveyed to the target that will cause him to form a desired perception. It is coordinated between the operations officer and the intelligence officer. Points of coordination include-

- Current blue force profile.
- Enemy's current perception of our true operation.

- Which enemy level of command will take action on deception operations.
- Personalities of enemy commanders and intelligence officers.
- Determination of the deception story for both feasibility and believability.

The operations officer (G3/S3) plans the deception tasks. With assistance from the OPSEC staff element, he must-

- Maintain and update friendly force profiles.
- Identify friendly indicators that should be considered in deception planning.
- Recommend essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).
- Recommend the deception story.

The intelligence officer (G2/S2)-

- Identifies enemy peculiarities or weaknesses that might make the enemy susceptible to a deception operation.

- Identifies the enemy's likely reaction to the deception operation.

- Recommends to the operations officer which information needs to be fed to the enemy to make him believe the deception story.

- Recommends information requirements (IR) and priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to verify whether the deception plan is working.

Step 5-Deception Plan

The deception plan will-

- Outline the methods selected for conveying the deception story to the enemy.
- Ensure all means are considered.
- Conform to normal SOPs.

The operations officer (G3/S3)-

- Decides and tasks those units that will accomplish the deception tasks.

- Develops an implementation plan to sequence the tasks.

- With assistance from the electronic warfare officer, develops electronic deception measures for the deception operation.

- Prepares the deception annex to plans and orders.

- Monitors and ensures execution of the deception plan.

- With assistance from the OPSEC staff element, develops OPSEC measures for the deception plan and the real plan.

The intelligence officer (G2/S2)-

- Recommends the means to project the story.
- In coordination with the counterintelligence analysis section and the all-source production section (ASPS), develops and maintains an enemy collection database. The database can be used to identify strengths and weaknesses in the enemy's collection capabilities. It can also be used to determine which means should be used.

- Recommends IR and PIR to check on and verify whether or not the deception story is working.

The logistics officer (G4/S4)-

- Prepares a logistic estimate for the commander analyzing logistic factors affecting the accomplishment of the overall operation and the deception operation.

- Advises the operations officer concerning the feasibility of various friendly courses of action dealing with deception operations, as well as the burden that will be placed on logistic personnel and equipment.

The personnel officer (G1/S1)-

- Advises the operations officer on the availability of personnel resources to augment a chosen deception operation.

- Provides a personnel estimate with conclusions and recommendations based on mission tasking within the force

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 5. Examination

SCOPE

This examination covers the material included in all S320B learning objectives and presented throughout the subcourse. The examination will measure how well you understand the fundamentals of echelons above division combat operations. It consists of multiple-choice (Select ONE.) and multiple-response (Select one OR MORE.) items. Exam items focus on your comprehension of tactical and operational concepts and doctrinal principles rather than on your ability to memorize definitions or look up answers. The examples you have thought about and the practical exercises you completed are similar to what you will see on the exam. This examination should take you approximately 2 hours to complete.

ADVANCE PREPARATION

1. Review your notes and the material presented in the S320B Course Book and the M/S320B Staff Planning Book. Pay particular attention to any notes you made and your practical exercise solutions. Be sure that you have to the S320B map sheets posted with overlays 4-1 and 4-2.

2. Review study assignments and requirements as necessary. The exam focuses on your comprehension and application of principles and concepts.

3. Appendix 1 to this lesson guide is read-ahead information for the examination. You *must* read appendix 1 before starting the exam. Appendix 1 advances the general and special situations forward in time and provides you with the starting point for the exam.

4. Appendix 1 provides you with enough information to set the stage for the special questions used to measure your mastery of Terminal Learning Objectives B.00 and C.00. These questions are designed to determine your ability to apply the concepts presented in your tactics instruction. Although you may be able to find answers to some exam questions in the references, the questions in part two of the exam require you to apply your knowledge in a scenario-based situation based on the corps planning practical exercise and appendix 1 to the lesson guide, lesson 5.

RESTRICTIONS

1. Possession or use of old or new CGSOC examinations and of old or new CGSOC solution-discussion booklets is prohibited.

2. Discussion of examination questions between students before or during the completion of this examination is considered collaboration and is not authorized.

3. Unauthorized assistance in conjunction with this examination is not permitted.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Lesson 5. Examination

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 5. 10th (US) Corps Situation Update as of D+10 (26 Aug 19__)

You are a plans officer for the X (US) Corps. Your shift begins at 260100A Aug 19_. and you are reviewing the significant events leading to the current situation as part of the shift change procedures for the plans cell. The corps historian provides you a copy of his narrative of the current operation

The X (US) Corps attack based on the new II Allied Army Group mission (FRAGO 4-1) began on 240430A Aug 19__(D+8). The two attacking divisions quickly overran and destroyed the remaining regiments of the 22 and 57 Divisions of the Krasnovian 2 GTA. To assist the divisions, the corps placed an aviation regiment (atk hel) OPCON to each attacking division. Both lead division commanders, known for their aggressive leadership styles, understood the corps commander's intent to quickly get forces to PL X-RAY. However, the intensive operational tempo took its toll on the lead brigades of the divisions in both personnel and equipment. The mech division's leading brigade became decisively engaged against a very determined 41 TR of the 57 TD. Although the mech division eventually destroyed these remaining regiments, it took 21 hours, which was longer than originally planned.

The corps leading brigades reached PL X-RAY at 252230A and began to occupy hasty defensive positions. They quickly encountered reconnaissance elements and advance guards of two new oncoming Krasnovian divisions. The northern division was subsequently identified as the 20 GTD of the 1 Krasnovian Front, and the southern division as the 42 TD of the 2 Krasnovian Front. These units were estimated at 90- and 88-percent combat effective, respectively. Corps deep operations, primarily fires using ATACMS and TACAIR, successfully delayed these two Krasnovian divisions for 12 to 14 hours. More important, they forced these divisions to increase the use of alternate routes, thereby disrupting their timetables. This caused a series of gaps between the regiments. For whatever reason, the 2 GTA commander committed these two divisions piecemeal, ensuring their defeat. Both the 20 GTD and 42 TD were defeated after 15 hours of continuous engagements throughout the corps sector, often between units of company or platoon size. Remnants of these Krasnovian divisions attempted to establish defensive positions along PL ARGON and a security zone midway between PL ARGON and PL X-RAY. Since some brigades of the committed X (US) Corps divisions are now 70-percent combat effective, they are unable to put additional pressure on the Krasnovian forces. However, they reported that PL X-RAY would be secured NLT 261730A Aug 19_

During the attack, the II AAG commander directed the X (US) Corps commander to establish a strong defense along the German-Polish border, organized in depth. Strategic intelligence indicated the second strategic echelon of the Krasnovian TVD was moving faster than originally thought. At 260001A, the main CP received II AAG FRAGO 4-2 over tactical facsimile.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

Copy No-of-copies
II Allied Army Group
PADERBORN (MC8529), GE
260001A Aug 19_
NZ10

FRAGMENTARY ORDER 4-2

References: No change to basic order

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy forces. The 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts have been defeated, although company-sized units and smaller continue to operate in the eastern part of II AAG sector. There are indications that the Krasnovian TVD commander is committing the second strategic echelon ahead of schedule. The 3 Krasnovian Front is expected to be committed in the north against 1st (NL) Corps as a supporting attack, with the main effort in center sector against X (US) Corps. Regimental- and battalion-sized reconnaissance elements of the 3 and 4 Krasnovian Fronts and their lead divisions are moving at night and have closed to within 100 kilometers of the German-Polish border.

b. Friendly forces. No change.

c. Attachments and detachments. 4th PzGren Div detached X (US) Corps,

2. MISSION

II AAG establishes a covering force along the German-Polish and German-Czech borders NLT 280430A Aug— and defends in sector against Krasnovian TVD forces to establish conflict termination conditions favorable to NATO.

3. EXECUTION

Intent: The purpose of this operation is to defeat the Krasnovian TVD and restore the territorial integrity of GERMANY This will be accomplished by orienting and thickening NATO defenses to the east with strong corps-controlled covering forces and a defense in depth. Corps commanders will organize reserves prepared to defeat any significant penetrations of PL X-RAY. At the conclusion of this operation, the German-Polish border must be secured and the Krasnovian TVD attack defeated with no Krasnovian formations larger than battalion size in the LANDCENT theater of operations.

a. Concept of operation. 1st (NL) Corps (supporting effort) and X (US) Corps (main effort) establish covering forces between PL X-RAY and PL ARGON and defend the German-Polish border in current sectors against first-echelon divisions of the 3 and 4 Krasnovian Fronts. II AAG and AIRCENT will attack divisions

of the second-echelon front to isolate the close fight against lead divisions. II (GE) Corps will provide a division as II AAG reserve in AA HOUND, with priority of commitment to defeat counterattacks in the X (US) Corps sector.

b. Tasks to maneuver units,

(1) 1st (NL) Corps * * *
(2) X (US) corps.
(a) Establish a covering force forward of PL X-RAY (FEBA).
(b) Establish a defense in depth.

* * * * * * *

d. Coordinating instructions.

* * * * * * *

(2) Do not commit reserves without approval of Commander, II AAG.
(3) Do not cross the German-Polish border (vic PL ARGON) with ground maneuver forces.

* * * * * * *

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

* * * * * * *

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

No change.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

APPLEBY
General

OFFICIAL:
KORN
BG, ACofS, G3

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

Based on II AAG FRAGO 4-2, the corps commander informed the chief of staff to get the G3 plans staff working on a new defensive plan for a deliberate defense along PL X-RAY while the current operations cell continues to execute the current operation. He is concerned about having troops available to provide a strong covering force along PL ARGON and, at the same time, prepare and occupy defensive positions along PL X-RAY.

The time is now 260100A AUG 19 . You are at the map when the corps commander approves the restated mission and shares the following guidance and initial intent with his staff.

Mission: On order, X (US) Corps establishes a covering force along the German-Polish border (PL ARGON) and defends in sector to defeat elements of the 4 Krasnovian Front to facilitate the defeat of the Krasnovian TVD.

Commander's guidance: "I intend to defeat the 4 Krasnovian Front's initial attack quickly and have the corps positioned to continue to defend against follow-on forces. Our first line of defense is wisely employing our deep attack systems to "reach out and touch" the Krasnovian formations before they reach the border. We must quickly organize a strong corps-controlled covering force between PL ARGON and PL X-RAY to force attacking Krasnovian divisions to deploy into their attack formations along PL ARGON. We must organize the main battle area (MBA) in depth but with at least two divisions forward as the primary means to defeat the enemy through fires and maneuver. Our reserve must be positioned with the flexibility to defeat any division-sized penetrations of PL X-RAY. After defeating these divisions, we will conduct local counterattacks to destroy remaining forces and restore initial defensive positions. Based on the intelligence reports I have read, I am willing to accept some risk on approaches along our southern flank. Our ability to rapidly defeat the 4 Krasnovian Front should force the TVD commander to cease offensive operations. At the conclusion of this operation, the German-Polish border must be secured and the 4 Krasnovian Front attack defeated with no remaining Krasnovian formations larger than company size in the X (US) Corps area of operations. On order, the corps will reestablish a strong security force along PL ARGON.

"I am concerned about collateral damage to civilian facilities in Poland. Be sure that any planned engagement areas minimize civilian casualties while attacking enemy high-payoff targets. We need a plan that will delay the first-echelon armies and divisions by 24 to 36 hours if possible. The best way to do this is to target the enemy's command and control and fire support systems. I have requested special operations forces for this operation Think about how we should employ them if we get them. Until we get permission from higher. corps deep operations are limited to the use of fire support, TACAIR, Army aviation and special operations forces. WC do not have permission to cross PL ARGON with ground maneuver forces at this time.

"Don't waste time developing an elaborate deception plan. According to the G2, many of the small units we bypassed during the last 48 hours have become long-range reconnaissance detachments for the 2 Krasnovian Front commander. It will take some time to find and eliminate them. I don't think we can fool the Krasnovians. However, we need to reinforce counterreconnaissance and security operations within the corps to protect critical areas and assets.

"Finally, I believe that the key to success for this operation is how well we delay and disrupt the enemy's preparations to attack, forcing deployment of the 4 Krasnovian Front's first-echelon divisions early, then canalizing them into a series of engagement areas from PL ARGON to PL X-RAY. At the same time, an aggressive counter-tire plan will deprive the enemy of his artillery support and unhinge his attack."

The G3 plans cell will meet in 30 minutes to discuss this operation. You review X (US) Corps OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG, several other documents, and the latest unit status reports and intelligence summary. As you gather your information you ask the G2 plans officer for the latest estimate of what forces w-ill be opposing the corps and when they will arrive at PL ARGON. As he describes the situation, you sketch out how the enemy attacked, and what might be left. You also review the timeline of the operation.



List of Significant Events and Planning Times

240430A Aug 19- (D+8)	LD time for the corps attack to PL X-RAY.
260430A Aug 19- (D+10)	Time the corps was to secure PL X-RAY. Lead brigades of the 25th and 52d Divisions arrive from 252230A to 252345A. PL X-RAY should be secured NLT 261730A.
260001A Aug 19- (D+10)	II AAG issues FRAGO 4-2 for next mission.
280430A Aug 19- (D+12)	Corps must establish defense along PL ARGON.
281230A Aug 19- (D+12) (est)	Estimated time 10th (US) COSCOM elements complete displacement and are prepared to fully support the corps operation.
071830A Sep 19- (D-+22) (est)	Estimated time elements of the 4 Krasnovian Front (second strategic echelon) may begin to arrive in corps area of operations.
5 to 15 Sep 19 (est) (D+20 to D+30) -	Second Krasnovian strategic echelon enters the battle.

As you finish reviewing the enemy situation, the corps G4 informs you that some elements of the COSCOM are still moving into their new locations. While support is adequate during this operational pause, the corps support groups will not be fully mission capable until D + 12.